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Cover Image: This narrow-angle color image of the Earth, dubbed “Pale Blue 
Dot,” is a part of the first ever “portrait” of the solar system taken by Voyager 
1. The spacecraft acquired a total of 60 frames for a mosaic of the solar system 
from a distance of more than 4 billion miles from Earth and about 32 degrees 
above the ecliptic. From Voyager’s great distance Earth is a mere point of light, 
less than the size of a picture element even in the narrow-angle camera. Earth 
was a crescent only 0.12 pixel in size. Coincidentally, Earth lies right in the 
center of one of the scattered light rays resulting from taking the image so close 
to the sun. This blown-up image of the Earth was taken through three color 
filters — violet, blue, and green — and recombined to produce the color image. 
The background features in the image are artifacts resulting from the magni 
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Since I am convinced that nobody reads editorials I will keep my re-marks brief. Putting together the 
inaugural issue of Speculations has been an unusual experience. 
It has depended on the collusion of fellow speculative types, 
the help of many anonymous reviewers, the endless patience 
of designer Thomas Gokey, and more hours than someone 
in the final year of their PhD should ever spend on a project. 
Looking over the final product I think it has all been worth it. 
This is the first journal dedicated to speculative realism and 
despite the obscurity of that term I think we all understand 
it as a handy label under which weird realists, continental 
metaphysicians, object oriented ontologists, transcendental 
realists, vitalists, and Lovecraftians can unite. This is also, 
perhaps, the first time a journal can boast that each con-
tributor is also a blogger. This is the reason why Speculations 
could only ever be an online, open-access journal. The issue 
is divided up into three sections. The first section contains 
three full-length articles as well as Peter Gratton’s series of 
interviews for his spring 2010 Speculative Realism course. The 
second section contains shorter position-style papers. The 
third section contains reviews of books relevant to specula-
tive realism and post-continental philosophy. 
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Ennis speak for themselves. As is well known the interviews 
were conducted as part of Gratton’s spring 2010 Speculative 
Realism course. In these interviews we get an insight in the 
work of thinkers just emerging onto the speculative realism 
radar (Bennett, Morton) as well as the three established ob-
ject oriented ontologists (Harman, Bryant, and Bogost). The 
interviews have been revised and, in some cases, expanded 
for this publication. 
Our first position paper, ‘Nomological Disputation: Alain 
Badiou and Graham Harman on Objects,’ comes from Nathan 
Coombs. This paper was presented at the ‘Real Objects or 
Material Subjects?’ conference at the University of Dundee, 
Scotland (March 27th-28th, 2010). In this paper Coombs 
engages in a comparative reading of Badiou and Harman by 
seeking out their points of connections and their outright 
differences. Graham Harman, in attendance on the day, gives 
his view on the paper in ‘Response to Nathan Coombs.’
Our second position paper, ‘Networkologies: A Manifesto, 
Section I,’ is an excerpt from Christopher Vitale’s forthcoming 
book Networkologies – A Manifesto: Towards A New Philosophy of 
Networks. In this manifesto Vitale aims to introduce readers to 
his wider and more ambitious project of networkology. Vitale’s 
unique text is designed to visualize his argument alongside 
the more traditional argumentative format. 
Finally we conclude the issue with three book reviews. Adrian 
Ivakhiv takes his considerable knowledge of environmen-
tal thinking and Deleuze to bear on Bernd Herzogenrath’s 
ambitious collection Deleuze/Guattari & Ecology. Next Peter 
Gratton reviews Tim Morton’s The Ecological Thought with 
an eye toward its place in the broader speculative realism 
movement and in Tim Morton’s response we discover just 
what he thinks about speculative realism and object oriented 
ontology. Finally Austin Smidt reviews Anthony Paul Smith 
and Daniel Whistler’s long-awaited After the Postsecular and 
the Postmodern: New Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion 
and argues that the collection, in particular the final section, 
will hold immense appeal for those interested in speculative 
realism. 
unsettled alliance,’ Fabio Gironi attempts to answer the big 
question: just what is speculative realism? Readers com-
ing to speculative realism for the first time are advised to 
begin here. Gironi, drawing on Latour, attempts to outline 
the assemblages involved in the emergence, dissemination, 
and proliferation of speculative realism by focusing on its 
relationship with the natural sciences—in particular cosmol-
ogy, astrophysics, and theoretical physics. Gironi touches on 
almost all the significant developments in speculative realism 
in recent years from the confusion over the name itself, its 
online presence, and its awkward position within the wider 
continental tradition. 
In ‘Thinking against Nature: Nature, Ideation, and Realism 
between Lovecraft and Schelling’ Ben Woodard traverses 
across the speculative terrain to tackle correlationism’s 
tortured relationship to the Real/nature. Woodard draws on 
(Grant’s) Schellingian Naturphilosophie to reveal the horrifying 
nontotalizable excess that belongs to the Real/nature. Contra 
correlationism it is Schelling, Woodard argues, who locates 
nature as first in order to thought and the unwillingness to 
accept thought’s genesis in the Real/nature is shown to be 
a pitfall that continues up into the process philosophies of 
contemporary continental thinking. The speculative force 
required for properly thinking the horror of the Real/nature 
necessitates a new weird realism that remains humble in the 
face of what exceeds thought.
In ‘To Exist Is To Change: A friendly disagreement with 
Graham Harman on why things happen’ Michael Austin 
critiques Graham Harman’s theory of vicarious causation for 
failing to explain why it is that causation occurs at all. Accord-
ing to Austin a full account of causation must explain both 
the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of causation. Austin finds a number 
of traditional accounts of causation deficient or, at best, only 
partially complete in fulfilling his dual criteria. In the end 
Austin comes down on the side of vitalism since it alone 
tackles both the ‘why and the how’ of causation. 
Peter Gratton’s series of interviews with Jane Bennett, Tim 
Morton, Graham Harman, Levi Bryant, Ian Bogost and Paul 
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“What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we 
call thought, that we must make it the model of the whole universe? Our 
partiality in our own favour does indeed present it on all occasions: But 
sound philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural an illusion.”1
Science-Laden Theory
Outlines of an Unsettled Alliance
Fabio Gironi
School of Oriental and African Studies
University of London
hat is speculative realism? 
Many readers of this journal 
will already have a more or less 
precise understanding of the defining traits of this movement, 
while other—perhaps more sceptical—readers will want to 
get a better grasp of what the fuss is all about. My aim in this 
paper is not so much to give a definite answer to this ques-
tion, but rather to propose a sketch of the causes, conditions 
and the network of actors which has led to the generation 
of such a diverse—and at times seemingly contradictory—
philosophical trend.
It is certainly hard, if not downright impossible, to try and 
clearly discern this network now, when still involved in its 
historical unravelling, but this is meant to be an exercise in 
self-reflection, not a historical enterprise. Only time will 
tell how long speculative realism will remain in play. In the 
meantime, we could adopt a Latourian methodology (given 
that Latour is often referred to as a fundamental influence 
on the development of at least a certain ‘splinter group’ of the 
W
Finally it is important that I thank all the people who have 
contributed to the development of Speculations. My utmost 
thanks goes to Thomas Gokey who designed the issue and all 
its formats. Without Gokey’s hard work it is quite possible that 
the journal might have launched much later than it has. I have 
learned quite a bit from reading Peter Gratton’s experiences 
as an editor and he has been immensely helpful in making 
me feel that this project was possible. Since the speculative 
realist blogosphere contains a longer list of names than any 
sane person is likely to read I want to extend a broad thanks to 
the speculative realist community. All of them have contributed 
to this journal at one point or another and without them no 
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a group name. But I pointed out to Ray that I’m not a materialist—in 
my view materialism always veers toward idealism, because it always 
reduces objects to a fairly shallow set of discernible and humanly ac-
cessible properties. No appeal to the Marxist spirit of liberation can 
redeem materialism from its miserably flawed metaphysical attitude 
(here I’m speaking only for myself; my three colleagues are to some 
extent materialists, each in his own way). Nonetheless, I told Ray I’d be 
willing to go along with “speculative materialism” if there were nothing 
better. But then Ray came up with “speculative realism” as a solution. 
It still seems like a reasonably good term to me (it’s caught on fairly 
well in the blogosphere), but it only has value as a deliberately vague 
umbrella under which all four of us can huddle. By no means should it 
be seen as Meillassoux’s new term for his own position; he’s still quite 
attached to the phrase “speculative materialism,” I believe. “Specula-
tive realism” was a compromise between four people, nothing more’.3
The term ‘speculative realism’,4 therefore, is from the start 
characterised as being a provisional alliance between at least 
two similar yet distinct positions, a term that today—three 
years later—has perhaps already exhausted its utility.5 Look-
ing at the conference announcement itself can offer some 
insight regarding the content of this term. I quote here in full: 
Contemporary ‘continental’ philosophy often prides itself on having 
overcome the age-old metaphysical battles between realism and idealism. 
Subject-object dualism, whose repudiation has turned into a conditioned 
reflex of contemporary theory, has supposedly been destroyed by the 
critique of representation and supplanted by various ways of thinking 
the fundamental correlation between thought and world.
But perhaps this anti-representational (or ‘correlationist’) consen-
sus—which exceeds philosophy proper and thrives in many domains 
of the humanities and the social sciences—hides a deeper and more 
insidious idealism. Is realism really so ‘naïve’? And is the widespread 
dismissal of representation and objectivity the radical, critical stance 
it so often claims to be?
This workshop will bring together four philosophers whose work, 
although shaped by different concerns, questions some of the basic 
tenets of a ‘continental’ orthodoxy while eschewing the reactionary 
movement) for discerning actors operating within networks 
of translations in order to outline how speculative realism—
as an assemblage—has so far gained momentum, thanks to 
its explicit and implicit alliances. My guiding thesis here is 
that the movement grew as it was fuelled by a certain neces-
sity, internal to continental philosophy as whole, to confront 
itself with the growing epistemological prestige, metaphysical 
strength and even popular appeal of the natural sciences. The 
way in which I will sketch this picture will be somewhat al-
lusive, but—as a partial justification for my lack of rigour—I 
believe that the current, protean state of the movement, (and 
indeed its questionable unity) justifies this approach.
Speculative What?
At this moment in time—an extremely fugacious one given the 
speed with which the movement is evolving—the interested 
newcomer can only discern a number of elements loosely 
bound by a set of family resemblances, mainly expressed in 
recurrent nomenclature such as ‘anti-correlationism,’ ‘objects,’ 
‘non-human,’ ‘reality’ and of course ‘speculative.’ It might be 
useful, if slightly scholastic, to go back to the first public ap-
pearance of the term ‘speculative realism,’ in the title chosen 
for a conference which effectively marked the ‘coming out’ 
of the movement, and which has already acquired the status 
of a landmark event. On the 27th of April 2007 a conference 
entitled ‘Speculative Realism’ was organized at Goldsmiths 
College in London. The participants were Ray Brassier, Iain 
Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman and Quentin Meillassoux.2 
Before examining the content of the conference, let me quote 
Harman’s disclosures about its title:
Meillassoux never chose to rename his position speculative realism, 
which is merely an umbrella term for four very different philosophi-
cal positions (Meillassoux’s, Ray’s, Iain’s, and mine). The history of the 
term “speculative realism” is fairly simple. We needed a title for the 
Goldsmiths workshop in April ‘07, and it was suggested that we simply 
adopt the term “speculative materialism” from Meillassoux’s book as 
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demand that science be taken seriously, since
[t]aking as a given the empirical fact that all philosophical attempts 
to define conditions of possibility for scientific thought have proved 
to be dismally unsuccessful, we conclude that these failures are a 
matter of principle rather than empirical circumstance, and that it 
is the presumption that philosophy is in a position to provide a tran-
scendental footing for science which must be abandoned. There is no 
first philosophy. Consequently, although relatively autonomous vis a 
vis science, philosophical ontology can neither ground nor disregard 
the ultimately physical description of the universe provided by the 
natural sciences.8
Or, take Graham Harman’s claims about the dullness of 
philosophical literature, as opposed to the speculative range 
of scientific texts:
pick up a random book of recent physics and you will find dazzling 
speculation on all manner of things: the creation and destruction of 
the universe, the existence of parallel worlds, chance and necessity, hid-
den spatial dimensions, time travel, and two-dimensional holograms 
that delude us into believing in three....We have reached a point where 
I, a passionate reader of philosophy, prefer any section in bookstores 
except philosophy...[P]hilosophy has become boring.9
And, of course, the entire argument against correlationist 
thought in Meillassoux’s After Finitude is another such example, 
which hinges upon a precise dating of ‘ancestral phenomena’ 
such as the origin of the universe, something which has only 
been possible through (relatively recent) scientific techniques. 
So, rather than a contemporary philosophy flat-lined by the 
phenomenological climate, 
it was science that made it meaningful to disagree about what there 
might have been when we did not exist, and what there might be when 
we no longer exist—just as it is science that provides us with the means 
to rationally favour one hypothesis over another concerning the nature 
of the world without us.10
prejudices of common-sense. Speculative realism is not a doctrine but 
the umbrella term for a variety of research programmes committed to 
upholding the autonomy of reality, whether in the name of transcen-
dental physicalism, object-oriented philosophy, or abstract materialism, 
against the depredations of anthropocentrism.6
Taking this text as a preliminary guideline, it seems legiti-
mate to assume that the minimum common denominator 
of any philosophy that can be christened ‘speculative realist’ 
could be summarized in a reaffirmation (which can be for-
mulated in various ways) of the autonomy of reality (which 
is implicitly a rejection of the commonplace assumptions of 
much of recent continental philosophy). What I would like 
to do here is to think about what led philosophy to this place. 
Whence this feeling regarding the necessity of returning to 
the question of independent reality? And how did speculative 
realism spread so fast if not by addressing and thematizing 
some concerns which were already present in the members 
of what now is its active community? A number of answers 
could be thought of. Here I will merely try to propose how, 
within speculative realism itself, a number of techno-scientific 
conditions have led to different approaches and problems. 
The Copernican Revolution, in Colour
 
The most obvious place to look, when seeking a condition7 for 
this new philosophy, is to direct our attention to the develop-
ments of the natural sciences in the last forty years, both in 
terms of their dramatic internal growth (the elaboration of 
successful new theories or promising new research projects) 
and external public engagement (the increased interest 
amongst broader society in the results of science). My conten-
tion is that these two elements, by shaping the last decades 
of western intellectual history, have indirectly contributed to 
the re-emergence of realism as a philosophical trope. 
Within speculative realism, a science-friendly attitude is 
explicitly associated with the rejection of a certain kind of 
(post-critical, human-centred, phenomenological—in a word—
correlationist) philosophy: see for example Ray Brassier’s 
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‘beyond the gaze of these instruments are sites more distant 
than these, some of them grimmer than the plains of Hell’.15 
So strong has the cultural impact of the hst been, that the 
20th anniversary of its commissioning (24th of April 2010) 
has been celebrated with full-page articles in several major 
newspapers around the globe, commemorating its ‘birthday’ 
with a selection of its most iconic images accompanied by 
words of praise for this overworked piece of technology. 
And the hst is only the most iconic of an army of such 
instruments: we have enjoyed the sunset on Mars thanks to 
the images from the Mars Exploration Rover, we have peered 
at the distant Earth through the rings of Saturn when receiv-
ing the images from the Cassini probe and we have observed 
the aeons-old first light of the universe thanks to the wmap 
satellite. Moreover, it is thanks to the discoveries granted 
by the data received from less iconic but equally successful 
probes, that our vocabulary has extended to include terms 
like ‘expanding universe’, ‘black hole’, ‘dark matter’, ‘dark 
energy’ and ‘exoplanets’, concepts that soon proved fertile 
new metaphors for philosophers—and speculative realists.16
It is well known how speculative realists call for a return to 
the true meaning of the Copernican Revolution, against the 
Kantian hijacking of this term. If, according to Meillassoux 
it is due to ‘a sense of desolation and abandonment which 
modern science instils in humanity’s conception of itself and 
of the cosmos’17 that we are forced to face the contingency of 
thought and therefore to rethink the priority of human ac-
cess, it appears that no cultural force has managed to present 
more powerfully to humankind as a whole the disconcerting 
vastness of the ‘great outdoors’ than the last forty years of 
physical sciences, particularly astronomy.
To substantiate this claim, I would like to take a brief histori-
cal excursus. In his Earthrise, historian Robert Poole explains 
how the famous Earthrise picture taken in 1968 by the crew 
of the Apollo 8 mission (showing the planet rising from 
the lunar horizon), and its even more popular ‘Blue Marble’ 
successor, taken in 1972 by the astronauts of the Apollo 17 
(showing the planet in its full spherical appearance) were ap-
The authority of contemporary science is fuelled by its 
achievements. The extraordinary experimental success of 
the Standard Model of particle physics and of the descrip-
tion of quantum mechanical interactions between those 
particles, the observational data confirming the Big Bang 
theory and the age of the universe, as well as the discovery 
of its accelerating expansion (not to mention more specula-
tive hypotheses/research programs such as those linked to 
the Multiverse and String Theory), are momentous results 
that have been achieved in less than half a century. Such a 
massive scientific output11—concentrated in such a relatively 
short time-span—has had an enormous cultural impact out-
side laboratories and observatories, largely thanks to the 
increased resources dedicated to public outreach from the 
scientists’ side. Whether because of their eagerness to share 
the revolutionary discoveries of their discipline, or for the 
more pragmatic realization that general public interest aids 
the acquisition of governmental and private funding; natural 
scientists have come to represent intellectuals in close contact 
with the public.
Following this increase in public engagement with science 
in the last decades we have witnessed pieces of scientific 
equipment raise, possibly for the first time,12 to the status of 
cultural icons and sources for entertainment and awe. A solid 
example of this is the Hubble Space Telescope (hst), whose 
huge impact on physical astronomy since the early 1990s is 
matched by its impact on the ‘general public’, providing us 
with an unprecedented peek into the far universe via a dazzling 
series of images of distant galaxies and nebulae making their 
way onto the front covers of hundreds of magazines. Pictures 
of these astronomical objects, immensely far in both space 
and in time, have offered us a whole new understanding and 
visual grasp of the term ‘things in themselves’.13 By opening 
up a space beyond ‘the moon, the outer planets, and the icy 
Oort Cloud with its stagnant mist of dim future comets’ the 
Space Telescope14 has allowed us to probe deeper into the 
fabric of the universe while at the same time imposing upon 
us the humbling acknowledgement of our myopia, since 
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probe, having completed, the main part of its mission in its 
first 13 years of interplanetary flight, was instructed to turn its 
camera around, and to take a picture of Earth from a distance 
of approximately 6 billion kilometres. The alive, dynamic 
planet that in the early 70s was shown in its blue marble 
glory was now, in the famous words of Carl Sagan (the man 
responsible for convincing nasa to take the picture and for 
its successive popularization),21 a ‘pale blue dot’, a handful of 
pixels on a background of black nothingness.
The Earth, which thirty years earlier had been a glorious 
  The ‘Blue Marble’ picture. Credit nasa.
propriated and diffused in popular culture by the dominant 
ideologies of the time. In a complex network linking such 
different forces as the technical constraints of the Apollo 
missions, cold-war era political interests, the amazement 
of the first astronauts seeing the planet from above, and the 
lsd-fuelled rise of 1970s hippie counterculture, the first im-
ages of planet Earth ended up as bearing an unprecedented 
meaning. In particular, Poole argues that
[t]he famous Apollo 17 ‘Blue Marble’ photograph appeared in Decem-
ber 1972, just in time to supply the environmental movement with its 
most powerful icon. It was, however, the Apollo 8 image of December 
1968 that had started it all off. Both images owed much of their instant 
power to the way they tapped into a ready-made agenda: in the case of 
the ‘Blue Marble’ it was the eco-renaissance; in the case of Earthrise 
it was ‘Spaceship Earth’. What happened over the years in between 
was that natural metaphors for the planet began to take over from 
technological ones.18
Hence ‘Blue marble’, according to Poole ‘the single most re-
produced image in human history’,19 was fruitfully assimilated 
by contemporary culture, and at the same time produced a 
feedback effect, fuelling the amazement for a living planet, and 
shaping a holistic attitude which subsequently appropriated 
the ‘Gaia’ hypothesis as a scientific proof of the life-cycles of 
the global organism that Earth was. The picture from outer 
space, even if showing the fragile beauty of Earth, effectively 
increased the intrinsic value of the planet, so that the focus 
of the environmental movement (and of the emergent New 
Age spirituality) which adopted the photograph as a graphic 
reminder of the wonders of our planet, ‘was not “wilderness” 
or “nature” but “the environment”, with humankind very 
much in the picture’,20 a humankind now seen as never before 
as the lucky inhabitants and custodians of a natural marvel, 
strikingly alive in an empty, dark, and colourless space.
Let us try to compare the ‘Blue Marble’ picture, and its ef-
fect on the cultural unconscious, with another, more recent 
picture of our planet. On the 14th February 1990, the Voyager 
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philosophy book not merely as a thought experiment, but as 
a factual truth to be philosophically appraised and exploited:
sooner or later both life and mind will have to reckon with the disin-
tegration of the ultimate horizon, when, roughly one trillion, trillion, 
trillion (101728) years from now, the accelerating expansion of the uni-
verse will have disintegrated the fabric of matter itself, terminating 
the possibility of embodiment. Every star in the universe will have 
burnt out, plunging the cosmos into a state of absolute darkness and 
leaving behind nothing but spent husks of collapsed matter. All free 
  The ‘Pale Blue Dot’ picture. The Earth is in the
centre of the superimposed circle. Credit nasa.
‘Blue Marble’ was now shown as a ‘pale blue dot’. If this picture 
did not directly slide so glamorously into the popular media 
and in popular culture it is not only because of its inferior 
intrinsic aesthetic value, but also because of the radically dif-
ferent social climate of the early 90s. And yet, I believe that 
we can fruitfully look at the ‘pale blue dot’ picture as having 
as strong a cultural significance as its predecessor. Indeed, 
where to find a better, more powerful representation of the true 
meaning of the Copernican Revolution—as we are reminded 
by Meillassoux—than in this ‘pale blue dot’ picture, sent as a 
faint electromagnetic signal by an unmanned probe, from a 
distance where no human had ever, or has since, reached? If 
humanity could previously be seen as the privileged custo-
dian of a sacred cosmic gem, it was now merely dwelling on a 
infinitesimal speck of dust, a planet whose awe-inspiring face 
was now irresolvable, irrelevant, disfigured. If the coloured 
face of the planet dominated the ‘Blue Marble’ picture, it is the 
featureless cosmic space which dominates this second picture, 
a space where the Earth, and the environment it hosts, is but 
a mere point floating across an arbitrary set of coordinates.22 
Science delivered the photographic evidence of the—at best—
provincial placement of our planet, a graphic memento that 
there is much more to the universe than our ‘world’ (both in 
the sense of a correlationally defined existential space and 
in the sense of our material planet), a picture that indeed in 
its coarse immediacy strikes a powerful blow to the ‘pathetic 
twinge of human self-esteem’.23 The philosophical trope of 
‘otherness’ itself was now to be revised: from the otherness 
of a human neighbour to that of a nonhuman, utterly alien,24 
external reality.
Eight years after the ‘pale blue dot’ picture, physical cosmol-
ogy delivered some even more stunning results: the empty, 
cosmic space, through which our planet, our solar system 
and our whole galaxy is wandering, is not only expanding 
but accelerating in its expansion.25 The discovery of this in-
creasing rate of expansion effectively sanctioned the fate of 
the universe to be one of cold dissipation, and thus created 
the possibility for a passage like the following to appear in a 
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culated the content of science among the public, the Internet 
has played a crucial role in the dissemination of speculative 
realism among the philosophical community. 
The scientific ‘community’ experienced an exponential 
enlargement when scientific work became accessible to the 
interested layperson through dedicated websites and, espe-
cially, through the new phenomenon of blogging scientists. 
Similarly, one of the most significant phenomena directly 
linked to the rise of speculative realism in the philosophical 
scene is its resilient online proliferation mainly in the form 
of blogs.30 From the academic point of view, this is nothing 
short of a revolution: blogs (many of which are run by gradu-
ate students) have taken over the role of a kind of ‘pioneering 
secondary literature’, commenting and expanding on tradi-
tional publications, virtually in real-time; a phenomenon 
which completely restructures the usual temporal structure 
of publication and feedback, as well as the very formation and 
organization of ideas.31 This phenomenon is the inevitable 
effect of the translation of philosophical production into the 
network of information that constitutes our everyday reality.32 
Thanks to blogs and bloggers, speculative realism went viral.33
It is a pleasing irony that the philosophical movement 
that focuses on the importance of nonhuman entities is—so 
far—the one that owes most to nonhuman entities for its dif-
fusion and reproduction.34 Indeed, if the cognitive revolution 
that the hyperlinked structure of the internet produced is at 
times condemned as guilty of producing a superficial way 
of thinking, increasingly unable (especially in the younger 
generations) to concentrate linearly on a single, unified object 
of thought,35 I think that we can draw a comparison between 
the flattened (and networked) informational landscape and 
the flattened (and networked) ontological plane which object 
oriented philosophy (one of the main ‘forms’ of the specula-
tive realist movement) advocates, where a possible encounter 
of the two would provide an excellent tool for thinking ‘hy-
perlinked phenomena’. While the generational gap36 between 
yesterday’s great figures of continental philosophy (Derrida, 
Deleuze, Levinas, Foucault, as well as Badiou as the last of his 
generation), and today’s speculative realists is widened by, in 
matter, whether on planetary surfaces or in interstellar space, will 
have decayed, eradicating any remnants of life based in protons and 
chemistry, and erasing every vestige of sentience—irrespective of its 
physical basis. Finally, in a state cosmologists call ‘asymptopia’, the 
stellar corpses littering the empty universe will evaporate into a brief 
hailstorm of elementary particles. Atoms themselves will cease to exist. 
Only the implacable gravitational expansion will continue, driven by 
the currently inexplicable force called ‘dark energy’, which will keep 
pushing the extinguished universe deeper and deeper into an eternal 
and unfathomable blackness.26
If, to quote this important passage once again, contempo-
rary philosophical thought needs to engage with ‘the sense 
of desolation and abandonment which modern science in-
stils in humanity’s conception of itself and of the cosmos’,27 
it is because of such scientific narrations of the fate of our 
universe, holding today such a powerful social and cognitive 
authority and offering us a ‘speculative opportunity’.28 By ex-
posing the cosmic irrelevance of humankind and its dwelling 
place and by denouncing the contingency of its existence as 
subordinate to random cosmic caprices, science has set the 
scene for the development of a new metaphysical revolution 
consisting in a new ‘blow to human narcissism, where man 
is dethroned from his position of centrality in the order of 
being and situated in his proper place as one being among 
others, no more or less important than these others’.29
Networked Techno-Capitalism
The extensive cultural impact of these scientific results has 
been magnified to a global scale thanks to another kind of 
revolution, a digital one, and its omnipresent product, the 
Internet, which opened up human experience from space to 
cyberspace. In an interesting turn of events, given the origins 
of the Net in Tim Berners-Lee’s work at cern, the Internet 
itself allowed for the message of the renewed Copernican 
Revolution to sift into public consciousness by making recent 
scientific knowledge ubiquitously available in the form of 
readily accessible digital information. And just as it has cir-
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rary philosophical thought needs to engage with ‘the sense 
of desolation and abandonment which modern science in-
stils in humanity’s conception of itself and of the cosmos’,27 
it is because of such scientific narrations of the fate of our 
universe, holding today such a powerful social and cognitive 
authority and offering us a ‘speculative opportunity’.28 By ex-
posing the cosmic irrelevance of humankind and its dwelling 
place and by denouncing the contingency of its existence as 
subordinate to random cosmic caprices, science has set the 
scene for the development of a new metaphysical revolution 
consisting in a new ‘blow to human narcissism, where man 
is dethroned from his position of centrality in the order of 
being and situated in his proper place as one being among 
others, no more or less important than these others’.29
Networked Techno-Capitalism
The extensive cultural impact of these scientific results has 
been magnified to a global scale thanks to another kind of 
revolution, a digital one, and its omnipresent product, the 
Internet, which opened up human experience from space to 
cyberspace. In an interesting turn of events, given the origins 
of the Net in Tim Berners-Lee’s work at cern, the Internet 
itself allowed for the message of the renewed Copernican 
Revolution to sift into public consciousness by making recent 
scientific knowledge ubiquitously available in the form of 
readily accessible digital information. And just as it has cir-
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world voided of both human and metaphysical comfort. This cold world 
is the world made strange, a world that has ceased to be the ‘life-world’ in 
which we are usually immersed and instead stands before us in a kind of 
lop-sided objectivity. It is a world between worlds, a disfigured world.40
On the other hand, from the object-oriented side of specula-
tive realism, Levi Bryant has described us as living in a world
pervaded by objects of all kinds....Whether we are speaking of techno-
logical objects, natural objects, commodities, events, groups, animals, 
institutions, gods, or semiotic objects our historical moment, far from 
reducing the number of existing objects as alleged by reductive mate-
rialisms, has actually experienced a promiscuous proliferation and 
multiplication of objects of all sorts. Moreover, this proliferation has 
caused massive upheaval and transformation all throughout planetary, 
human, and collective life.41
In contrasting these two passages I want to indicate how any 
contemporary attempt to reactivate realism, and indeed 
speculative realism as a philosophical view grounded on 
this desire, bears a certain intrinsic, genetic, schizophrenia. 
If on the one side it powerfully denounces the narrow view 
of the correlationist philosopher, and thus forces philosophy 
to open its field to the multiplicity of non-human objects 
which surround us, on the other it carries the burdensome 
knowledge that this flat world is an uncanny and desolate 
place, cold, glacial (in Meillassoux’s words), supremely in-
different. And this is why the speculative realist movement 
is able to accommodate both a tendency for the celebration 
of the richness of reality (well exemplified in the rhetorical 
power of the so-called ‘Latour litanies’)42 in order to found a 
new—and ontologically richer—philosophy, and a tendency to 
embrace this barrenness, towards a philosophy which pushes 
the human to recognize the nihilism of being and of meaning 
which underlies the world, as a ‘speculative opportunity’. It is 
the tension between the desolation and the richness of the Real, 
which gives rise to either a barren or a promiscuous ontology.43
To turn our philosophy away from the human-world rela-
tion can lead to a thought whose aim is to make the rest of the 
the first place, the gestalt shift produced by information and 
communication technologies, yet another force is contribut-
ing to the intellectual distancing from the past decades: the 
political status quo of the western societies.
Today’s young philosophers have to confront themselves 
with what Mark Fisher has defined ‘Capitalist Realism’, the 
general feeling of inevitability regarding the capitalist struc-
ture, the ‘widespread sense that not only is capitalism the 
only viable political and economic system, but also that it 
is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to 
it’.37 Even if aiming to find new ways to counteract it, this new 
generation has formed its intellectual commitments within 
this climate of political staleness, therefore developing a 
radically different set of expectations (and hopes) viz. social 
change and revolution. As Fisher has commented ‘we’ve now 
got a generation of young adults who have known nothing 
but global capitalism and who are accustomed to culture 
being pastiche and recapitulation’.38 If one recognizes how 
Fisher’s analysis is isomorphic with Jameson’s theorization 
of postmodernism and late capitalism, it is clearer how for 
this new generation of (blogging) philosophers to overcome 
the immobilism of capitalism means to break free from the 
logic of postmodernity and to re-theorize the world starting 
from this lack of hope—from a world where (capitalist) ide-
ology has taken an undefeatable form which is at the same 
time petrified and plastic, replacing reality with referent-less 
simulacra—in order to then move towards a retrieval of a lost 
reality-in-itself.39 It is through the technological structure of 
capitalist society itself that the new philosophical current has 
reached out to, and linked together, like-minded individuals 
eager to re-ground philosophy by theorizing from the primacy 
of reality itself. But what does this reality look like?
A Flat World or a Cold World?
Dominic Fox, reflecting on the state of ‘dystopia’ which 
characterizes contemporary western capitalist society, has 
defined our predicament as a ‘Cold World’, that 
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once we accept that the world as it is in itself is the same as the world 
for us, once we grant to mathematics the task of providing a correct 
ontology of nature, then philosophy becomes totally useless. The task 
of an ontology of nature passes to scientists and mathematicians and 
the philosopher, having written his suicide note, quietly slits his wrists 
and reclines in a warm bath.47
Whether or not this picture is accurate, we can oppose this 
possibility of philosophy’s demise latent in Meillassoux’s (viz. 
mathematics) and in Brassier’s (viz. naturalism) work with 
the object-oriented position in order to highlight radically 
different engagements with science. The ‘object-oriented’ 
philosophical project does not open up spaces for the ques-
tion of survival of philosophy to emerge since—even after 
having, with Harman, diagnosed contemporary philosophy 
as chronically boring—it can (indeed, it must) clearly state 
that the task is to claim back for philosophy all that has been 
unwittingly left to the natural sciences, a confinement which 
has had the effect of leading philosophical work into increas-
ingly sterile pastures:
[f]or several centuries, philosophy has been on the defensive against 
the natural sciences, and now occupies a point of lower social prestige 
and, surprisingly, narrower subject matter. A brief glance at history 
shows that this was not always the case. To resume the offensive, we 
need only reverse the long-standing trends of renouncing all specula-
tion on objects and volunteering for curfew in an ever-tinier ghetto of 
solely human realities: language, texts, political power.48
Hence for Harman, and for object-oriented philosophy as a 
whole, the task of philosophy is to discuss the real in its entirety, 
avoiding both its confinement in the epistemic confines of 
the ‘human ghetto’ and its subordination to an all-powerful, 
reductionist, science. In a recent comment on the work of 
Ray Brassier, Harman made this very clear: ‘I [don’t] think 
Brassier is an anti-correlationist anymore: he’s gradually 
become pro-science at the expense of pro-real (the two are 
not the same)’.49 And indeed Brassier recently recognized a 
divergence between his work and that of other speculative 
world ‘more real’ (as in the Latourian motto), but can also focus 
our attention on a world which exhibits coldness to human 
concerns, thus confronting thought with its own facticity. It 
is only a matter of where one desires to place the emphasis: 
the same world of independent Dinges-an-sich can be seen as 
flat just as it can be seen as glacial. Indeed, this ultimately is 
the underlying reason for the gradual emancipation of object-
oriented ontology from other positions in the speculative 
realist spectrum, since the former—following Latour—aims 
at achieving ontological flatness (or a ‘democracy of objects’) 
by denying the quintessentially modern split between nature 
and culture and pursuing real interactions between real 
objects everywhere, against any attempt to place (reduce)44 
reality squarely on the side of nature. As Bryant clearly puts 
it, Object-Oriented Ontology ‘agrees that the natural sciences 
investigate realities, but it vehemently rejects the thesis that 
these realities are exhaustive of being or reality’.45
In a way, both the object-oriented side and the ‘natural-
reductionist’ sides agree that we have never been modern. 
However, if the former group wants to uphold this position, 
and recognize the project of modernity as an (ontological) 
impossibility, the latter wants to return to the true (and 
philosophically misunderstood) meaning of the Copernican 
Revolution, and to engender an ‘Enlightenment redux’ (in the 
somewhat sarcastic phrasing of Alberto Toscano) by seeking 
being—and the conditions for our thought of being—in the 
inanimate matter scientifically described by mathematical 
formalisms.46 The two positions correspond to two different 
philosophical approaches to the natural sciences. 
Indeed, having carved this line of differentiation across the 
speculative realist spectrum, certain ‘varieties’ of speculative 
realism can become objects of the question: what is left for 
philosophy to do? In the case of Meillassoux, Simon Critchley, 
in his review of After Finitude, answered this question in a 
rather dramatic way, claiming that 
[i]t would seem that philosophy is not just Locke’s under labourer to 
science, but a handmaiden to mathematics. That is, once the obfusca-
tions and errors of correlationism have been philosophically refuted, 
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systematic, large-scale philosophical reaction to the ‘irruption 
of the Real’ into our familiar correlationist world, as expe-
rienced by our society in the wake of the enormous amount 
of observational data gathered from the unfathomably large 
scales of the universe and the unfathomably small scales of 
particle physics. Secondly, and at more conscious level, the 
return to realism is a reaction against the identification of 
philosophy with ‘world-denying constructivism’ which we 
inherited from the troublesome years of the Science Wars.51 
At the heart of the last two decades of continental philosophy 
lurks a desire to disentangle (and here more than anywhere 
else the work of Badiou was seminal for speculative realism) 
the concepts of ‘truth’, ‘reality’ and ‘universality’ from the 
post-metaphysical ban. A reality in-itself which, having been 
banned by transcendental idealism and phenomenology 
first, became the open target of postmodernism and social 
constructivism later. This historical dismissal allowed science 
to claim privilege on ‘reality’; and yet, what for science was 
a reason for pride, to ‘postmodern’ eyes was a weak spot, so 
that science could be identified as the naïve—and yet power-
ful—cousin to be debunked. This is the attitude against which 
speculative realism is an internal philosophical reaction.52 
In claiming this, I am not reducing speculative realism to a 
paltry, utilitarian acknowledgement that science cannot be 
beaten and that it should therefore be befriended, for indeed 
it is in the choice of position viz. science that the speculative 
realists part ways. 
The point is that speculative realism builds on the expe-
rience of the failure of postmodernity—as the most recent 
form of continental philosophy as a whole—to reckon with 
science, and presents itself as taking place, from the begin-
ning, in a scientifico-philosophical hybrid field. Indeed, 
we can trace back the developments of these ideas to 2005, 
when the journal Angelaki published two special issues on 
‘Continental Philosophy and the Sciences’, itself a follow up 
of a homonymous three-day international conference held 
at the University of Warwick in late 2003, four years before 
the speculative realism movement took shape. In the edito-
realists on the grounds of scientific naturalism
Harman espouses a Latour-inspired ‘democracy of objects’ according 
to which science has no particular cognitive authority when it comes 
to discriminating between reality and appearance and no object can 
be said to be any more or less real than any other....I think it safe to say 
that neither Grant, nor Harman, nor Meillassoux shares my commit-
ment to epistemological naturalism, or my sympathy for ‘reductionist’ 
accounts of subjective experience.50
Thus, from a common interest in the (real) world delivered 
to us by science, at least two diverging ontologies emerge: one 
aimed at contrasting subjective or linguistic idealism and 
any kind of correlationism by granting being to every object 
that ‘resists’ or that ‘makes a difference’, and considering it 
in its withdrawn being irreducible to its relationships with 
other such objects, regardless of the presence of humans; the 
other aimed at reducing ‘folk’, epiphenomenal conceptions 
of ‘beings’, founded on human experience (arguably includ-
ing the category of ‘objects’ itself) to their naturalistically 
(or mathematically) expressible fundamental features. The 
saying ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ describes well 
the link between the speculative realists. However, to identify 
this enemy precisely seems to be a tricky business, since we 
cannot always safely invoke the spectre of correlationism, 
and since different ontological commitments will make it 
hard to delineate what or who counts as an enemy. If it would 
perhaps be more correct to say that the common enemy is 
any form of antirealism, it is precisely in the evaluation of what 
counts as ‘real’ that speculative realists diverge. 
If, in light of this fragmented picture, the umbrella term 
‘speculative realism’ seems increasingly inappropriate, if not 
downright misleading, I still believe that it is possible to identify 
a general trait shared by all the participants in this movement. 
This collective interest in a return to realism—surprising, if 
we consider the recent history of continental philosophy, and 
the unflattering nickname of ‘naïve’ attached to it—can be 
explained in at least two ways. First, it can be interpreted as a 
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will to respond to the call for renovation and hybridization 
of continental philosophy, that we can perhaps identify the 
most common trait of speculative realism: the will to specu-
late, to bring philosophy forth, to use the scientific challenge 
as a springboard for stretching philosophy out of its self-
generated borders.
Third Cultures
It can be argued, then, that the speculative realist tendency 
to—adventurously—move philosophy away from any analysis 
about reality which keeps, as a constitutive moment, the pres-
ence of human consciousness/thought and bring it closer to 
the ambitions reserved to scientific thought, can be seen as 
a first philosophical attempt to fill the gap between the ‘two 
cultures’, and to create a ‘third culture’, in the meaning that C.P 
Snow gave to the expression,56 indicating a group of ‘literary 
intellectuals’ getting in touch with scientists and discussing 
common ground about human-independent realities.
This ‘third culture’ however, would be somewhat late. By and 
large, the most powerful after-effect of the Science Wars for 
the scientific establishment has been the increased emancipa-
tion (or alienation) of natural scientists from ‘the humanities’. 
Indeed, one of the most interesting intellectual creations of 
the last decades is a self-proclaimed ‘third culture’ whose 
development benefited from the massive commercial growth 
of the Internet in the 90s, and whose main expression is to be 
found in the Edge website (www.edge.org), the central hub for a 
large group of academics and entrepreneurs to publish short 
essays and debate with each other over scientific and cultural 
topics.57 The Edge Foundation Inc., as we read on the website
was established in 1988 as an outgrowth of a group known as The 
Reality Club. Its informal membership includes of some of the most 
interesting minds in the world. The mandate of Edge Foundation is 
to promote inquiry into and discussion of intellectual, philosophical, 
artistic, and literary issues, as well as to work for the intellectual and 
social achievement of society.
rial introduction of the first issue, Damien Veal observed that 
[w]hile Continental philosophers typically pride themselves upon 
their in-depth knowledge of the history of philosophy, and while it 
is obviously true that they often have a far richer and more nuanced 
understanding of the canonical texts of that history than their analytic 
colleagues, this history is only very rarely read against the backdrop of 
parallel developments in the history of the sciences.53
The effort was therefore to finally recognize the magnitude of 
this oversight, and to commence, for historians of philosophy, 
a careful rediscovery of the links between great figures of 
continental philosophy and the scientific world around them 
and, for the philosophers, a humbling process of reconcilia-
tion with contemporary science.54 Miguel De Bestegui well 
summarized the spirit of this enterprise by claiming that 
[p]hilosophy need not shy away from the challenge of science. Yet the 
challenge in question is a challenge for philosophy. It is a challenge that, 
if taken up, makes philosophy richer. If philosophy becomes richer in 
the process, it is by remaining philosophy. It remains philosophy to the 
extent that it develops an eye for what science itself cannot see, and 
yet discloses. It is concerned to disclose the being of the phenomena 
science analyses. The question regarding the being of phenomena is 
the question of philosophy. It cannot be developed, however, indepen-
dently of science. Philosophy is neither within nor outside science. It 
traverses it. The questions it puts to science are not the questions of 
science. Yet the answers to such questions can be found only in and 
through a certain mode of engagement with science.55
Here we witness a careful statement (interestingly imbued 
with a Heideggerian flavor) of the necessity for continental 
philosophy to confront the ‘challenge’ of science, but a chal-
lenge that will allow it to remain philosophy through the de-
marcation of a transversal field of competence, within which 
to rightfully reclaim its theoretical ambitions, and return as 
an informed player in the contemporary intellectual scene. 
It is by looking at this shared feeling, by highlighting this 
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scientists have broken out of their arcane labs, dismissed the 
white coats and come out to the public,60 which recognizes 
them today as the ‘new cool’,61 while philosophy, especially 
in its continental form, is seen as, by and large, useless and 
intellectually irrelevant.62
Is it a coincidence that today we find philosophers who 
reject entire sections of their own tradition, who (if in a 
provocative spirit) label most recent philosophical publica-
tions as ‘boring’ and that more generally, and substantially 
echoing Brockman’s claims, find the most interesting philo-
sophical questions in scientific publications? Does it mean 
that philosophers covet the same epistemic status of their 
techno-scientific colleagues, and that they feel deprived of 
their role as public intellectuals? 
If such a claim might be hasty, what I think is indeed the 
case is that continental philosophy, as a whole, is going 
through an internal restructuring of beliefs, surely caused 
by the changes in our society but also deeply motivated by 
a necessity to propose an intellectual production capable of 
doing constructive work and of having an—albeit indirect—
practical purchase on social change.63 Paraphrasing Marx (and 
doing an injustice to Derrida)64 one could say that continental 
philosophy now feels that it is not enough to deconstruct the 
world, but that it is time to find a metaphysical ground from 
which it can be changed.65 And the main channel through 
which this renovation of philosophy is to be accomplished 
is that of a new regard towards the natural sciences (just as 
Badiou’s philosophy grounds the possibility of change into a 
mathematical ontology) those sciences that recent (critical) 
continental philosophy has so far dismissed because of—in 
Harman’s words—‘fear and arrogance’, ultimately caused by 
an ‘inferiority complex’.66
Now, if my argument so far is at all sound, the ultimate 
challenge for speculative realism—and for philosophy as a 
whole if this movement is indeed a product of our zeitgeist—
is to clarify its position in the historical dialectic between 
the natural sciences and whatever responds to the name 
of ‘humanities’ (a term which clearly appears increasingly 
However, the ‘third culture’ embodied by the participants of 
the Reality Club discussions is significantly different from 
the one envisioned by Snow. Let me quote from the founder 
and mastermind (and ‘cultural impresario’) behind Edge 
John Brockman’s, description of this ‘third culture’ that Edge 
aims to embody:
The third culture consists of those scientists and other thinkers in the 
empirical world who, through their work and expository writing, are 
taking the place of the traditional intellectual in rendering visible 
the deeper meanings of our lives, redefining who and what we are.  
Although I borrow Snow’s phrase, it does not describe the third culture 
he predicted. Literary intellectuals are not communicating with sci-
entists. Scientists are communicating directly with the general public 
•
The wide appeal of the third-culture thinkers is not due solely to their 
writing ability; what traditionally has been called “science” has today 
become “public culture.” 
•
Throughout history, intellectual life has been marked by the fact that 
only a small number of people have done the serious thinking for 
everybody else. What we are witnessing is a passing of the torch from 
one group of thinkers, the traditional literary intellectuals, to a new 
group, the intellectuals of the emerging third culture. 58
Edge has indeed managed to include in the list of its regular 
discussants an outstanding number of scientists, a group 
which includes all ‘those that matter’ (including several Nobel 
prize-winner) in diverse disciplines such as physics, biology, 
economics, mathematics, psychology, informatics and neuro-
science, and a number of science-friendly philosophers from 
the analytic side.59 What this means is that through initiatives 
like the Edge lobby, the scientific establishment aims to com-
pletely bypass ‘literary intellectuals’ (a category which I take 
to include continental philosophy): these ‘traditional’ figures 
are painted as out of fashion, quaint, unable to communicate 
with the public, since public culture now means ‘science’. So 
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complex’ of philosophy which can take the shape of either an 
arrogant dismissal of science, or of a shamed and somewhat 
craven apology for philosophy’s blindness to the power of 
science. Consequently, it seems that the question that ‘specu-
lative realism’ attempts (variously) to give an answer to (and 
in fact to be an answer to) is: how could a ‘new philosophy’ 
be built through a mature relationship of mutual exchange 
with the natural sciences? If the development of these ques-
tions has to remain the task for a work to come (or already 
in progress), what I hope to have delineated in this paper, are 
some forces in the cultural network in which a new genera-
tion of philosophers—whether we call it a post-continental 
or a speculative realist one—is today developing. For the time 
being, my suggestions here are merely speculative.
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unfit to designate any philosophy that aims at overcoming 
the strictures of anthropocentric thought).67 A new kind of 
philosophy—whose label as ‘Post-Continental’ is defended 
by John Mullarkey68—is attempting to place itself at that 
juncture between the radical science-skeptical positions that 
preceded it on one side and the danger of losing any identity 
and being swallowed whole by empirical science on the other. 
Recently, Harman has claimed—refuting some accusations 
of being dismissive of science—that 
I am not ‘dismissive’ of science. I love science. What I am dismissive 
of is the notion that science can replace metaphysics. Or rather, I think 
that the metaphysics lying at the basis of the science worship found 
in some sectors of speculative realism is a weak one and needs to be, 
if not ‘eliminated,’ then at least severely improved. 69
while, on the other hand, Brassier is happy to embrace even 
the worst (in the contemporary philosophical climate) of the 
characterizations, that of scientism:
since the indiscriminate use of this epithet as a blanket term of abuse 
by irate phenomenologists convicts of ‘scientism’ anyone who takes it 
on scientific trust that the earth orbits around the sun, or who believes 
in the existence of black holes and neutrinos—notwithstanding all 
phenomenological evidence to the contrary—, then we can only plead 
guilty as charged. If ‘scientism’ simply means refusing the obligatory 
subordination of empirical science to transcendental philosophy, then 
by our lights, there is not nearly enough ‘scientism’ in contemporary 
philosophy.70
If, in the face of this possible fusion of the ‘two cultures’, 
philosophy is to conserve an identity this means retaining 
the possibility of doing metaphysics, while rejecting its post-
critical vetoing. This will be possible by either constructively 
challenging its scientific reduction or by rejecting the ‘phe-
nomenological stalemate’ by injecting more scientism into 
philosophical speculation. Along the way we must carefully 
avoid the opposite reactions to the common ‘inferiority 
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37 Fisher, Capitalist Realism, 2.
38 http://www.readysteadybook.com/Article.aspx?page=markfisher/.
39 Interestingly, note that particle physicist Brian Cox—an overnight ce-
lebrity in the UK thanks to his leading role in the hugely popular series 
of documentaries on recent astronomical discoveries titled ‘Wonders of 
the Solar System’, produced by the BBC—diagnosed the surge in popular-
ity that science is today enjoying to the diffused cynicism induced by the 
financial crisis that hit the markets in 2008. According to Cox ‘[a] growing 
appreciation of the low-cost, high-value and good old-fashioned solidity 
of science and engineering relative to finance has, I believe, contributed 
to the new public mood....There is a desire to look at the tangible world of 
science and engineering to replace the perceived smoke and mirrors of the 
financial sector’ (from The Guardian G2, 13th April 2010, p.6). At the same 
time, Cox often employs his fame to publicly stress the necessity for the UK 
government to increase the budget for science. The message seems thus to 
be: ‘the banks will steal your money while Science will give you hard—and 
yet wonderful—facts’, and the impressive investments in producing high-
value series of science-related documentaries (as the BBC successor of 
Cox’s ‘Wonders’: ‘A Story of Science’) can indeed be seen as contributing by 
displaying science’s prowess. Without questioning the importance of both 
the scientific and the ‘humanistic’ endeavors, is bitterly ironic to note how, 
in an economic system where the flow of money seems to decide the fate of 
our universities (and our philosophy departments, as recent events testify 
of) the resources that scientists can mobilize to amaze and thus modify the 
public opinion (and vicariously, the policy makers) dwarf the less rutilant 
pledges for intellectual independence by humanities scholars, quaintly 
unable to produce prime-time TV contents. 
40 Dominic Fox, Cold Wold: The Aesthetics of Dejection and the Politics of Militant 
Dysphoria. (Hants: Zer0 Books, 2009), 4.
41 http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/01/12/object-oriented-ontology-
a-manifesto-part-i/.
42 A term coined by Ian Bogost, a ‘Latour litany’ is any list of objects/actors 
in the world, aimed at giving an expressionist sample of the lavishness of 
the non-human world. For example ‘washing machines, snowstorms, blades 
of grass, satellites, gods, pots, paintings, laws, horseshoes and engines’ is 
a Latour litany. Bogost has created a litany generator, or ‘Latour litanizer’, 
availlable at: http://www.bogost.com/blog/latour_litanizer.shtml.
43 Incidentally, the charge of ignoring the richness of reality has been indeed 
moved against Meillassoux. Arun Saldanha argues that Meillassoux’s collapse 
of the distinction between formal and theoretical ends up excluding entire 
sections of reality, and consequently entire branches of science. According to 
Saldanha what remains under-analyzed in Meillassoux’s work is the ‘intrin-
sic excess of reality over the mathematizable and the representable’ so that 
his ‘desire for mathematics...risks abstracting from the physical and social 
reality, becoming quasi-esoteric at worst, reductive at best’. For Saldanha 
‘[i]f Meillassoux’s speculative system is to become a realist ontology of and 
speculative-realism/.
35 See, for example, Nicholas Carr’s well known 2008 article on The Atlan-
tic, titled ‘Is Google Making Us Stupid?’ (Carr 2008) and his forthcoming 
The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains (2010). Note that, his 
positive assessment of the philosophy blogosphere notwithstanding, Mark 
Fisher can also be said to be in substantial agreement with Carr. He claims 
that the younger generations are ‘too wired to concentrate’ and that ‘[t]
he consequence of being hooked into the entertainment matrix is twitchy, 
agitated interpassivity, an inability to concentrate or focus.’ Mark Fisher, 
Capitalist Realism: is there no alternative? (Hants: Zer0 Books, 2009), 24. More 
than that, Fisher goes as far as suggesting that the structure of the internet 
essentially recalls the plasticity of capitalism, since capitalist reality ‘is akin 
to the multiplicity of options available on a digital document, where no de-
cision is final, revisions are always possible, and any previous moment can 
be recalled at any time’ (Ibid., 54). I think that this parallel casts an unfairly 
gloomy light on an instrument—the Internet—whose open structure has 
certainly engendered new phenomena of digital indifferent individualism, 
but that presents no inherent connivance with capitalist rule, and that in fact 
can as well be one of the main mediators for the formation of that new kind 
of political agency that Fisher calls for.
36 Taking the ‘Speculative Realism Aggregator’ (an aggregator website that 
links to a series of blogs related to speculative realism) as a crude sample, 
we can already see that eleven of the twenty-two blogs listed there are run 
by under-30s (mainly graduate students on their way to a PhD) while the 
rest (mainly teaching academics) are mostly under-45s (unfortunately, and 
probably significantly, there isn’t a single female blogger in the list). There 
are some ironies: for all its shifting of focus away from the human, this 
development of SR has given people access to the philosophers involved 
in it as human beings which is equally unprecedented, unless one was to 
be a close disciple of a given philosopher. Moreover, as always is the case 
with Internet phenomena, one must remember that its virtual space often 
tends to replicate real-life hierarchies: for all its—undoubted—democra-
tization of philosophical discussion, and its lending its space to the voice 
of whomever wants to join in, the ‘marketplace of attention’ (I borrow the 
term from James G. Webster [see Webster in Turow and Tsui, The Hyperlinked 
Society: Questioning Connections in the Digital Age. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2008.]) that is the philosophical blogosphere—where the 
commodity exchanged is the attention (and time) of the reader—remains 
largely dominated by the individuals who are ‘someone’ in the real world, 
so that the amount of traffic (via hyperlinks) to a particular blog cannot be 
claimed to be completely independent from who the blog owner is. Having 
said this, I am too much of an Internet enthusiast to give a negative balance 
to the online speculative realist scene. These observations notwithstanding, 
the blogging philosophical environment presents undeniable advantages: it 
grants an unprecedented level of grassroots diffusion of ideas, it allows for 
a rapid and productive dialogue, and it forces the user to encounter direct 
exposure to possible critiques.
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“merely crude matter”, where it has absolutely no effects whatsoever, where 
it’s left to one side of the philosophical and the political problem, seems 
to me a recipe for disaster’ (Grant in Brassier et al. “Speculative Realism”, 
Collapse Vol. III 2007: 360).
64 Which is justified by the all too hasty identification of all the postmodern 
evils with the term ‘deconstruction’. For a defense of the logic of deconstruc-
tion against accusations of being incapable of proposing political change 
see Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life. (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2009), and for a powerfully argued differentiation 
between Derrida’s deconstruction and the more constructivist-relativist 
trends of ‘postmodernism’ see Christopher Norris, Against Relativism: Phi-
losophy of Science, Deconstruction and Critical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.
65 Something should be noted however: the contemporary popularity and 
social impact of scientists is largely due to the union of the communica-
tive skills of the most pedagogically gifted among them with the intrinsic 
authority that the ‘scientist’ holds in our society. Concretely, this means 
that public lectures by prominent scientists are often crowded, and that 
books of so-called ‘popular science’ are—by comparison with the average 
philosophy book— bestsellers. This is the case because scientific discoveries 
and theories are a description of the world, which, once purged from their 
more heavy-going mathematical formalism, can be turned into more or 
less compelling narratives. Could, or should, philosophers aim at a similar 
‘double register’ of publications both technical and popular?
66 Graham Harman, “Some Preconditions of Universal Philosophical Dia-
logue.” Dialogue and Universalism Vol. 1-2, 2005: 168. Harman explains that 
‘The fear arises from the great success and public prestige of the natural 
sciences, whose results begin to pile up so rapidly that no non-specialist 
can easily keep abreast of the latest developments in more than a few of 
its dozens of branches....For this reason, it [philosophy] wants to set up 
a special transcendental preserve that science cannot touch, a zone that 
science cannot possibly outflank since it will contain the very “conditions 
of possibility” to which any science will have to be indebted. Science will 
be exposed as a set of propositions to be appraised by a theory of reference, 
or as a Machiavellian power game to be unmasked’ while ‘the arrogance of 
critical philosophy is visible as well. After renouncing all claims to speak 
of the world as it really is, philosophy begins to convince itself that its tiny 
ghetto is better than the stars and seas and deserts beyond. The philosophy 
of language dismisses the findings of brain chemists; Heidegger makes the 
sweeping claim that science does not think. Philosophy has nothing more 
to tell us about rocks, insects, comets, or souls? “Well, good riddance anyway. 
It’s your own fault for expecting us to discuss these things. How naive you 
must be.” Specific philosophical questions about objects are thrown to the 
empirical sciences with an attitude of smug affrontery, just as sour milk is 
left behind the garage for the stray cats to lick up. Fear and arrogance: these 
are the two classic symptoms of an inferiority complex’ (Ibid.).
67 For a clinical and unforgiving diagnosis of the ‘sordid state’ of the hu-
manities, whose only possible cure is identified in a radical reshaping of 
bringing exciting new discoveries from the scientific community to the 
general public.
61 Allow me to make a popular culture reference (which would perhaps shroud 
me in a aura of Žižekian depth): one of the most successful tv shows of the 
last years, both in the us (where it is produced) and in several other countries, 
is The Big Bang Theory. As any sit-com, the show has been carefully packaged 
to appeal to a large audience, and yet the main characters are young theoreti-
cal physicists or astronomers, in other words geeks. Of course, their geeky 
antics are often used as comic material, mainly due to their lack of social 
skills, but I think the show demonstrates an interesting ideological twist by 
presenting people in the ‘hard sciences’ as being prominent enough in our 
society to appeal at a large enough audience. The point is trivial, but can 
we imagine a tv show named The Principle of Non-Contradiction, portraying 
a group of philosophy PhD’s struggling with their daily life while drawing 
propositional logic on their whiteboards or discussing the ontological sta-
tus of their table? I’m sure it would be hilarious to other philosophers, but 
what about the general public? And yet, is the general public more skilled 
in string theory than it is in process metaphysics? No, but it doesn’t matter. 
The casual viewer doesn’t ‘get’ the physics jokes more than it would ‘get’ a 
philosophy one (which is why the character of the scientifically ignorant 
—and, unsurprisingly, female—Penny was introduced, to allow the non-geeky 
public to identify with someone). The show works because first, there is a 
relatively higher percentage of academics (and graduate students) in the 
hard sciences than there is in almost any other discipline, second, because 
‘geeks’ are not perceived as social outcasts anymore but a socially recognized 
group, and because, third (and mainly) the non-scientist, non-geek general 
public now accepts that somehow ‘science is cool’. As I’ve already observed, 
this phenomenon is not limited to the us, as the success of bbc’s recent 
Wonders of the Solar System, and of its unashamedly ‘geeky’ protagonist, Brian 
Cox can testify.
62 And, as more cynical commenter would observe, less profitable. Why 
would you invite, for example, an old French communist philosopher to 
your dinners when you can have at your table representatives of the higher 
echelons of Google, or Bill Gates? Why would a University want to maintain 
low-return ‘literary’ departments when they could make twice the profit out 
of the research output of an industrial engineering or a chemistry program?
63 Going back to the problem of materialism, classical materialism of the 
Marxist variety could be defined as a position essentially concerned with 
practical social change, where the matter is physical, social labor. I should 
emphasize that—for object-oriented philosophers who are not ready to 
make any concession to correlationist thought—the practical dimension 
of human social action might be derived from a non-correlationist ontology, 
but not be employed as a criterion for the construction of such an ontology, 
in order to avoid any privilege given to the human-world relation over the 
real object-real object relation. This problem has also been considered by 
Grant, who claimed that ‘[t]he idea that it is possible to invoke a diminished 
realm, as it were, for matter and to condemn whatever does not fulfill the 
economic, teleological purposes of certain types of agents to a sphere of 
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ontological commitments, accompanied by an opening to the richness of 
the outside world, see Ian Bogost’s blogpost at http://www.bogost.com/blog/
the_turtlenecked_hairshirt.shtml. The issue of the rejection of the human 
sphere has been a delicate one for speculative realists, having to defend 
themselves from accusations of anti-humanism. As a very rough guideline, 
I think it would be fair to claim that the ‘object-oriented’ faction, operating 
under the guideline of a ontological ‘democracy’ (to place all objects, including 
the human, on the same ontological plane) would not subscribe to Brassier’s 
(Alien Theory, 17) eliminativist position when he claims that ‘[t]here is no 
longer any room within the bounds of a univocally physical natural order 
for a special category of putatively trans-natural being called ‘human’. 
68 Mullarkey writes that ‘I defend this title of “Post-Continental Philosophy”...
as both an assessment of the current transitional state in which Continental 
thought finds itself with respect to its theorization of science in particular 
and immanence in general, as well as a caution against thinking that such 
an engagement could ever be a straightforward evolution’. John Mullarkey, 
Post-Continental Philosophy: an Outline. (London: Continuum, 2006), 3.
69 http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2010/02/18/ennis-responds/. If an 
open-minded scientist would agree with Harman here, as Roberto Trotta does 
when he claims that ‘[t]he only thing we can ask from science is to provide 
us with a logically-consistent, experimentally observable, predictive narra-
tive of a model of reality. Apart from that, in order to interpret this model, to 
delimit its applicability, we need another form of discourse which necessarily 
sits beyond the methodology of science itself’ (Roberto Trotta, “Dark Mat-
ter: Probing the Archefossil.” Collapse Vol.II, 2007: 168-169), there are other 
philosophers (not necessarily related to the speculative realist movement, 
but still involved in the construction of a realism) who are more skeptical 
of a metaphysics not grounded on science. See for example James Ladyman, 
proponent of a ‘ontic structural realism’, who argues that ‘we should stop 
trying to interpret physics in terms of objects of some kind...I have...recently 
come to despair of many philosophers’ inability to escape the manifest im-
age, and their insistence on trying to do metaphysics with categories like 
object and intrinsic property, which I now see as anthropomorphic in the 
sense that they are a projection of how the everyday world of our experi-
ence is conceptualized. Scientists, especially physicists, have moved on, and 
it is time that metaphysicians tried and at least catch up’ (James Ladyman, 
“Who’s afraid of Scientism?” Collapse Vol. V, 2009: 140). Tellingly, at a recent 
conference at the University of Dundee, Scotland, Graham Harman deliv-
ered a paper directly attacking James Ladyman’s (and Don Ross’s) variety of 
scientific realism, coherently with his general rejection of any reductionist 
or eliminativist project since ‘the problem with eliminativism, as I see it, 
is that it makes no room for real objects at all. Its sense of realism is that of 
scientific realism, and so there isn’t any concept of withdrawal there. The 
difference between real and unreal, for that position, is simply a difference 
between real images and scientific images. It is a mere metaphysics of images, 
despite all its huffing and puffing about reality’ (http://doctorzamalek2.
wordpress.com/2010/05/09/shaviro-with-an-interesting-twist/).
70 Brassier Alien Theory, 22. 
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Introduction
“Science, already oppressive with its shockig revelations, will perhaps be the 
ultimate exterminator of our human species—if separate species we be—for 
its reserve of unguessed horrors could never be borne by mortal brains if 
loosed upon the world.”1 
“The ideal world presses mightily towards the light, but is still held back by 
the fact that nature has withdrawn as a mystery.”2
espite statements regarding 
its fundamental impossibility, the 
philosophy of nature stands as a 
metaphysical project not only worth pursuing, but also criti-
cal to complete. This task requires not only the resurrection 
of a dead philosophical form but an issuing of a challenge to 
post-modern restrictions on thought and existence (which 
have remained couched in the comfortable obscurity of the 
term materialism) in order to interrogate the foreclosure 
of the relation between being and thinking resulting from 
the widespread limitations of correlationism, the dominant 
mode of contemporary philosophy. As defined by Quentin 
Meillassoux: “Correlationism consists in disqualifying the 
claim that it is possible to consider the realms of subjectivity 
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“Science, already oppressive with its shockig revelations, will perhaps be the 
ultimate exterminator of our human species—if separate species we be—for 
its reserve of unguessed horrors could never be borne by mortal brains if 
loosed upon the world.”1 
“The ideal world presses mightily towards the light, but is still held back by 
the fact that nature has withdrawn as a mystery.”2
espite statements regarding 
its fundamental impossibility, the 
philosophy of nature stands as a 
metaphysical project not only worth pursuing, but also criti-
cal to complete. This task requires not only the resurrection 
of a dead philosophical form but an issuing of a challenge to 
post-modern restrictions on thought and existence (which 
have remained couched in the comfortable obscurity of the 
term materialism) in order to interrogate the foreclosure 
of the relation between being and thinking resulting from 
the widespread limitations of correlationism, the dominant 
mode of contemporary philosophy. As defined by Quentin 
Meillassoux: “Correlationism consists in disqualifying the 
claim that it is possible to consider the realms of subjectivity 
and objectivity independently of one another.”3 In addition, 
D
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Meillassoux names two variants of correlationism: weak 
correlationism and strong correlationism. Weak correlation-
ism, which Kant is the flag-bearer of, asserts the above claim 
while maintaining the conceivability of the in-itself whereas 
strong correlationism dismisses any possibility of thinking 
the in-itself.4
Furthermore, a scientifically coherent or non-correlationist 
philosophy of nature is necessary if any virulent formulation 
of realism is to be attempted. Such a realism will be, following 
the work of Meillassoux, Ray Brassier, Graham Harman and 
Iain Hamilton Grant, a Speculative Realism. Speculation, again 
following Meillassoux, “releases us from the phenomenal 
stability of empirical constants by elevating us to the purely 
intelligible chaos that underlies every aspect of it.”5 Against 
the domineering shadow of Kant’s Copernican revolution, 
our attempt at a new philosophy of nature must first discover 
the means to suture the breach between speculative (meta)
physics and empirical knowledge, thereby forming a ground 
for a useful (i.e. non-naive) realism.
Towards this end this text will investigate the impossibility 
of (a) being or (a) thinking against nature in the fiction of H.P. 
Lovecraft and how a certain phenomenological queasiness 
results from a radically productive nature which overrides 
any form of transcendental subjectivity capable of either 
exception from, or organizing of, nature itself. The very con-
cept of being with or against nature confronts the problem 
of how epistemology is rooted, or not rooted, in a realist 
conception of nature and how realism is possible given a 
complex or non-totalizable nature. Our guiding thought is 
the following: Nature is simultaneously a productivity and 
an infinite set of products responsible for the generation and 
capability of human subjects and their capacity to think. As 
a master of the weird, Lovecraft was deeply aware with the 
horrifying possibilities of science as well as its limitations 
in the face of nature. Lovecraft’s investigation of the tenuous 
linkage between thought, humanity, and the cosmos makes his 
work ideal for exploring ideation and its relation to nature. 
Furthermore, while the weirdness of Lovecraft’s stories would 
seem to irreparably damage any attempt at realism, it in fact 
expands the Real as Lovecraft’s creations draw not from the 
supernatural but from an unbound nature.
The weirdness of Lovecraft’s fiction, along with the weird 
realism of the Speculative Realists (paying particular attention 
to Ray Brassier’s Transcendental Naturalism and Iain Grant’s 
Schellingian Nature Philosophy), provides fertile ground for a 
resuscitation of a philosophy of nature against the apparently 
unassailable entanglement of being and thinking (under the 
name correlationism) which functions as an obstruction to 
all forms of realism.
The Moss-Thickened Lantern or Natural-Ideation
“Self-consciousness is the lamp of the whole system of knowledge, but it casts 
its light ahead only, not behind.”6
“What lies beyond the light and the luminous world is for our senses a sealed 
book and buried in eternal darkness.”7
Taken together, these statements of Schelling suggest not only 
the limitation of thought in grasping the non-ideal but also 
affirm the a priori status of nature in itself.8 As Iain Grant 
notes, Schelling’s insistence on the non-priority of think-
ing goes beyond asserting the a priori status of nature when 
Schelling reconfigures Kant’s dyad of a priori and a posterori 
replacing it with prius and posterius.9 The prius, or firstness, 
designates an originary indeterminateness of being,10 which 
immediately appears as a kind of nothing11 in that it is pure 
process, or sheer potency. The nothingness, or nothingness as 
such, is provisional being, a being which is only to the point 
that it is alien to reason, that it is nature, always moving in 
its being.12 This is why the “concept of becoming is the only 
one appropriate to the nature of things.”13 Here Schelling’s 
nature is differentiated from that of Kant’s noumenon as 
it is not merely an unknowable entity but a productivity; 
Schelling’s nature is known to thought as the activity that 
precedes thought, an activity which is undetermined and 
unconstrained.14 Furthermore, Schelling dictates that “If it is 
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the task of transcendental philosophy to subordinate the real 
to the ideal, it is on the other hand, the task of the philosophy 
of nature to explain the ideal by the real”15
Schelling’s suggestions that there is something prior to 
thought (nature as prius) as well as that the transcendental (the 
most extensive capacity of thought) is thoroughly naturalized 
as part of nature, have serious ramifications for the trajectory 
of philosophy and the possibility of realism, however weird. 
If thinking and the subject-that-thinks are both direct results 
of the Real (and not a transcendental formalization such as 
Kant’s concept of apperception), then the genesis of thought 
must be explained through natural means.
Schelling’s rejection of metaphysical formalism and his 
unbinding of nature make it possible to draw from a force 
previously foreclosed as such under Kant’s humanistic con-
ceptions: the force of time. As Grant writes in his Philosophies 
of Nature after Schelling, Schelling’s naturalism is implicitly 
time-based.16 Time, as non-perceptual but deeply natural, is 
always non-existent to us and therefore is everything that it 
can be (and the ground for everything that could be) while 
appearing as nothing, in a kind of pure-isness “by its nature 
or the Idea” of time-in-itself.17 Temporality, as neither an inert 
formality, nor as purely that which is perceived, is then for-
mulated as a time that propels itself, that functions outside 
of the purview of human thought and human subjectivity. 
The germ of this metaphysical scaffolding lies in the churn-
ing abyss of Schelling’s deep past. This deep past indexes the 
ancestral time of Meillassoux, a conception of time which 
points to processes and beings prior to the emergence of 
thought. Deep time thereby denies the subsumption of deeply 
temporal objects and ideas under the work of transcendental 
synthesis, of being merely correlates of thought. Where cor-
relationist time is always the time of the thinking self, for 
Schelling the time of the self is time conceived as an activity 
and not an epistemological or ontological limit.18 Immedi-
ately Lovecraft’s specter is raised as space-time becomes the 
generator, and place of generation, for objects obscured by 
the long stretch of time.
Schelling’s concept of the past, which is always a process 
and never a being, and the Vorweltiche (the time before the 
world) in particular hold the possibility of the emergence of 
thought.19 “Everything is only the work of time, and it is only 
through time that each thing receives its particular character 
and meaning.”20 The apparently endless stretch of the past 
(as well as the future) draws thinking beyond its tie to sensa-
tion since, against Kant, time is not merely a formalism and 
sensation is not the authority of epistemology. However, such 
speculation can lead to a certain uneasiness. As Benjamin 
Noys writes in his piece “Horror Temporis” “the horror of 
time is not simply the trifling matter of individual human 
finitude, but rather the recognition of scientific statements 
concerning cosmic timescales that precede and exceed the 
existence of humanity and life itself.”21 Noys’ subjects are 
both Meillassoux’s ancestral time and Lovecraft’s treatments 
of temporality as being beyond the ability of the mind to 
comprehend opening the possibility of an eventual genera-
tion of the horrible.
As Noys and others have recognized, few authors better 
grasp the dangerousness of both speculation and knowledge 
in relation not only to the investigator’s own sanity, but in 
learning too much about the horridness of nature’s capa-
bilities. If the lamp of Schelling’s knowledge points forward, 
Lovecraft’s thinking suggests a turning backwards of the light 
(perhaps fruitlessly) towards eternal darkness. As Lovecraft 
writes in the beginning of “The Call of Cthulhu”:
The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the 
human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of 
ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant 
that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direc-
tion, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together 
of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, 
and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from 
the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety 
of a new dark age.22
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Lovecraft’s statement addresses the limitation of our knowledge 
(“island of ignorance”) as well as the danger of its speculative 
possibility (“terrifying vistas” and “deadly light”) as they are 
anchored in the uncertain real (“black seas” and our “fright-
ful position therein”). One dimension that Lovecraft does 
not mention, the dimension which his own work embodies, 
is that of thought’s capacity to produce the horrible and not 
merely to reveal it. The question is whether the worst aspects 
of thought, of the deepest power of speculation, is a capacity 
divorced from nature, simultaneously questioning the onto-
logical and epistemological status of the unnatural. Lovecraft 
writes in “The Unnameable”: “[...] if the psychic emanations 
of human creatures be grotesque distortions, what coher-
ent representation could express or portray so gibbous and 
infamous a nebulousity as the spectre of a malign, chaotic 
perversion, itself a morbid blasphemy against Nature?”23
This tale which begins with two characters “speculating 
about the unnameable,”24 exemplifies the central mode of 
Lovecraft’s story telling: the rampancy of the imagination 
and that which falls out of standard psychic classification.25 
The problem is the productive capacity of imagination and 
philosophy26 in relation to the self-determined discernibility 
of the thinker.
As Grant clarifies, the self can only grasp the productivity 
of its thinking by making itself into an object, although this 
process of objectifying the self is itself an ongoing process.27 
Being, or objectivity, is only the temporary limit of produc-
tivity.28 The unnameable then is the inability of thinking 
to capture being in the flow of its production, not because, 
in the Kantian sense, that being as such is inaccessible on-
tologically as noumenon, but because being is in motion 
and thought—as an interruption of this trajectory—is just 
as transient. The question of an approaching horror raises 
questions of the limits of being (‘what is that’ in terms of 
its being) and the limits of epistemology (‘what is that’ in 
terms of the perceiver’s thinking). In other words horror, and 
speculative or weird horror in particular, functions based 
on a simultaneous obfuscation and separation of essence 
(what it is) and existence (that it is). Furthermore, following 
Schelling, thatness functions at the level of experience which 
already assumes being proper or isness, whereas cognition 
thinks whatness, or the concept.29 Reason comprehends what 
is real; experience grasps reality.30 
To return to Noys’ indexing of Meillassoux, Lovecraft’s 
thinking summons the specter of what he calls “creative 
death,” not a closing of oneself to the chaos and madness of 
the world as it is and as it appears, but to open oneself to such 
madness. As Meillassoux writes: “the living being is not the 
emergence of pain in an atrophied world, but on the contrary 
the diminution of madness in a becoming-terror of chaos.”31 
Yet while Meillassoux’s chaos would seem to buttress Schelling’s 
own dynamic nature, it undercuts such dynamism with its 
thinkability (if only on the logical level) following from the 
anthropocentric articulation of the virtual. That is, if nature 
must remain always-already thinkable, and if time is a virtual 
function from the outside, it would seem that if Meillassoux 
was to formulate the horrible it would be a supernatural horror, 
one which must emerge ex nihilo. This distinction between 
the natural and the unnatural is important to the work of 
Lovecraft. As his principal biographer S.T. Joshi points out, 
Lovecraft’s creations are not supernatural but supernormal; 
they are unlikely but not impossible,32 thereby refusing to 
make the being-of-horror outside of the realm of nature. If 
horror can be taken to be knowing too much, then true horror 
is knowing too much about the unknowable, that amorphous 
strange being, or Lovecraft’s unnameable. Horror becomes the 
simultaneously generative capability of thought and nature, 
with thought being nature’s attempt to become an object to 
itself.33 Schelling’s concept of nature traces the apparently 
transcendental advent of thought while maintaining the fact 
that thought is only ever a part of nature. Given this natural 
annihilation of subject and object, what becomes of the use 
of thought and the possibility of realism?
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Weird Realism or Immanence Unbound
“The real seems to flee before me, or to vanish under my hand, and matter, 
the first foundation of all experience, becomes the most insubstantial thing 
we know.”34
“[...]philosophy’s sole mission is weird realism. Philosophy must be realist 
because its mandate is to unlock the structure of the world itself; it must be 
weird because reality is weird”35
If the real as a horrible unknown, as x is not an object, or 
a series of objects following from Schelling’s productive 
nature which critical philosophy (following from Kant and 
his humanist concept of nature) tried to define as only ut-
terly unknowable or as a construct of the senses, or following 
Meillassoux purely correlationist, then what is realism? To 
determine a form of realism that acknowledges the unknow-
ability of the real, of the real as x, then one must determine 
the relation of the terms what and is, or the relation of epis-
temology and being. Ray Brassier, one of the Speculative 
Realists mentioned in the introduction, is pursuing exactly 
such a project of re-interrogating this relation, a relation 
which, as we have seen, is central to Lovecraft’s work. Para-
mount in beginning a discussion of Brassier’s work and the 
issue of realism is his formulation of the Real which follows 
from the work of Francois Laruelle’s usage of the term. For 
Laruelle, the Real exists as the “zero point of being,” as a kind 
of indeterminate force of matter; that which is given without 
givenness, without a giver or receiver, and is, ultimately, a 
being-nothing.36 The materialized nothing (which is not to 
be codified as metaphysical substance or as being as such) is 
that which makes up the non-formalized core of the object. 
The contours of the object are discerned by the known object 
via determination-in-the-last-instance.37 One can immediately 
see a connection to Schelling’s nature a no-thing, as nothing 
which is in fact the most crucial thing, that of pure process.
The object is a particle of non-being which is snipped 
from the Real yet still tied to it by thought, which carries 
that “which is unobjectifiable in the object, the Real.”38 The 
being of the object—its emergence as a transcendentalized 
glob of the Real—closes off immanence itself (the nothing-
ness from which it was ejected), leaving thought as a kind 
of transcendental afterbirth moving alongside the Real.39 
It is in this sense that Brassier invokes the term identity, in 
that the object is identity without unity and duality without 
distinction.”40 This duality without distinction is a unilateral 
duality of objectifying transcendence and unobjectifiable im-
manence. This unilateralization functions as a non-dialectal 
logic of negation.41 This duality is realized as a unity on the 
side of objectifying transcendence, but is not operative on 
the side of unobjectifiable immanence; it is on the side of 
thought but not on the side of the Real.42 
Schelling’s concept of the unconditioned eternal—which 
he discusses in the Ages of the World as an x which is a and 
b which is also a One, one and the same x, but this x is also 
a and b—is distinctly Laruellian.43 The what-is, the relation 
of thinking and being, is existence since being is isness but 
never is for us.44 Is-ness as existing is only ever thought, as 
unity is something that exists only for the thinking being,45 
where mind is merely invisible nature, nature in us.46 My as-
sertion here is that Schelling’s One as divided yet formalizable 
as One is conceptually compatible with Brassier’s Laurellian 
formulation; Lauruelle’s One being simply the name for non-
conceptual immanence.47 For both Brassier and Schelling, 
all thinking is an attempt to think the x but this x is not an 
object that can be fully caught by thought since the x itself 
is a process and this process, this x-ing, produces our very 
capacity for thought.48 It is this capacity that is too quickly 
forgotten in the strains of process philosophy. The issue is 
that a world of processes must be guaranteed and stitched 
together by thought, by the thinking subject. The question 
is not what is x but how do we divide the being of x and the 
thinking of x? As both Brassier and Schelling point out, x 
is usually pre-thought or set up as always-already thinkable. 
This is particularly evident in the philosophical category 
of immanence. For Brassier it is Gilles Deleuze who is the 
central offender in this sense, where for Schelling it is Hegel 
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following in the footsteps of Kant.
Deleuze’s plane of immanence, as a return to nature as an 
extended and ideal entity, partially embodies the productiv-
ity of nature but still assumes the priority of thought. This 
ontological valorization of thought is present in Manuel 
DeLanda’s Deleuzian articulation of the ontological sta-
tus of the laws of nature49 following from a definition of 
the Deleuzian virtual as a space of spaces allowing for the 
emergence of progressive difference.50 DeLanda argues that 
the Laws of nature are merely enhanced probabilities, that 
they are regularities made into axioms.51 Following Nancy 
Cartwright, DeLanda argues that laws unify and organize 
but otherwise lie.52 Whereas DeLanda is criticizing the be-
ing (or isness) of the laws of nature suggesting that they rely 
on a fundamental narrow mode of thinking (of whatness), 
he does not then question that particular mode of binding 
existence (of the relation of what and is) but instead, by us-
ing Deleuze’s virtuality, ontologizes thinking. In other words, 
instead of instantiating the difficulty of the x for thought, 
DeLanda’s process philosophy, and process philosophies in 
general, assert that it is only a question of finding the right 
construction of x by thought and not thought’s relation to 
x that is the issue. Lovecraft’s own view of nature’s laws was 
that while they are only fictions, they have a grasp on the 
reality of the universe at the expense of free will, with the 
real becoming a challenge to thought.53
Schelling’s attack on Hegel follows from similar concerns 
regarding the relation of thought and being. Schelling asserts 
that Hegel overestimates the ability of reason, that Hegel 
steamrolls the category of experience, or thatness, in order 
to assure the primary role of reason. For Schelling, Hegel’s 
insistence on the primacy of reason, or being-as-concept, 
makes existence (or experience) merely a metaphysical ne-
cessity. As Meillassoux writes: “for Hegel, the fact that nature 
only partially corresponds to the Hegelian concept of nature 
is the mark of the former’s necessary defectiveness—a de-
fectiveness through which the absolute must pass in order 
to be absolute.”54
Schelling’s absolute functions in an ostensibly reverse way, 
in that nature’s aborted attempt at realizing the absolute results 
in individuation.55 For Hegel, reason grasps the absolute as 
a whole and therefore all contingency is contained within 
thought; for Schelling contingency is a question of experience 
on the one hand and the darkness of the absolute on the other. 
The epistemological in relation to the real, remains given the 
real’s non-totalizability as well as its obscurity. As Schelling 
knew, the task of a philosophy of nature is to determine the 
use of its fictions for observation and not its ability to provide 
a more effective purchase on the Real.56 Process philosophy, 
to be a coherent formulation, can not solidify thinking as the 
origin of process or even make possible an understanding of 
process in totality. In correlationism not only does thought 
supersede nature, but thought constructs nature/the Real. The 
difference between correlationism and realism, to return to 
Lovecraft, can be discerned in the common phrase of horror 
tales which we have already introduced: ‘what is that?’ The 
phrase is knowing (what), being (is), and the particular (that) 
which binds them together. For materialism (or correlation-
ism) what-is (as existence) consumes thinking and being under 
the process of construction, which originates in the virtual 
or other ontologized mode of thinking. Following Laruelle, 
Brassier names this mode transcendental synthesis, which 
is the genetic code for correlationism.57
Following from transcendental synthesis thinking is con-
structive because immanence is co-imbricated with thinking 
and not, as Brassier argues, closed off by it. By tying imma-
nence to thinking, the “what is” is always what-is (existence). 
In properly correlationist terms, existence must have always 
been since existence is where being is thinkable and where 
thought is.That which is unnameable or unthinkable is only 
designated as such because thought hasn’t yet arrived there. 
Correlationism names the eventual extinction of the horrible 
while realism admits the horrible’s infinity: where Deleuze 
is concerned with the production of concepts, Schelling is 
concerned with a concept’s ability to grasp the productivity 
of nature, of the weirdness of the Real. As Brassier outlines in 
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“Objects and Concepts” this concept production of Deleuze 
comes from his univocal being and its immanence although 
“the celebrated ‘immanence’ of Deleuzean univocity is won 
at the cost of a pre-Critical fusion of thinking, meaning, and 
being.”58 If the concept is from a place of thought, then, as 
Brassier points out, all difference in correlationist philoso-
phy remains internal to the concept.59 In other words, all 
difference must be thinkable and purely representational 
difference. The core of realism lies in the difference between 
model and reality which, as the philosopher-physicist Bernard 
d’Espagnat points out, is not addressed in most scientific 
articles, where a ground of intelligibility is often assumed60 
even though that ground may be itself always out of reach.61 
This of course does not negate the possibility of naturalism 
but confronts it with the problem of the ground of grounds, 
with the possibility that our knowledge does not exhaust the 
reality of the thing.
Against Nature/Against Materiality
“The succession of our ideas arises in us, and indeed a necessary succession; 
and this self-made succession, first brought forth in consciousness, is called 
the course of Nature.”62
“Concepts are mere silhouettes of reality.”63
If we are to guarantee the horrifying capacity of nature, we 
require a concept that is not determined in advance as well 
as a concept of nature that, like the classical conception, is 
cosmological and not merely terrestrial or even phenomenal. 
If nature is the possibility and non-possibility of is-ness itself 
then nothing can be against nature: the “beginning of Nature 
is everywhere and nowhere.”64 To name something as against 
nature, or unnatural, suggests the limitation of the concept 
of nature on the one hand and the valorization of thought 
on the other. In Lovecraft’s stories, the experience of horror 
resulting from what could be seen as unfathomable or un-
natural could be viewed as against nature in the proximate 
sense, in that the abomination is only beyond nature as it 
is understood locally.65 Furthermore, as we have seen, the 
extension of thinking does not work towards taking in the 
whole of the universe but instead unveils the foundationally 
groundlessness of the cosmos.66 But if nature becomes a realm 
of anything goes—if nothing is impossible in nature—then 
doesn’t nature and the non-natural become meaningless? 
Does our conceptualization of nature merely become a less 
thinkable version of Meillassoux’s chaos? It is the experience 
of horror which points to the existence of divisions in nature; 
of the existence of objects (if only on the phenomenal level), 
and of thinking objects in particular; and to interior and exte-
riors in nature, of bounds. That is, even if nature is primarily 
a play of forces it does not deny the existence of materiality. 
Materiality is the evidence of the forces of nature and their 
progressiveness. As Schelling writes in Clara: “What a quiet 
sorrow lies in so many flowers, the morning dew, and in the 
evening’s fading colors. In only few of her appearances does 
nature emerge as terrible, and then always temporarily.”67
Compare to a passage in Lovecraft’s “The Call of Cthuhlu”: 
“I have looked up all the universe has to hold of horror, and 
even the skies of spring and the flowers of summer must 
ever afterward be poison to me [...] Loathsomeness waits and 
dream in the deep, and decay spreads over the tottering cit-
ies of men.”68 In this sense, materiality appears to be against 
nature in that it, along with the thinking subject, resists the 
decomposition of nature. However, as discussed further in 
Clara, the destructive and progressive forces in nature can be 
assumed to be one and the same, that is, the forces which allow 
for the construction of the “towering cities of men” are not 
ontologically different from those forces which reduce them 
to ruin. In his “Supernatural Horror in Literature” Lovecraft 
engages these forces partially betraying the title of his piece 
when he writes: “A certain atmosphere of breathless and un-
explainable dread of outer, unknown forces must be present; 
and there must be a hint, expressed with a seriousness and 
portentousness becoming its subject, of that most terrible 
conception of the human brain—a malign and particular 
suspension of defeat of those fixed laws of Nature which 
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the course of Nature.”62
“Concepts are mere silhouettes of reality.”63
If we are to guarantee the horrifying capacity of nature, we 
require a concept that is not determined in advance as well 
as a concept of nature that, like the classical conception, is 
cosmological and not merely terrestrial or even phenomenal. 
If nature is the possibility and non-possibility of is-ness itself 
then nothing can be against nature: the “beginning of Nature 
is everywhere and nowhere.”64 To name something as against 
nature, or unnatural, suggests the limitation of the concept 
of nature on the one hand and the valorization of thought 
on the other. In Lovecraft’s stories, the experience of horror 
resulting from what could be seen as unfathomable or un-
natural could be viewed as against nature in the proximate 
sense, in that the abomination is only beyond nature as it 
is understood locally.65 Furthermore, as we have seen, the 
extension of thinking does not work towards taking in the 
whole of the universe but instead unveils the foundationally 
groundlessness of the cosmos.66 But if nature becomes a realm 
of anything goes—if nothing is impossible in nature—then 
doesn’t nature and the non-natural become meaningless? 
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of the existence of objects (if only on the phenomenal level), 
and of thinking objects in particular; and to interior and exte-
riors in nature, of bounds. That is, even if nature is primarily 
a play of forces it does not deny the existence of materiality. 
Materiality is the evidence of the forces of nature and their 
progressiveness. As Schelling writes in Clara: “What a quiet 
sorrow lies in so many flowers, the morning dew, and in the 
evening’s fading colors. In only few of her appearances does 
nature emerge as terrible, and then always temporarily.”67
Compare to a passage in Lovecraft’s “The Call of Cthuhlu”: 
“I have looked up all the universe has to hold of horror, and 
even the skies of spring and the flowers of summer must 
ever afterward be poison to me [...] Loathsomeness waits and 
dream in the deep, and decay spreads over the tottering cit-
ies of men.”68 In this sense, materiality appears to be against 
nature in that it, along with the thinking subject, resists the 
decomposition of nature. However, as discussed further in 
Clara, the destructive and progressive forces in nature can be 
assumed to be one and the same, that is, the forces which allow 
for the construction of the “towering cities of men” are not 
ontologically different from those forces which reduce them 
to ruin. In his “Supernatural Horror in Literature” Lovecraft 
engages these forces partially betraying the title of his piece 
when he writes: “A certain atmosphere of breathless and un-
explainable dread of outer, unknown forces must be present; 
and there must be a hint, expressed with a seriousness and 
portentousness becoming its subject, of that most terrible 
conception of the human brain—a malign and particular 
suspension of defeat of those fixed laws of Nature which 
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are our only safeguard against the assaults of chaos and the 
daemons of unplumbed space.”69
In this sense, Lovecraft’s fiction operates in the frayed edges 
of the objects (the laws) constructed by human thought and 
those objects’ purported distance from nature. Following 
Brassier, this formal object, which also carries that “which is 
unobjectifiable in the object, the Real,” does not determine 
the Real but builds off of it.70 Hence, every “physical impos-
sibility is relative, i.e., valid only in relation to certain forces 
or causes in Nature, unless of course we take refuge in occult 
qualities.”71
If correlationism demands the fundamental impossibility 
of both realism and a philosophy of nature given their tie to a 
determinable real, then the dominant mode of contemporary 
philosophy is occult in its obscurantist formulation of the real 
and its valorization of a thinking possible of fully determin-
ing it. While Meillassoux discusses the religiousization of 
reason, in that all connections to the absolute (nature in our 
case) have become a question of belief and not reason,72 he 
maintains however, that logic remains the privileged way of 
accessing the absolute while simultaneously attacking strong 
correlationism for hypostatizing one term over another, nam-
ing Schelling’s Nature as one such term.73
While Meillassoux names the problem of correlationism 
his solution, as Alberto Toscano puts it, is a revival of neo-
Hegelianism in its appeal to a virtuality of the mind, of think-
ing, not all together different from Deleuze’s prioritization of 
thinking. Meillassoux’s metaphysical formulation of nature 
as a storm of hyper-chaos74 appears similar to DeLanda’s de-
scription of the virtual as a space of spaces; where the former 
assures pre-thinkability, the latter assures that logical rule 
remains immune to the breach of hyper-chaos. As Meillas-
soux writes “chaos can do anything except the unthinkable.”75
As Lovecraft knew well, thought acts as only a brief suspen-
sion in the flow of nature (while still a part of it) and the hor-
rible functions as one of the strongest reminders of thought’s 
limit. And while “men of broader intellect know that there 
is no sharp distinction betwixt the real and the unreal”76 the 
challenge of the real should not be neglected because of our 
discomfort with a fundamental limit to thinking the real, to 
thinking nature. A Lovecraftian-Schellingian realism is one 
that arrests the flow of the object (in-the-last-instance) while 
aware of the fact that this object is only an identity, a work of 
the horribly speculative mind, but a work that uses the ma-
terial of the Real, of the actual generative work of nature, to 
construct it. Realism becomes an open formalism that instead 
of vouchsafing our sanity and our ontological and existential 
importance apropos a veiled nature, points to objects, that 
are in existence or sensible only due to formalization. This 
object in both Lovecraft and Schelling is that of an indefinite 
swirling; the object is the minimalistic representation of the 
temporary inhibition of the annihilating forces of nature in 
itself, appearing as a void, or as a whirlpool. The voidic object 
works as the formation of a border amidst the play of forces, 
thereby separating interior from exterior, form from matter, 
life from the inorganic, and the real from the unreal. The 
unnatural is only a temporary occurrence and never gains 
ontological status; the voidic object is the formal quality of 
the unnatural, of that which represents our epistemological 
limits in the face of a nature of pure process.
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The title of this essay comes from a quote in Bergson’s Cre-ative Evolution with the full 
quote being: “…for a conscious being, to exist is to change, 
to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself 
endlessly. Should the same be said of existence in general?”1 
This could be taken as something of a micro-manifesto for 
contemporary (neo-) vitalist metaphysics and we will return 
to this idea of change as continual (re)creation, but this isn’t 
an essay on Bergson. It is, rather, an essay on contemporary 
metaphysics and the issues (or non-issues in some cases) 
of causality and change. Graham Harman has done much 
to revive causality as a real metaphysical problem through 
his own model of localized occasionalism known as vicari-
ous causation. Something remains fundamentally lacking in 
Harman’s form of causality though, namely why change occurs 
at all. In this essay I will explicate Harman’s vicarious causa-
tion before moving on to several potential responses to the 
question of why change happens. Essentially, Harman is so 
focused on the “how” of change in the face of correlationists, 
empiricists, naturalists and relationists that he has entirely 
ignored the more fundamental question of why anything 
happens at all. This essay will also serve then as a survey of 
contemporary causality. 
To Exist Is to Change
A Friendly Disagreement With Graham 
Harman On Why Things Happen
Michael Austin
Memorial University of Newfoundland
We will begin by outlining briefly the basics of Harman’s 
object-oriented philosophy, why it necessitates a return to 
the problem of causality—including Harman’s history of the 
problem of causality in Modern philosophy—before we ap-
proach vicarious causality as his solution. This will be followed 
by an overview of possible models of causality (occasional-
ism, empiricism, correlationism, naturalism/materialism, 
relationism and vitalism) with both their causal mechanisms 
(the “how”) and their causal reasons (the “why”) examined. It 
will be shown that besides the mechanical “how” of causality 
provided by Harman, object-oriented philosophy requires 
a reason for causality. The essay will conclude by seriously 
considering the question of why things happen at all.
Objects and Cause
Prior to Kant causality was a serious issue. The concept of 
change is certainly one of the breakthroughs of Aristotle, and 
his four causes (formal, material, efficient and final) will guide 
us through the historical terrain necessary to understand 
the larger issues of cause and change into the contemporary 
era. The fact that causality was at one point an issue at all 
should tell us something already about the contemporary 
philosophical climate. The question of how two substances 
can interact, let alone when they are different in kind, was 
a real issue for most of the history of philosophy and has 
only recently become a “non-issue” that is discussed as a 
purely historical problem. The seriousness of the problem of 
interaction among substances reached what could perhaps 
be seen as its apex in the work of the Islamic occasionalists. 
They maintained that God is the necessary mediator between 
things since finite entities have no causal power but serve as 
the occasions for Divine activity. God is thereby the first and 
only cause in the cosmos. This tradition of causal mediation 
is then carried on in the modern rationalists. Descartes has 
no qualms about allowing direct causation in the realm of res 
extensa but has difficulty explaining how mind and matter 
can ever interact, ultimately relying on the power of God to 
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will be shown that besides the mechanical “how” of causality 
provided by Harman, object-oriented philosophy requires 
a reason for causality. The essay will conclude by seriously 
considering the question of why things happen at all.
Objects and Cause
Prior to Kant causality was a serious issue. The concept of 
change is certainly one of the breakthroughs of Aristotle, and 
his four causes (formal, material, efficient and final) will guide 
us through the historical terrain necessary to understand 
the larger issues of cause and change into the contemporary 
era. The fact that causality was at one point an issue at all 
should tell us something already about the contemporary 
philosophical climate. The question of how two substances 
can interact, let alone when they are different in kind, was 
a real issue for most of the history of philosophy and has 
only recently become a “non-issue” that is discussed as a 
purely historical problem. The seriousness of the problem of 
interaction among substances reached what could perhaps 
be seen as its apex in the work of the Islamic occasionalists. 
They maintained that God is the necessary mediator between 
things since finite entities have no causal power but serve as 
the occasions for Divine activity. God is thereby the first and 
only cause in the cosmos. This tradition of causal mediation 
is then carried on in the modern rationalists. Descartes has 
no qualms about allowing direct causation in the realm of res 
extensa but has difficulty explaining how mind and matter 
can ever interact, ultimately relying on the power of God to 
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connect unlike substances. Forms of causal mediation are 
prevalent in Spinoza (with modes unable to interact except 
through the power of the one substance itself) and Leibniz 
(with a form of monadal auto-affection whereby the interior 
play of one monad affects all others as a form of “spooky 
action at a distance” à la quantum entanglement2). Modern 
occasionalism is perhaps best known though through the 
thought of Malebranche who claimed, as the theologians of 
Basra did before him, that God is responsible for all change 
in the universe. Unlike Descartes who limits this principle to 
the interaction of mind and matter, Malebranche maintained 
that God’s mediation was necessary for any and all interaction.
In opposition to this “occasionalist” tradition3 we have 
what we could call, for lack of a better term, the empiricist 
tradition. This group, which includes Locke and Hume but 
will also count Kant as a member, argues essentially the 
inverse of the position held by the occasionalists; while the 
occasionalists hold God to be the necessary mediator in 
all causality, the empiricists hold this position to be naïve 
and groundless. Instead, they hold that it is only the human 
mind (or habit in the case of Hume) that acts as the neces-
sary mediator for causality. It is the human being that takes 
the place of the occasionalist God. This is no real solution to 
the problem of how two substances come to interact though. 
While it is acceptable to openly laugh at the occasionalist for 
relying on theology to ground the world, it is somehow also 
perfectly acceptable to side with the empiricists and claim 
that placing causality within the mind solves the problem. 
Just because Hume or Kant claim causality is a function of 
the mind (whether necessary or not) the question of how 
change is possible or ultimately how anything happens at 
all is not answered, but passed over.
Harman’s proposed solution to the problem of causality 
begins by asking why only one entity (or type of entity) is able 
to mediate between two substances. In either of the above-
mentioned cases, which encompass the majority of thinkers 
who maintain causality as some sort of problem,4 one being, 
be it God or the human, is able to allow for causality at all. 
Instead, says Harman, we should look for a model that works 
whether or not the human being is involved and one which 
allows us to explain the mechanics of causality in the first 
place rather than shrouding it in mystery. But before we go 
in to the details of vicarious causation, we should understand 
why it is necessary to have a model of indirect causality at all.
Indirect Causation
Objects do not touch directly, at least, not real objects. Based 
on Heidegger’s tool-analysis, Harman maintains that objects 
withdraw from one another and interact only with caricatures 
of each other or what are called sensual objects, which are 
essentially equivalent to Husserl’s intentional objects. In Sec-
tion 15 of Being and Time, Heidegger will distinguish between 
ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, and, for a short time, talks 
about things. According to Harman, it is in this revealing text 
that we learn the truth of the interaction between objects. 
Heidegger will say that
[The] less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize 
hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it 
become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it 
is—as equipment…If we look at Things just ‘theoretically,’ we can get 
along without understanding readiness-to-hand. But when we deal 
with them by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not 
a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by which our manipulation 
is guided and from which it acquires its specific Thingly character.5
There is a difference between the object-in-use, and the object-
as-observed. When I am using the hammer, I am in some 
sense blind to it. Heidegger continues:
The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the 
sort of thing that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective 
theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in 
its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw [zuruckzuziehen] in 
order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our 
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everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves [die 
Werkzeugeselbst]. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves 
primarily is the work—that which is to be produced at the time; and this 
is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears with it that referential 
totality within which the equipment is encountered.6
In order for the thing to be used, to really be used and useful, 
it must go unseen. In short, I must caricature the thing, reduc-
ing it entirely to its use value which is only one of the thing’s 
many qualities. In the case of the hammer, it is only used and 
useful when it is not an object of idle speculation but when it 
shows itself in its use. This works both ways; to think an object 
theoretically, it cannot be in use, but also when an object is 
no longer useful (when it ceases functioning properly), only 
then can it truly be thought theoretically. Harman’s reading 
of the tool-analysis can be summed up rather easily:
Heidegger observes that the primary reality of entities is not their 
sheer existence as pieces of wood or metal or atoms. The wood in a 
primitive sword and that in a modern windmill occupy utterly differ-
ent niches of reality, unleash completely different forces into the world. 
A bridge is not a mere conglomerate of bolts and trestles, but a total 
geographic force-to-reckon-with: a unitary bridge-effect. But even this 
unified bridge-machine is far from an absolute, obvious unit. It too has 
a vastly different reality depending on whether I cross it on the way to 
a romantic liaison, or as a prisoner underway to execution...Instead of 
being a solid object that enters into relation only by accident, an entity 
in its reality is determined by the shifting, capricious storm of references and 
assignments in which it is enveloped. The shift of the tiniest grain of dust 
on Mars alters the reality of the system of objects.7
An object is not exhausted by a theoretical understanding of 
the thing, as if milk could be exhausted through an under-
standing of its chemical composition. Neither is it entirely 
exhausted however through drinking it, that is to say, an 
object is caricatured equally in use as it is in theory with 
only a selection of qualities being tapped.8 Drinking milk, 
understanding it chemically, physically, culturally, historically, 
none of these exhausts its milk-being; and it is not simply 
a matter of putting these modes of understanding together 
as if that would give us the entirety of milkness. We relate to 
milk differently than we do kittens, bacteria, farm equipment, 
refrigerated trucks or warm glasses and all of these things 
equally fail to exhaust it. Any object contains multitudes, an 
infinity of possible relations and qualities, none of which can 
ever give us the entirety of the thing. These objects are not 
solid unchanging entities, but are rather constantly shifting 
and moving entities as they break connections and form 
new ones, spreading their tendrils out into the network of 
objects that make up reality. When equipment is in use, it 
is hidden, it is a thing concealed from our view, and exists 
purely as something which is silently relied upon. There are 
countless objects at work in allowing me to write this essay 
you are reading, from my home, to the laptop I am using, to 
the various parts of my body which I am counting on oper-
ating properly. When in use, objects go unseen, remaining 
underground as part of an intimate network of other objects 
that I am blissfully unaware of. I cannot fully have an idea of 
what a heart does until it no longer does what it is meant to, 
namely, when it stops beating in my chest.9 More than that 
however, all objects remain in some way hidden in their rela-
tions, and not simply those involving human beings. I am not 
alone in the withdrawn relation I have to my heart, as neither 
blood cells, stethoscopes, nor parasitic worms enjoy the full 
essence of my heart. The essence of the thing always remains 
untouched, with only its various qualities ever being engaged.
The problem is made apparent: things withdraw from each 
other, never coming into full contact at the level of essence 
and yet we cannot conclude that change is illusory. Things 
are not simply a cosmic lump of inert matter, the universe is 
made up of things which change, move and interact. How are 
we to reconcile the empirical observation of obvious change 
with the more logical argument that any interaction can be 
described as at best superficial? It is here that Harman pro-
poses a return to the model of causation proposed by both 
the occasionalists and the empiricists, for what they hold in 
common is the impossibility of things interacting on their 
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own, that is to say, they both emphasize the necessity of me-
diation.10 Harman proposes a new union of occasionalism 
and empiricism, a fusion of Malebranche and Hume.
What both positions have in common is a basic hypocrisy. If nothing 
at all is truly linked to anything else, these positions still invoke a deus 
ex machina or mens ex machina that will form an exception to the rule. 
One privileged entity is allowed to form links where others cannot. 
Against this notion, I propose the more democratic solution of a local 
occasionalism or vicarious causation, in which every entity that exists 
must somehow be equipped to serve as a medium of contact between 
two others.11
Rather than saying there is only one entity able to link objects 
causally, be it God or the subject, Harman says that this must 
be extended. No two objects interact with each other directly, 
but must rather interact indirectly through a third object. 
This third object is none other than the phenomenological 
intentional object, which resides inside all entities. When I 
experience a tree, I have in mind not the real tree, but the 
intentional tree. The real tree is saturated with detail, the angle 
experienced, the lighting, my mood, etc, while the intentional 
tree is stripped of these. Changing any of these details does 
nothing to the intentional tree in my mind, “which always 
remains an enduring unit for as long as I recognize it as one.”12 
The real me cannot interact with the real tree, but rather, we 
interact on a phenomenal level through the mediation of 
the intentional object. This intentional object relation is 
asymmetrical however, the real me only ever interacts with 
the intentional tree and never the tree in-itself.13 Harman 
will claim that this is how all objects interact, that is, all 
object-relations are mediated, instituting a universal system 
of indirect causality whereby all real objects relate through 
further relations with intentional objects, as he will say:
The tree and its mountainous backdrop are indeed distinct, yet they 
are unified insofar as I am sincerely absorbed with both. But more 
than this: when the parts of the tree fuse to yield the tree with its single 
fixed tree-quality, I too am the vicarious cause for the connection of 
these sensual objects. Even if I merely sit passively, without unduly 
straining eyes or mind, it is still for me that these parts have combined. 
Here, a real object (I myself) serves as the vicarious cause for two or 
more sensual ones.14
Interaction between two real objects can only happen within 
the space of a third non-real (sensual) object which itself 
resides within the only parts of objects we ever access, their 
qualities.15 Since objects are always withdrawing from one 
another, there must be this third object, a second type of object, 
in order for there to be any interaction at all. This mediator 
is the sensual object, that veneer that we run up against in 
the world, what Harman also refers to as the kaleidoscope of 
qualities.16 This is the intoxicating aura of visual and audio 
delights, a showcase of tastes and smells, and the divine spec-
tacle of things demonstrating their qualities and abilities like 
circus performers attempting feats of strength. When I pet 
a small kitten the real me does not contact her directly but 
only through the faint signals sent via petting her soft hair 
and listening to her gentle purr as she slowly falls asleep. The 
kitten-being likewise only interacts with me on this surface 
level while aiming beyond these obvious qualities, assuming 
always more beyond this sideshow of appearance. It is not the 
case however that I encounter qualities as detached from an 
object, as if I am lost in an ocean of qualities with only a few 
solid island-objects. Rather, this third term is itself another 
kind of object.17 When I pet a soft kitten, I don’t come into 
contact with soft, but am already engaging with a soft thing. 
Harman will tell us that there is a split not only between 
individual objects, but between objects and their qualities, 
that just as the object is not exhausted by its relations, so too 
is it not exhausted by its own qualities.18 This outer crust of 
relations, accidents and qualities is able to be pierced because 
they are removable, able to be detached from the real object.19 
Beyond that however, the sensual object and the qualities 
can themselves be detached from each other, through what 
Harman terms allure. 
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Allure is evident through metaphor, where the qualities 
of one sensual object are detached and sutured to another 
object, as when I say “he is a mouse,” various mouse-qualities 
are affixed to the person I am describing (timidness, small-
ness) while others are not (covered in hair, living inside of 
walls, etc). That is to say, some of the qualities of mouseness 
are detached, the metaphor showing that the thing (mouse) 
is more than the totality of its qualities since the metaphor 
holds whether or not I am speaking of all of the qualities or 
just a select few.20 Causation is indirect in this same way, as 
detached qualities interact and reassemble in new formations. 
The qualities and notes of a thing act as mediating objects 
between other real things, as the play of surface effects send 
vibrations on down into the inner sanctum of the things 
themselves. We should abandon the atomic idea of objects 
and instead make room for the real objects which make up 
our universe which
resembles a massive complex made up of numerous caverns, outer 
walls, alleyways, ladders, and subway systems, each sealed off from the 
others and defining its own space, but with points of access or passage 
filled with candles and searchlights that cast shadows into the next. 
The cosmos is similar to a rave party in some abandoned warehouse 
along the Spree in East Berlin, where the individual rooms are each 
surprisingly isolated from all external sources of music, flashing lights, 
perfumed odors, and dominant moods–but in which it is quite possible 
to move from one space to the next, and in which the doorways are 
always flooded with faint premonitions and signals of what is to come.21
Possible Causes
We now have something of an understanding of how Har-
man’s proposed vicarious causation works. That is to say, we 
have outlined, however roughly, how causation and change 
occur in the world. It should be clear from this foray into 
the myriad world of objects however that the question of 
why anything happens is entirely open. In this section, I will 
outline what I see as six possible ways to view causality. These 
six types or species of causation contain differing specific 
models of causality, meaning there will be variations within 
these defined species but I think the family resemblance is 
sufficient to allow us to use these more general models while 
making occasional forays into specific examples.
The first species of causation is that of traditional occasionalism. 
As outlined above, we can see that we run into the immedi-
ate problem that Harman also sees with this system, namely 
that it fails to explain how causality actually happens.22 The 
mechanics of causality are implanted in the mind of God so 
that we cannot say exactly how causality actually happens 
only that it does and must happen by God’s will. This means 
we do have a reason for causality and change however, though 
it remains as mysterious as the causal process itself. Change 
happens due to God’s willing it to happen. No other reason 
is seen as necessary for the members of this causal species. 
While we could suggest that under the Aristotelian categories 
of the four causes that material cause is the only one with 
which we cannot answer “God” (with the forms residing in 
the mind of God, His being the efficient cause of all change 
and motion and clearly being the final cause), this ultimately 
doesn’t impact our study. The fact that things are made up of 
differing materials or consist in different substances has no 
impact on the causal system of occasionalism except insofar 
as it becomes the source of the problem in Descartes. For the 
Ash’arites as with Leibniz and Malebranche, it doesn’t matter 
what the things involved are made of since even like cannot 
interact with like without the intervention of God.
Since empiricism is positioned in direct opposition to the 
traditional occasionalists, it is there that we turn now. While 
occasionalism fails to provide us with the mechanism of cau-
sality, it does at least provide us with a reason for change, no 
matter how unsatisfactory that answer may be. Empiricism 
fails on both of these fronts however. For Hume, there is no 
logical connection between cause and effect as it is purely 
by habit and induction that we assume that one event will 
continually cause another.23 There is no logical reason that 
my hitting a billiard ball will cause it to move simply because 
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this action has had that outcome in the past. We have no 
actual perception of causality, simply inferring it from a suc-
cession of witnessed events. Kant will perfect this doctrine 
by making it a fully inverted occasionalism when he argues 
in the First Critique that this is not a haphazard assignment 
we impose on events but the necessary structure of human 
reason, causality being “grounded completely a priori in 
the understanding.”24 The question of “how” two events are 
connected for the empiricist is not answered, nor is the ques-
tion of “why.” Causality is simply a given, or even possibly 
an illusion constructed solely by the mind, and remains just 
as mysterious for those who embed its power in the human 
mind as for those who embed it in the mind of God.
The Kantian position which has been included with the 
empiricists gives way to the position that I will term, follow-
ing Quentin Meillassoux,25 correlationism. Correlationism 
is “the idea according to which we only ever have access to 
the correlation between thinking and being, and never to 
either term considered apart from the other.”26 Originating 
in Kant’s synthesis of rationalism and empiricism, corre-
lationism dictates that we only have access to that which is 
for-us, with an end to “naïve” metaphysics which claims we 
actually know things outside of our own grasping them. To 
speak of things-in-themselves is to speak of the unknowable. 
Meillassoux distinguishes between weak and strong forms of 
correlationism based on whether or not a thinker allows for 
the possibility of things-in-themselves at all. Kant or Husserl 
would fall under the weak form of correlationism while Fichte 
and Hegel would be archetypal examples of strong correla-
tionism. The distinction is essentially that of dualism and 
monism. While the weak correlationist maintains that there 
may be (or likely is) an outside world, the chaotic manifold 
is only synthesized by the power of rationality, meaning that 
causality does not pertain to things-in-themselves but only 
to things as they appear for-us. The strong correlationist does 
away with the very idea of things-in-themselves as nonsense 
and maintains that we can only discuss that which is for-us 
since the very idea of anything outside of mind is incoher-
ent. The stronger position is closer to what we usually mean 
colloquially by idealism but I find this term less helpful than 
correlationism.27 When it comes to causality, when I speak 
of correlationism as a causal species, I am speaking specifi-
cally of the position of the strong correlationists. Causality 
remains as much a mystery for the correlationist as it was 
for the above-mentioned species. It falls into the same trap 
of saying that causality is a necessary function of experience 
without telling us why this is the case or how it happens at 
all. Saying that the mind needs causality or that the mind 
cannot help but have causality does not answer the question.
We seem to have a common thread running through these 
models of causation. None of them actually provide any 
sort of explanation as to how causation occurs and only the 
occasionalist will provide us with a reason why causation 
occurs (the will of God). Perhaps we should turn then to the 
champion of efficient causality, naturalism. Like idealism, 
naturalism can be a problematic term. Aristotle could be 
included as a naturalist for example. What I mean with this 
term is simply the perspective taken by the natural sciences 
and those philosophers who ascribe to the scientific view 
that the universe is made up of nothing more than matter 
in motion. This is the first species we have encountered that 
does not maintain causality to be a problem, a significant step 
since the three prior systems have necessitated a mediator 
in order for there to be causation. For naturalism, causality 
is nothing more than one particle impacting another in 
space and causing it to move. All of history and the entire 
universe can be reduced to nothing but the impacting of 
matter on matter. It should be made clear that the naturalist 
has nothing but efficient causality in their system. To speak 
of formal or final causality is to speak of superstition, while 
material causality is nothing but the category “matter” or 
“stuff” which is made equivalent to existence (if something 
is said to exist, it is material and if it is material it is said to 
exist). The problem of how causation occurs is shown to be 
no problem at all. Reality is simply things hitting other things, 
though Harman will characterize this as the most immature 
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of causal systems:
The model of the world as a hard layer of impenetrable matter tells 
us only that matter can shove other matter out of the way or smack it 
forcefully, with the added sweetener that cognitive science will no longer 
allow the human mind to be exempt from this process. But this merely 
takes inanimate causation as an obvious given while doing nothing 
to explain how it occurs. It is a metaphysics fit for a two-year-old: ‘da 
wed ball pusht da gween ball...an da gween ball fell on da fwoorr.’28 
According to Harman, the explanation of matter simply col-
liding with more matter does nothing to answer the question 
of how causation happens. I would add that the explanation 
as to why this matter is in motion is also lacking. Saying that 
it simply is in motion tells us nothing as to why any sort 
of change happens. Formal and final causality, the ideas of 
essence and telos are entirely ejected, matter and cause are 
givens and to question beyond that is seen as, at best, naïve 
and at worst, stupid.
We turn now to the thinkers that one would assume take 
causality the most serious, a species of causation that we will 
term relationism. For these thinkers (such as Whitehead and 
Latour), a thing is nothing more than its system of relations, 
Latour maintaining for instance that a thing’s identity is 
nothing beyond whatever it modifies, transforms, perturbs 
or creates.29 Similarly for Whitehead, a thing is the sum of 
its relations, or prehensions, and changes with these relations. 
Relationism denies any notion of substance or essence beyond 
the qualities a thing exhibits in its system of relations. This 
leads us to a dilemma on the topic of causality: if a thing is 
nothing but its relations then there is no causal mechanism 
that allows it to detach from one set of relations and re-ally 
with new forces. Likewise, save for chance there is no real 
reason for any change to take place. Both Whitehead and 
Latour find themselves in the position of needing to ground 
causality in something else. Whitehead grounds the play of 
actual entities in eternal objects which are found in God as 
in traditional occasionalism30 while Latour travels beneath 
objects to something he terms “plasma,”31 a subterranean 
realm of possibility and power flux. It is this underworld 
that explains why empires and corporations can collapse 
seemingly overnight, it is a realm of fluid, liquid qualities 
that allows for rapid and sudden changes to the networks 
and alliances above its surface.
This brings us to our final causal species which I will term 
vitalism. Not to be confused with the tired biological theory 
of a vital impetus separating the organic from the inorganic, 
vitalism maintains that all things are in some sense willing. 
We can understand this will through the historical concept 
of conatus or as drive; it is the theory that all things are in 
some sense self-moving due to an appetite for being, a will 
to exist. To be is to want to be. We can see this understanding 
of existence in both Spinoza and Bergson but can likewise 
find it in Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Deleuze. We 
could say that under this model, objects become genetic in the 
sense that they are self-creating, “creating oneself endlessly” 
as Bergson says and as quoted at the beginning of this essay. 
Like occasionalism and unlike the rest of the species examined 
in this essay, vitalism has a definite answer to the question 
of why things change, of why there is causality, because all 
things are enacting their internal nature or essence which is 
to exist. Things act to sustain themselves and enter into rela-
tions to do just that. They have a telos and an inner essence 
and are therefore the only species we have encountered to 
have the four causes of Aristotle. On the other hand, many 
vitalists fail to adequately explain the mechanics of causa-
tion that Harman is concerned with, with many falling into 
the occasionalist position similar to Latour’s plasma, with 
causation necessitating a vertical movement to explain any 
horizontal movement.32
Causal Reasons
What are we to make of this brisk walk through the zoo of 
causation? It would seem that no system of causality answers 
both of the questions we set out to answer: “how” causation 
happens and “why” it happens. Harman’s theory of vicarious 
Speculations I Michael Austin – To Exist is to Change
78 79
of causal systems:
The model of the world as a hard layer of impenetrable matter tells 
us only that matter can shove other matter out of the way or smack it 
forcefully, with the added sweetener that cognitive science will no longer 
allow the human mind to be exempt from this process. But this merely 
takes inanimate causation as an obvious given while doing nothing 
to explain how it occurs. It is a metaphysics fit for a two-year-old: ‘da 
wed ball pusht da gween ball...an da gween ball fell on da fwoorr.’28 
According to Harman, the explanation of matter simply col-
liding with more matter does nothing to answer the question 
of how causation happens. I would add that the explanation 
as to why this matter is in motion is also lacking. Saying that 
it simply is in motion tells us nothing as to why any sort 
of change happens. Formal and final causality, the ideas of 
essence and telos are entirely ejected, matter and cause are 
givens and to question beyond that is seen as, at best, naïve 
and at worst, stupid.
We turn now to the thinkers that one would assume take 
causality the most serious, a species of causation that we will 
term relationism. For these thinkers (such as Whitehead and 
Latour), a thing is nothing more than its system of relations, 
Latour maintaining for instance that a thing’s identity is 
nothing beyond whatever it modifies, transforms, perturbs 
or creates.29 Similarly for Whitehead, a thing is the sum of 
its relations, or prehensions, and changes with these relations. 
Relationism denies any notion of substance or essence beyond 
the qualities a thing exhibits in its system of relations. This 
leads us to a dilemma on the topic of causality: if a thing is 
nothing but its relations then there is no causal mechanism 
that allows it to detach from one set of relations and re-ally 
with new forces. Likewise, save for chance there is no real 
reason for any change to take place. Both Whitehead and 
Latour find themselves in the position of needing to ground 
causality in something else. Whitehead grounds the play of 
actual entities in eternal objects which are found in God as 
in traditional occasionalism30 while Latour travels beneath 
objects to something he terms “plasma,”31 a subterranean 
realm of possibility and power flux. It is this underworld 
that explains why empires and corporations can collapse 
seemingly overnight, it is a realm of fluid, liquid qualities 
that allows for rapid and sudden changes to the networks 
and alliances above its surface.
This brings us to our final causal species which I will term 
vitalism. Not to be confused with the tired biological theory 
of a vital impetus separating the organic from the inorganic, 
vitalism maintains that all things are in some sense willing. 
We can understand this will through the historical concept 
of conatus or as drive; it is the theory that all things are in 
some sense self-moving due to an appetite for being, a will 
to exist. To be is to want to be. We can see this understanding 
of existence in both Spinoza and Bergson but can likewise 
find it in Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Deleuze. We 
could say that under this model, objects become genetic in the 
sense that they are self-creating, “creating oneself endlessly” 
as Bergson says and as quoted at the beginning of this essay. 
Like occasionalism and unlike the rest of the species examined 
in this essay, vitalism has a definite answer to the question 
of why things change, of why there is causality, because all 
things are enacting their internal nature or essence which is 
to exist. Things act to sustain themselves and enter into rela-
tions to do just that. They have a telos and an inner essence 
and are therefore the only species we have encountered to 
have the four causes of Aristotle. On the other hand, many 
vitalists fail to adequately explain the mechanics of causa-
tion that Harman is concerned with, with many falling into 
the occasionalist position similar to Latour’s plasma, with 
causation necessitating a vertical movement to explain any 
horizontal movement.32
Causal Reasons
What are we to make of this brisk walk through the zoo of 
causation? It would seem that no system of causality answers 
both of the questions we set out to answer: “how” causation 
happens and “why” it happens. Harman’s theory of vicarious 
Speculations I Michael Austin – To Exist is to Change
80 81
causality aims explicitly to answer the first in the face of a 
history of thought unable or unwilling to do so. He fails to 
consider the latter question however. Why is it important to 
consider the question of why causality occurs? To answer as 
simply as possible, because if we don’t ask, and answer, the 
question of “why” when it comes to causality then not only 
do we not understand it any more than the occasionalists and 
empiricists, but we are likely to conclude with the dominant 
form of causal reasoning and side with the naturalists who 
claim that causality has no reason and is simply random yet 
determined. There is no possibility for freedom or spontane-
ity under such a system.
I don’t think Harman wants vicarious causation to be the 
alibi of a determined series of billiard balls and so I propose 
that we consider the question as to why anything happens 
at all. It should be clear from his criticism of both the occa-
sionalists and empiricists that they mask causality in a cloud 
of mystery. They provide no satisfactory answers. The same 
can be said for the position I have termed here correlation-
ism. The correlationist is only concerned with the fact that 
the occasionalist and empiricist posit anything outside of 
mind, calling them mystery mongers and irrationalists. This 
position has no time for the question of causality as it takes 
the empiricist line to the extreme, claiming that causality is 
not the way mind synthesizes the world but simply how the 
mind fashions its own contents.
Assuming the possibility of siding with the naturalists is 
out this leaves us with two options: relationism and vitalism. 
It is curious that relationism must have an alliance with some 
other mode of causality in order to have meaningful causality 
at all and not simply fall prey to the billiard ball determinism 
of the naturalists—with things simply bumping against each 
other with no invested interest in their surroundings. Both 
Whitehead and Latour, the two champions of relationality, 
fail to satisfy either question (with Latour perhaps coming 
closer to the mark). This leaves us ultimately with vitalism, 
the position that maintains there is something internal 
to the thing called will, drive or conatus which causes it to 
repeatedly instantiate itself. Things are not entirely static 
but are interacting with the world around them, negotiating 
their existence, prolonging their presence through duration 
or repetition. It is also only with the vitalists that we find any 
concept of freedom, spontaneity or contingency. Things are not 
thus and so because of some long chain of causal reference 
back to some first cause or prime mover, nor is it simply 
God’s will, but things are the way they are because things are 
constantly making them that way. When I play with my cat, 
the cause is not some random firing of particles but has to 
do with my inner life, the qualities I manifest in the world 
through my actions. It seems that it is here that Harman must 
turn if he hopes to answer the question of why change happens, 
adding more to the inner life of objects, namely a hunger for 
life, a drive for existence, leading to complex duels between 
objects as they not only seduce one another but manipulate 
and back-stab as well, devouring their enemies and creating 
new alliances in order to sustain their very being. The inner 
life of things is more than happenstance or chance encounters, 
it is made up of deeply held interior qualities which I bring 
to the world through my activities and interactions. I recre-
ate myself and the world through these interactions, as do all 
things. Signals do not simply extend down into the depths 
of objects, but vibrate from the inner core of their being as 
they fight for survival. Listen carefully and you will hear the 
seductive drone of the deep.
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The context for these interviews was a seminar I conducted on speculative realism in the Spring 
2010. There has been great interest in speculative realism and 
one reason I surmise is not just the arguments offered, though 
I don’t want to take away from them; each of these scholars 
are vivid writers and great pedagogues, many of whom are 
in constant contact with their readers via their weblogs. Thus 
these interviews provided an opportunity to forward student 
questions about their respective works. Though each were 
conducted on different occasions, the interviews stand as a 
collected work, tying together the most classical questions 
about “realism” to ancillary movements about the non-human 
in politics, ecology, aesthetics, and video gaming—all to point 
to future movements in this philosophical area.
Interview with Graham Harman
“You can’t have Realism without Individual Objects”
Graham Harman is Associate Provost for Research Administration 
and Associate Professor of Philosophy at the American University 
in Cairo, Egypt, and has written numerous books and articles 
arguing for an “object oriented ontology.” His modus operandi, 
which we discuss below, is to offer a counter-revolution to the lin-
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guistic turn in contemporary philosophy. Harman’s work looks to 
side with the oppressed objects said to be held under the thumb 
of our conceptual schemes, languages, or subjective stances. Two 
questions relate to Harman’s work on aesthetics, collected in the 
forthcoming Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures 
(London: Zero Books, 2010), which offer greater depth to Harman’s 
claim that “aesthetics is first philosophy.”
Peter Gratton: Graham, just to bring you up to speed, in the 
course we’ve read some of your most widely available works 
on the web: your book Prince of Networks, your essay “On Vi-
carious Causation,” your essay on “Intentional Objects,” and 
several other works. In addition, my students have peeked 
into your work on your blog. Thus, I thought I’d start with a 
self-referential question, one that has interested me greatly 
in doing the Speculative Realism course: what do you make 
of this online environment for doing philosophy?
Graham Harman: It’s changed everything, and that’s the 
main reason I’ve stuck with it. Anyone doing continental 
philosophy who isn’t currently involved in the blogsophere 
(whether as blogger or simply as reader) is inevitably falling 
behind. A new community has been building over the past 
two years, primarily through the blog medium, and Dundee 
in late March was perhaps the first time that many of the key 
blog players assembled together in person.
The philosophy blogosophere has its upside and its downside. 
The upside is that international philosophical discussion has 
become a daily event rather than an intermittent one. I’ve 
often been prompted to rethink certain things based on blog 
exchanges, and in one well-known case I actually co-edited a 
book [The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Real-
ism] with two people I had never met in person! (I refer here 
to Levi Bryant and Nick Srnicek.)
The blogosphere also has a democratizing effect, since all 
blogs are in principle equal. In my graduate student days 
there was no way I’d have been able to make open challenges 
to articles by continental kingpins such as John Sallis and 
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Charles Scott, but in the blogosophere students are empowered 
to do just that. 23-year-old students are calling me confused 
and mistaken in the blogosphere all the time. Sometimes it’s 
pretty annoying, in fact, but on the whole I think it’s healthier 
than the generational conditions under which you and I were 
educated. Some of these young people have already become 
blog celebrities, and a few of them even have book deals as 
a result of it.
The downside is that it can be emotionally draining to 
maintain a blog. There are certainly days when I wish I had 
never started mine, because once you have a blog, it feels like 
a garden that can’t be left unattended for long. There’s also an 
obvious dark underside to the “democratization” part, which 
is that you have a certain number of rude people lipping 
off beyond the limits of civility (some of them shielded by 
pseudonyms), including people who have never completed a 
significant piece of work in their lives. At times it’s unavoid-
able that you want to punch back at those people, but while 
momentarily satisfying, it just becomes another energy drain 
in the end, and you have to learn to ignore them.
Furthermore, there is a problem not just with trolls, but 
even with the more useful comments. Back in the days when I 
was allowing comments on my blog, along with the worthless 
trolling remarks there were also many good critical points. But 
then you feel expected to answer those points quickly, and if 
it’s three or four per day, it starts cutting into your own work 
to a significant degree. And your own work is going to need a 
certain degree of privacy, distance, and slow-paced reflection 
for which the blogosphere leaves no room. For this reason, 
I have not seriously considered re-opening comments, and 
probably never will reopen them.
At the moment the blogosophere is still mostly a supple-
ment, with “real” work still appearing in traditional brick-
and-mortar publishing formats. But soon that will change 
as well, in ways that are difficult to foresee, and everyone is 
eventually going to need an online presence of some sort. 
That’s why I don’t quit (I did quit once, for less than a day, 
but a number of people asked me to restart the blog). If I did 
quit, I know I’d just have to come back online a few years later. 
The medium has so many advantages that its triumph is in-
evitable. However, we’re all still figuring out the rules in this 
new world. What’s the best way to handle the town drunks? 
How to punish the vandals? It’s being done piecemeal at the 
moment, but over time I think certain behavioral standards, 
and the enforcement thereof, will start to take root.
Peter Gratton: We have studied Meillassoux’s work as well as 
your 2007 review of After Finitude from Philosophy Today. Obvi-
ously, you take much away from his critique of correlationism. 
My students agree with your recent formulation, described 
often on your blog (http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/), 
that Meillassoux is a “correlationist” himself. Yet, despite 
your great respect for him, nothing seems farther from 
your work than his idea of a “chaotic in-itself” behind the 
phenomena of our world. Another way to think this is that 
many philosophers who argue for a form of realism seem to 
leave us without objects, but with a chaotic form of the real 
that bedevils our descriptions.
Graham Harman: Naturally, I agree that you can’t have real-
ism without individual objects. Otherwise, you’re just left 
with a vague notion of “resistance” or “recalcitrance” or 
“trauma” or “obstruction” at the limit of human experience, 
and if it isn’t articulated into individuals, then you have to 
explain how the magical leap is made from a unified Real to 
a pluralized Experience. And as far as I can see, such a leap 
cannot plausibly be explained.
Some attempt a subtler solution in which the Real isn’t just 
one, but it’s also not quite many. Examples of such solutions 
include Simondon’s “pre-individual” and DeLanda’s “het-
erogeneous yet continuous” realm. In my opinion Deleuze’s 
“virtual” never escapes this predicament either. We see it on 
the analytic side in thinkers such as Ladyman and Ross, the 
targets of my critique when I lectured in Dundee in March 
2010. The real for Ladyman and Ross is “structure,” which 
supposedly avoids being a monolithic lump and also avoids 
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being a realm of genuine individuals. All of these proposed 
solutions are, to my mind, the simple unearned positing of 
a wish. For there is in fact a serious philosophical problem 
in how to balance the autonomous isolation of things with 
their mutual relations, and these positions solve the problem 
merely by saying: “reality itself is already sort of individual-
ized and sort of in relation.” You can’t do it that way. You have 
to grant that the two extreme poles exist and then try to show 
how they are unified. That’s what I’m up to with vicarious 
causation: trying to show how links are possible despite the 
inherent separation of things. You can’t start out by calling 
it a “pseudo-problem,” because then you’re left to solve it by 
fiat. And in general, it displays incredible arrogance to call 
other people’s problems “pseudo-problems.” I hope this 
fashion eventually dies.
As for Meillassoux (I respect his work greatly and he is a 
personal friend as well) he rejects the principle of sufficient 
reason whereas I support it. In other words, he has a sort of 
occasionalist position in which everything is cut off from 
everything else, which I also start with, but the difference 
is that I think it’s a crucial problem to be solved whereas 
he doesn’t think there’s any solution to it. Nothing is truly 
connected to anything else; any connection remains purely 
contingent. But I would note the following point. Meillas-
soux’s argument, if true, would not only apply to the causal 
relation between separate things, but also to the part-whole 
relation within specific things. It’s strange enough to say that 
a flower could disappear at any moment and be replaced by 
a moose. But it’s even weirder to think that a flower at any 
given moment could be made of moose-pieces and still be a 
flower. If we look at sufficient reason inside a given moment 
rather than between two moments, it seems even harder to 
give it up than Meillassoux thinks.
Incidentally, I should say to your students that the study 
of parts and wholes is called “mereology.” It was founded 
in analytic philosophy by a Polish thinker named Stanislaw 
Lesniewski, and those who want a good introduction to the 
topic should read the book Parts by Peter Simons, which still 
seems to be the best introduction to mereology more than 20 
years later. Mereology has always been something of a rival to 
set theory, which is of course what dominates in Badiou and 
his followers. But one problem (shared by classical mereol-
ogy, I admit) is that Badiou’s set theory is an extensional set 
theory, meaning that there is no internal organizing principle 
of the sets. You can randomly stipulate 17 assorted objects 
as members of a set, and then by fiat they become a set; it is 
the one who counts who determines membership, not some 
internal principle. Perhaps it is obvious why that’s an anti-
realist gesture, and indeed very close to British Empiricism 
with its “bundle of qualities” theory of what makes a thing 
be one. But I have a realist take on parts and wholes myself.
 
Peter Gratton: I want to take head on the question of language. 
A number of my students (and not just them of course) have 
really appreciated your clear expositions of Latour. But the 
problem they had, which is similar to what you describe as 
a problem as well, is the endurance of what Latour calls a 
“black box” or “plasma.” This is an old philosophical problem 
about the relation between identity and change, and Latour’s 
gamble is to say that there is nothing but relations. How then 
can the White House, etc., be seen to endure? Your route is 
to discuss an “alluring” interiority of things that can’t be 
related to anything, which is, thus also “nothing” (that can 
be described) but yet is the attractor for relations to other 
things. Would this be correct?
Graham Harman: First, I would say that the black box and 
the plasma in Latour are two different things. Black boxes are 
any individual things (technical devices, animals, societies) 
insofar as they are viewed as obvious units without internal 
structure. Much of Latour’s method involves opening black 
boxes that used to be closed. For example, instead of saying: 
“Pasteur was a genius and a great man who brought light to 
the darkness of medicine,” Latour retraces the history of how 
Pasteur got there, and at times it’s quite a surprising history. 
My favorite part of The Pasteurization of France is the story 
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relation within specific things. It’s strange enough to say that 
a flower could disappear at any moment and be replaced by 
a moose. But it’s even weirder to think that a flower at any 
given moment could be made of moose-pieces and still be a 
flower. If we look at sufficient reason inside a given moment 
rather than between two moments, it seems even harder to 
give it up than Meillassoux thinks.
Incidentally, I should say to your students that the study 
of parts and wholes is called “mereology.” It was founded 
in analytic philosophy by a Polish thinker named Stanislaw 
Lesniewski, and those who want a good introduction to the 
topic should read the book Parts by Peter Simons, which still 
seems to be the best introduction to mereology more than 20 
years later. Mereology has always been something of a rival to 
set theory, which is of course what dominates in Badiou and 
his followers. But one problem (shared by classical mereol-
ogy, I admit) is that Badiou’s set theory is an extensional set 
theory, meaning that there is no internal organizing principle 
of the sets. You can randomly stipulate 17 assorted objects 
as members of a set, and then by fiat they become a set; it is 
the one who counts who determines membership, not some 
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Peter Gratton: I want to take head on the question of language. 
A number of my students (and not just them of course) have 
really appreciated your clear expositions of Latour. But the 
problem they had, which is similar to what you describe as 
a problem as well, is the endurance of what Latour calls a 
“black box” or “plasma.” This is an old philosophical problem 
about the relation between identity and change, and Latour’s 
gamble is to say that there is nothing but relations. How then 
can the White House, etc., be seen to endure? Your route is 
to discuss an “alluring” interiority of things that can’t be 
related to anything, which is, thus also “nothing” (that can 
be described) but yet is the attractor for relations to other 
things. Would this be correct?
Graham Harman: First, I would say that the black box and 
the plasma in Latour are two different things. Black boxes are 
any individual things (technical devices, animals, societies) 
insofar as they are viewed as obvious units without internal 
structure. Much of Latour’s method involves opening black 
boxes that used to be closed. For example, instead of saying: 
“Pasteur was a genius and a great man who brought light to 
the darkness of medicine,” Latour retraces the history of how 
Pasteur got there, and at times it’s quite a surprising history. 
My favorite part of The Pasteurization of France is the story 
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of Pasteur’s shifting alliances. His first allies were the hygien-
ists, who were very concerned with public health but had 
assembled a chaotic list of countless factors that might be 
making people sick, and Pasteur’s microbe gave them just 
the theoretical unifier they needed. Why was spitting in the 
street making people sick, and chicken left to thaw too long 
before it was cooked, and dark rooms without ventilation? 
Pasteur allowed them to say: microbes are promoted in all 
of these cases. But at the time Pasteur’s supporters wrongly 
believed that vaccinations would pre-emptively eliminate all 
disease, and hence doctors were viewed as useless relics soon 
to be eliminated, and so of course doctors started out as angry 
anti-Pasteurians. But the alliances shifted once serums were 
invented, because those were administered in doctor’s offices. 
Empowered in this way, the doctors now became Pasteurians. 
It’s a wonderful story that is hidden by the understandably 
simplistic view of Pasteur as the isolated truth-seeker bring-
ing a lantern to the darkness.
By contrast with black boxes, Latour’s plasma is never an 
individual thing, and that’s my objection to it. Latour defines 
everything in terms of its relations with other things, and 
there is a philosophical problem with this. For example, if 
I myself am nothing more than all of my relations with ev-
erything else right now, then why would I ever change? Why 
would anything ever change if it were nothing more than 
what it already is? To solve this problem, the recent writings 
of Latour have posited a hidden plasma that is the source of 
change, even of very sudden changes such as the collapse 
of empires. He even says that the individual networks are 
to the plasma as the London Underground is to the rest of 
London! The plasma is massive. This is a major concession 
in his philosophy, which otherwise insists that there is noth-
ing lying outside networks. However, it seems that for Latour 
the plasma is a single unified plasma, which is unfortunate. 
We’ve seen this move in the history of philosophy before, 
and it never succeeds. Why should my plasma be the same 
as your plasma, a dog’s plasma, or the plasma of a cigarette 
factory? All of us are capable of changing in different ways, 
and hence I see little point in explaining all change through 
a unified plasma shared by all things. This is nothing more 
than the heir of the ancient Greek apeiron, and there’s no 
way to explain why such a unified rumbling lump would ever 
break up into individual parts. This is why I think the world 
is already built of individual objects, they’re just a lot weirder 
than the everyday physical objects we know.
Ironically, the source of my anti-relational views is Hei-
degger’s tool-analysis; it’s ironic because usually people draw 
the opposite conclusion from Heidegger. He seems to say 
that the hammer in isolation is a bad, vulgar, present-at-hand 
object, while the hammer at work is defined by its relations to 
all oher things in some work-related context. The hammer is 
defined by what it helps to build, the way I grasp it and relate 
to it, and so forth. As you know, I have long argued that this 
is a misreading. The key point about the hammer is that it 
can break. And if it can break, this means that it is not fully 
exhausted by any of its current uses or even any of its possible 
uses. The hammer is partly withdrawn from every network.
I later learned to appreciate this point all the more by read-
ing Xavier Zubiri, Heidegger’s best little-known heir. Zubiri 
has more classical realist sympathies than Heidegger, and 
for Zubiri the key point is that the essence of a thing cannot 
be defined in respect of its relations to anything else. This 
even leads him to go a bit too far, in my opinion. For instance, 
Zubiri claims that a farm and a knife are not real, because 
they have to be a farm or a knife for someone. All that’s real 
in its own right is what he calls the “atomic-cortical structure” 
of reality, which verges alarmingly on saying that only small 
physical things are real. 
Personally I do hold that there is a farm-in-itself and knife-
in-itself that are not only constituted by the people who use 
them. But the wider agreement is more important. Though 
it took me some months to agree with him, I eventually saw 
that Zubiri is right: reality must be non-relational. The sum-
mer of 1997 was the most important intellectual time for me. 
That’s when I studied Zubiri seriously at the same time as 
studying Whitehead seriously, and those two were the authors 
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who allowed me to break free from Heidegger to some extent. 
(I had not yet read Latour; that came in February of 1998.) 
Zubiri showed me that reality must be non-relational. And 
Whitehead showed me that the human-world relation is no 
different in kind from the relations between fire and cotton, 
dogs and pavement, or raindrops and milkweed. Those two 
thinkers combined lie at the root of my current position.
Peter Gratton: The analogy I’ve used to describe your argument 
is to suggest that, just as in physics, you can’t get bouncing 
relations without some x to hit off of, so too, it would seem 
that Latour needs “something more” to discuss as the pivot 
of relations. Yet, my students wonder if this something more 
isn’t really enduring because we simply talk about it that way. 
We might discuss the White House, as you do, and say “we 
know it changes constantly, but it’s an important term and 
while it always changes in its relations, the word for it doesn’t 
and this, not some strange interiority is what endures.” You 
are clear about language not being the filter of the world of 
things back to itself, but what role does it have in your work?
Graham Harman: Endurance is a separate problem. There 
can be withdrawn realities that last for just a flash and others 
that might last for billions of years or even eternity. Sure, it’s 
quite possible to be duped by an identical word into thinking 
that identical things are being described. While reading Gib-
bon recently, I really started to wonder about the ontological 
question of whether the final decadent stages of Byzantium 
are really “Rome” in the same sense as the Roman Republic 
more than 1,000 years earlier. And there are many puzzles 
there for philosophers to work on. Let me just say, as an 
inadequate placeholder rather than as a full response, that 
I don’t think the unity of things is reducible to the unity of 
the words that describes them.
Language is an important topic for any philosophy. The 
problem is that it took on a vastly inflated role for quite 
awhile as the sole topic of philosophy, and indeed my work 
is part of a wider reaction against that tendency. Language 
was being used in an anti-realist way to reduce things to their 
accessibility to us. By contrast, what interests me most about 
language is its paradoxical power to make present without 
making present. The most masterful speakers and writers 
we know are those who do not make their subject present 
directly, but indirectly. One example is metaphor. If you take 
Max Black’s example of a (rather mediocre) metaphor, “man 
is a wolf,” there is no way to parse that metaphor in prose. You 
cannot exhaust the metaphor with a set of discursive state-
ments such as “man is savage, moonstruck, and travels in 
violent hierarchical packs,” because none of these statements 
ever get at what the metaphor communicates indirectly. The 
same goes for rhetoric. 
Aristotle thinks the key to rhetoric is the enthymeme, which 
again is a method of saying something without saying it. A 
trivial example: if I say “the Third Army then marched on 
Baghdad,” I don’t have to say “the Third Army then marched 
on Baghdad, which is the capital of Iraq, and during this war 
their goal was to capture the capital.” The latter part of this is 
boring and unnecessary, because it is already known to the 
listener without being stated. Jokes are based on enthymemes 
too: any joke is ruined if you spell it out. Not to sound like 
Slavoj Žižek, but do you remember those stupid “blonde” 
jokes? There was the one that went: “How does a blonde turn 
on the lights after sex? She opens the car door.” Not funny 
to begin with, but we can ruin it completely by making the 
logic explicit: “Blondes are so sleazy that they have sex in 
cars.” And suddenly, it no longer has the structure of a joke. 
Language is riddled with enthymemes, because we are never 
able or willing to spell out exactly everything that we are try-
ing to communicate. What metaphor and rhetoric teach us 
is that clear, plain language is not only impossible, but also 
self-defeating. Reality itself is not the kind of thing that can 
be parsed in a set of clear discursive statements. Something 
shadowy remains in the background of every topic, and 
sometimes we have to allude to it rather than bluntly stating it.
As you know, this is one of my most serious objections to 
analytic philosophy. It is a culture that prides itself on clear 
writing, avoiding pseudo-poetic gibberish, etc. And yet, almost 
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no one in analytic philosophy is a truly good writer. They 
never have produced and never will produce a Nietzsche, a 
Plato, a Giordano Bruno, or a Bergson in analytic philosophy. 
The reason has to do with what I said in the previous para-
graph. Clarity in writing is better than unclarity, but it does 
not yet imply the lucidity and suggestive power needed to 
approach the reality that lies deeper than language. Analytic 
philosophers seem to think that garble and fuzziness and 
fog are the only problems with bad writing. They’re not. One 
of the main problems with mediocre writing, in fact, is that 
it clarifies topics prematurely. Not all aspects of a topic are 
ever clear, and you have to be able to allude to that unclarity 
in a way that is both vague and compelling at the same time.
In a sense, then, my philosophy of language is less visible 
in my theories of language to date than in my practice of 
writing. No one has ever called my writing unclear, so in that 
sense I think I meet the rigorous prose standards of analytic 
philosophy. (The first reviewer of Tool-Being assumed I was 
an analytic philosopher, in fact.) But I also try to be not only 
clear. I try to write in good vivid English, not just good plain 
English. The latter is merely a negative goal.
Peter Gratton: I want to turn to art. One question a student 
asked about your essay on beauty is how beauty is different 
than what you call “allure.” My students, one of whom is an 
artist herself, thought that your descriptions of sincerity 
were helpful in talking about how objects are always related 
in meaningful ways to one another, and it’s only in this set 
of relations, that one could ever have cynicism or irony or 
what-have-you. But then it would seem that it gets hard to 
describe art objects as different from other objects, especially 
if aesthetics is first philosophy. Perhaps I can simply ask if 
you still take this to be the case and how you describe this in 
such a way that doesn’t get caught in the idea that “being is 
appearance.”
Graham Harman: Your student is right; I haven’t addressed 
that topic yet. My aim in Guerrilla Metaphysics was to show 
that beauty is part of a larger class of phenomena that I called 
“allure.” When writing it I had not yet read Dewey’s Art as 
Experience, which tries something similar, and also does not 
demarcate beauty from all the other surprising departures 
from the everyday that count as aesthetic for him. Dewey 
and I are equally guilty on this point, but the difference is 
that I’m still alive and hence still have a chance to fill in the 
blanks. Aesthetics is on my list of topics to write more about 
in the very near future.
Peter Gratton: You have made this clear by now in some ways, 
but is there anything you’re moving away from in the earlier 
works of yours, some of which many of us have read?
Graham Harman: Ironically, others may be able to answer the 
question better than I can, since I almost never reread my own 
works. Roland Barthes once said that he avoided reading his 
own books too, but then at one point late in life he sat down 
and read them all again. That sounds like something I’ll want 
to do too. Of course I read my books at page proof stage, and 
usually hate them then. I like them much better when they 
appear in print, and I immediately read them once at that 
point, but even that experience can be strangely depressing. 
So then I don’t read them again for a long time after that. But 
sometimes I come across someone quoting one of my books, 
and in those cases I tend to think: “wow, that’s pretty good. 
I’m happy to have written those words.”
But to get back to your question…Recently I was reviewing 
my list of publications for administrative reasons, and was 
shocked to notice that pretty much all of my work has been 
on 20th and 21st century philosophical topics. It’s a shock be-
cause, as a St. John’s College graduate, I have the most classical 
education one can still obtain. And I “think like a Johnnie” as 
well, in the sense that I’m not easily impressed by passing fads, 
try to size up books by whether they are likely to be readable 
two or three centuries from now, am unimpressed by recent 
jargon, and so forth. So I’m really a classically minded person 
who happens to love innovation, rather than an inherently 
modern-minded person like many in continental philosophy 
are. And that’s why it’s a bit of a surprise that I’ve worked so 
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exclusively on recent philosophy. Because of that shock, I 
realized that I ought to start doing work that’s a bit more in 
keeping with my classical temperament—so you’re likely to 
see me publishing on Greek philosophy before too long, and 
maybe some Medieval as well. Plato and Aristotle still have 
much to teach us, and by that I mean they have much power 
to help us innovate. I have no interest in the crusty old notion 
of a perennial philosophy, or that the Greeks already knew it 
all, or that modern philosophy is a waste of time. I have much 
sympathy for classicism, but none at all for conservatism. 
The past is dead unless we continually revive it in our own 
thinking. For some people classicism seems to mean “let us 
simply appreciate the great works of the past, and ignore all 
these trendy innovations from France.” But for me classicism 
means: “come on, let’s produce some new classics!”
But to get to that point, I do think that we should focus our 
attention on the best thinkers who have ever lived at various 
times, not just on who happens to be hot at a given moment. 
And Plato and Aristotle remain the gold standard for me. The 
attacks on Plato in recent philosophy are often outrageously 
shallow, even coming from people of the stature of Nietzsche 
and Heidegger (let alone Popper). But I’m increasingly sure 
that Plato is the best there’s ever been in philosophy, and that 
we need a new Platonist phase in continental thought more 
than anything else.
But in a way I’m dodging your question, which I take to mean: 
“are there any ideas you’re moving away from in your recent 
work?” I’m dodging it because I’m not sure I can answer it. I 
would have to go back and read Tool-Being carefully to look 
for signs of things in which I no longer believe.
Interview with Jane Bennett
“There is Nothing Simple about Materiality”
Jane Bennett is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political 
Science at Johns Hopkins University, and her Vibrant Matter: A 
Political Ecology of Things has itself been a vibrant matter of 
attention since its publication earlier this year. Vibrant Matter 
builds on her earlier books, The Enchantment of Modernity: 
Crossings, Energetics, and Ethics (2001) and Thoreau’s Nature: 
Ethics, Politics, and The Wild (1994), tying together well recent 
work in ecology and new forms of materialism. Bennett work have 
been critical in linking movements in recent Continental philosophy, 
namely a vitalist tradition that runs from Bergson to Deleuze and 
even, on Bennett’s reading, Bruno Latour, with a “political ecology 
of things” that should speak to anyone conscious enough to be 
aware of the devastating changes underway in the world around us.
Peter Gratton: What I should note straight off is that your 
book has gained a following among people in continental 
philosophy working on what’s called speculative realism and 
Graham Harman himself has said he wishes he had written 
this book. One of my students, I think, hit on this by saying 
last week that reading you brought together all of the themes 
we were covering this semester on speculative realism, and 
I think that’s right, since you also helped me to bridge to 
later work in the seminar on the ecological import of these 
discussions. Of course, you are writing out of a different set 
of philosophers, or at least not directly responding to these 
recent works. What do you make of this historical moment 
where we have this (seemingly) wide return to the things 
themselves that your book marks?
Jane Bennett: There is definitely something afoot, something 
about everyday (Euro-American) life that is warning us to pay 
more attention to what we’re doing. There is the call from our 
garbage: our private and public spaces—houses, apartments, 
streets, landfills, waterways—are filling up with junk, with vast 
quantities of disposables, plastic artifacts, old tv’s and devices, 
clothes, bags, papers, bottles, bottles, bottles. The American 
television shows “Clean House” and “Hoarders” expose the 
more extreme versions of this mounting mountain of mat-
ter, but it’s everywhere you look, including in the middle 
of the oceans: “San Juan, Puerto Rico—Researchers [have 
discovered]…a swirl of confetti-like plastic debris stretching 
over a remote expanse of the Atlantic Ocean. The floating 
garbage [is]…similar to the so-called Great Pacific Garbage 
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Patch, a phenomenon discovered a decade ago between Hawaii 
and California.” (Mike Melia, “A 2nd garbage patch, plastic 
soup seen in Atlantic,” Associated Press, April 15, 2010).
A second kind of call is coming from the weather, from 
volcanoes that stop flight traffic across Northern Europe and 
from hurricanes like Katrina that take down neighborhoods 
and maybe even George W. Bush. And 24 hour weather report-
ing and its disaster porn intensifies this call of the wild. For 
those of us who are philosophically-inclined, the response 
to such calls has been a renewed focus on objects, on an 
object-oriented ontology, or a renewed interest in material-
isms—there have been in the last decade materialist turns in 
literary studies, anthropology, political theory, history.  Part 
of this may be a pendulum swing in scholarship: a reaction 
to the good but overstated insights of social constructivist 
approaches.
Peter Gratton: What my students and I liked best about your 
work is its sustained critique of “mechanism,” which treats the 
things of the world as inert and determined. There’s a danger 
to writing about this, since apparently it’s okay to have a rather 
antiquated view of nature (circa Newton, or even before) but 
it’s not okay to risk trying to describe the unruly world in all 
its messiness. Your book calls for a “strategic anthropomor-
phism” as means for thinking a non-determined materiality 
in and around human beings. Could you say more about the 
limits of this strategy and what it risks?
Jane Bennett: A perhaps unnecessary caveat: while I think it’s 
a mistake to allow “mechanism” to serve as a generalizable or 
all-purpose model for natural systems (a model that contin-
ues to linger in popular and social scientific imaginations), 
it would be foolish to deny that many assemblages function 
with a degree of regularity and repetition characteristic of 
machines. So, while Bergson and other philosophers of ‘Be-
coming’ are right to draw attention to the creative element 
in evolution or to the capacity of physical systems to self-
arrange in ways that defy prediction, I don’t want to overstate 
the freedom, mobility, or fragility of the working groups that 
form in nature and culture.
One of the projects I’m working on now is to explore 
theorizations of the strange kind of structuration at work 
in what Michel Serres has described (in The Birth of Physics 
and Genesis) as “turbulent” systems. Here Graham Harman’s 
critique (in Prince of Networks) of “lump ontology” (which he, 
perhaps too hastily, associates with Deleuze) highlights for 
me the relatively under-theorized quality of the question of 
formativity within philosophies of immanence, including the 
version at work in my Vibrant Matter book. Harman makes me 
want to focus more carefully on the question of how it is that 
actants form and hold themselves together, both as individu-
als and as members of an assemblage. I want to get better at 
discerning the topography of ‘Becoming,’ better at theorizing 
the “structural” quality of agentic assemblages. For the ques-
tion of “structure”—or maybe that is the wrong word, and the 
phrase you suggest below is better, i.e., “linkages” between and 
within “open relations”—does seem to fall in the shadow of 
the alluring image of an ever-free becoming—the seductive 
appeal of Nietzsche’s world of energetic flows, of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s vibratory cosmos, of Bergson’s creative evolution, 
of Michel Serres’s “pandemonium of the gray sea.” Inside a 
process of unending change, bodies and forces with duration 
are somehow emitted or excreted. But how? How, Serres asks, 
“is Venus born from the sea, how is time born from the noisy 
heavens?” (Genesis 26). What is this strange systematicity 
proper to a world of ‘Becoming’? What, for example, initiates 
this congealing that will undo itself? Is it possible to identify 
phases within this formativity, plateaus of differentiation? 
If so, do the phases/plateaus follow a temporal sequence? Or, 
does the process of formation inside Becoming require us to 
theorize a non-chronological kind of time? I think that your 
student’s question: “How can we account for something like 
iterable structures in an assemblage theory?” is exactly the 
right question. I’m working on it!
With regard to the liabilities of the strategy of anthropo-
morphizing or allowing yourself to relax into resemblances 
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between your-body-and-its-operations and the bodies-of-
things-outside, I can think of at least three: it is easy to get 
carried away and 1) forget that analogies are slippery and often 
misleading because they can highlight (what turn out to be) 
insignificant or non-salient-to-the-task-at-hand resemblances, 
2) forget that your body-and-its-operations is not an ideal or 
pinnacle of evolution, but just the body you have; 3) forget 
that the human body is itself a composite of many different 
it-bodies, including bacteria, viruses, metals, etc. and that 
when we recognize a resemblance between a human form 
and a nonhuman one, sometimes the connecting link is a 
shared inorganicism. I think that anthropomorphizing can be 
a valuable technique for building an ecological sensibility in 
oneself, but of course it is insufficient to the task.
Peter Gratton: One could see a fear that by returning to the 
matter in and around us, even in a “new materialism,” this 
could return us to pinning down human being in some sort 
of nature to be found through some form of analysis. This 
is a view that has been critiqued for a long time now in the 
works of feminists and in critical race theory, and rightly so. 
How do you respond to those that may worry, after fighting so 
long for how certain human are not simply their materiality, 
that this is what is ecologically necessary to think?
Jane Bennett: I think that we are in fact constrained by some 
sort of nature, that we are free to operate but within iterated 
structures. Though of course a lot turns on how one under-
stands the constraint and the freedom: are we “pinned down” 
once and for all in the same spot? This is highly unlikely, 
given a (Nietzschean) view of nature as flux or a (Serresean) 
view of nature as a viscous, clotting flow. It is important to 
specify the ontological imagery one endorses: nature or 
materiality constrains human (and nonhuman) activities 
but because nature or materiality is not a perfect machine, it 
and we are never fully analyzable. There is always something 
that escapes—some dimension of objects, bodies, events, and 
processes that withdraws (Harman); there are always lines of 
flight (Deleuze and Guattari). It doesn’t make sense to me to 
say we are “simply” our materiality — there is nothing simple 
about materiality, and neither are material forces and flows 
best figured as determinate and deterministic. The need to be 
kind and respectful to other bodies will remain, regardless of 
whether one understands human individuals and groups as 
embodied minds/souls or as complex materialities.
Peter Gratton: This an elegant book and it really gives itself 
over to descriptions of how matter moves us as much as 
anything else. Your description of democracy, I think, gives 
us up to thinking of the “masses” or dêmos in an innovative 
way, since how the masses act, seemingly out of the blue (e.g., 
storming the Bastille), has thrown thinkers of individual free 
will and so on into fits for centuries. Could you talk about 
more the way this thinking could inform a look not just at 
the politics of matter (the way in which objects relate to one 
another) but also what we normally take politics to be?
Jane Bennett: You ask another important and difficult ques-
tion. Let me begin by saying something “Machiavellian,” i.e., 
that political effectiveness requires choosing the right action 
and the right style of action at the right time, and to do this 
one must be alert to the role of impersonal (fortuna) as well 
as personal (human intentional) forces at work in “real time.” 
The political strategy I pursue in order to enhance the pros-
pects for “greener” modes of consumption and production 
is an indirect one: the story of vibrant matter I tell seeks to 
induce a greater attentiveness to the active power of things—a 
power that can impede, collaborate with, or compete with our 
desire to live better, healthier, even happier lives. Perhaps this 
new attentiveness will translate into more thoughtful and 
sustainable public policies. I am not sure that it will, but it is, 
I think, a possibility worth pursuing for a while. My political 
strategy is indirect because its target is not the macro-level 
politics of laws, policy, institutional change but the micro-
politics of sensibility-formation.
In the book, I also suggest that a heightened sensitivity to 
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the agency of assemblages could translate into a national 
politics that was not so focused around a juridical model of 
moral responsibility, blame, and punishment. The hope is 
that the desire for scapegoats would be lessened as public 
recognition of the distributed nature of agency increased, 
and that politics would take on a less moralistic and a more 
pragmatic (in Dewey’s sense of problem-solving) cast.
Interview with Timothy Morton
“A ‘New’ Materialism after Marxism”
Timothy Morton is Professor of Literature and Environment at 
the University of California, Davis. He is author of The Poetics 
of Spice and Shelley and the Revolution in Taste, as well as 
editor of The Cambridge Companion to Shelley and Cultures 
of Taste/Theories of Appetite. Most recently, he is the author of 
a “pre-quel,” The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), to his 2008, Ecology without Nature 
(2008), in which he critiques previous conceptions of nature as 
inimical to ecological thinking. In these last two works, Morton 
introduces the idea of the “mesh” as a means for understanding 
the “interconnectedness” of existence. Morton seeks out this term 
as a means for thinking the form of connections and separations 
among the objects of the world, without arguing that there is some 
substance (e.g., Thales’ water) hovering in the background of all 
things. To think the “mesh” is to think these connections and blank 
spaces that is the (no)thing that connects all things in a manner 
akin to Bruno Latour’s irreductionist theory of assemblages, wherein 
there are no substances but only collectives of relations.
Peter Gratton: We’re reading here your work alongside 
speculative realists and object oriented philosophers, as well 
as Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter. Your point of attack in the 
book is all manner of Heideggerian “deep ecology” as well 
as new age holisms so abundant here in California. Perhaps 
I can begin by asking you summarize what brought you to 
this “pre-quel”…
Tim Morton: The “prequel” emerged out of my first ecology 
book, Ecology without Nature. I realized that there was a larger 
view that it was necessary to express. In some sense it was 
impossible to think this before having done some demolition 
work on the concept “nature.” Yet the new project is more 
foundational. Hence the fact that The Ecological Thought is a 
“prequel,” hopefully not like The Phantom Menace…
To some extent my thinking process mirrors what’s hap-
pening in the world at large, which is that humans appear 
to be in a kind of open window situation, in which we are 
noticing a lot of inconsistencies in old ways of modeling and 
mapping things—and it’s becoming clear that our maps are 
just that, maps and not the real thing. Something is emerging 
but it’s hard to give it a name.
If you like, the ecological thought is like a mathematical 
attractor in our future—it sort of pulls thinking towards 
it, though I might be unhappy with how teleological this 
metaphor sounds.
The other main factor in thinking the book was not want-
ing simply to kick over other models and walk away: it didn’t 
seem honest. As William Blake wrote, “I must create my own 
system or be enslaved by another man’s.” You are always car-
rying some kind of implicit ontology around in any case. 
It’s easy to hide behind the attitude that emerges when you 
undermine other models.
Peter Gratton: I like a lot about your book, but perhaps what 
I like most is your ability to find a language to talk about 
“interconnectedness” or assemblages of relations in terms 
of ecology without falling into the language of holism and 
deep ecology. What thinkers do you have in mind in the 
background here as you sound the depths without coming 
back to the surface with a deep ecology?
Tim Morton: I’m glad you saw that. Holism—and the deep 
ecology that acts as a vector for holism—is ironically opposed 
to a truly profound ecological view. The reason is simple when 
you start to think about how according to holism the whole 
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as a means for thinking the form of connections and separations 
among the objects of the world, without arguing that there is some 
substance (e.g., Thales’ water) hovering in the background of all 
things. To think the “mesh” is to think these connections and blank 
spaces that is the (no)thing that connects all things in a manner 
akin to Bruno Latour’s irreductionist theory of assemblages, wherein 
there are no substances but only collectives of relations.
Peter Gratton: We’re reading here your work alongside 
speculative realists and object oriented philosophers, as well 
as Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter. Your point of attack in the 
book is all manner of Heideggerian “deep ecology” as well 
as new age holisms so abundant here in California. Perhaps 
I can begin by asking you summarize what brought you to 
this “pre-quel”…
Tim Morton: The “prequel” emerged out of my first ecology 
book, Ecology without Nature. I realized that there was a larger 
view that it was necessary to express. In some sense it was 
impossible to think this before having done some demolition 
work on the concept “nature.” Yet the new project is more 
foundational. Hence the fact that The Ecological Thought is a 
“prequel,” hopefully not like The Phantom Menace…
To some extent my thinking process mirrors what’s hap-
pening in the world at large, which is that humans appear 
to be in a kind of open window situation, in which we are 
noticing a lot of inconsistencies in old ways of modeling and 
mapping things—and it’s becoming clear that our maps are 
just that, maps and not the real thing. Something is emerging 
but it’s hard to give it a name.
If you like, the ecological thought is like a mathematical 
attractor in our future—it sort of pulls thinking towards 
it, though I might be unhappy with how teleological this 
metaphor sounds.
The other main factor in thinking the book was not want-
ing simply to kick over other models and walk away: it didn’t 
seem honest. As William Blake wrote, “I must create my own 
system or be enslaved by another man’s.” You are always car-
rying some kind of implicit ontology around in any case. 
It’s easy to hide behind the attitude that emerges when you 
undermine other models.
Peter Gratton: I like a lot about your book, but perhaps what 
I like most is your ability to find a language to talk about 
“interconnectedness” or assemblages of relations in terms 
of ecology without falling into the language of holism and 
deep ecology. What thinkers do you have in mind in the 
background here as you sound the depths without coming 
back to the surface with a deep ecology?
Tim Morton: I’m glad you saw that. Holism—and the deep 
ecology that acts as a vector for holism—is ironically opposed 
to a truly profound ecological view. The reason is simple when 
you start to think about how according to holism the whole 
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is always greater than the sum of its parts. This means that 
at some level there is already fragmentation. It also means 
that the parts are ultimately replaceable. This gives rise to 
all kinds of ethical consequences, for instance the idea that 
it doesn’t matter much to Planet Earth if humans become 
extinct, or even the idea that humans are a kind of virus—a 
whole could have faulty components that might need to be 
cleansed or replaced.
Instead of feeling part of something bigger (holism), I’m 
going for intimacy: the others that inhabit Earth are already 
under our skin—they are our skin. In the back of my mind 
there is Spinoza, who is arguing that matter moves all by itself 
and that there is only one thing. This one thing is indivis-
ible in some sense—so it’s not a whole. Spinoza’s view is so 
profound because it combines materialism with something 
like theology—this combination being precisely why he got 
into such trouble with his Synagogue and with the Christian 
culture around him…
Whitehead is in the background with his astonishing 
reworking of matter as a relatively autonomous, abstracted 
moment in a flowing process (an “actual occasion”).Then 
there is Deleuze, who modulates Spinoza and Leibniz in 
his own inimitable way. A lot of the work on infinity in the 
book was inspired by Deleuze on Leibniz. And then we have 
Emmanuel Levinas, who puts totality into stark opposition 
with infinity. Holism would be totality, for Levinas. Thinking 
ecology involves thinking infinity, in many different senses. 
And then there’s Derrida—I can’t help it! He is a modern Zeno, 
with powerful tools for showing how subdividing things gets 
you into all kinds of trouble. In this respect, his thinking 
is identical to Darwin, the one major textual source in The 
Ecological Thought.
Ecology also means thinking what I call “very large finitude,” 
which in some respects is even harder than infinity since it 
doesn’t make us feel grand. Very large finitudes such as global 
warming and radiation, for instance: they outsize and outlast 
us and our descendants beyond anything meaningfully like 
“me” or “mine.” But they’re not fragments of some whole. If 
anything they’re more like the abortive fabrications of an 
evil god in some Gnostic system. I like very much the idea 
that reality is fundamentally incomplete in some sense. I 
was influenced to talk about radiation by Derek Parfit, a very 
surprising utilitarian. I’m not sure where very large finitude 
itself comes from—it might be homegrown…
Peter Gratton: Your book is wonderfully clear about the need 
to get unclear about traditional concepts. Let me play devil’s 
advocate for a moment: you might suggest you’re moving 
beyond a certain postmodernist moment in culture, but you 
still take language and how we know about “nature” as more 
paramount than what it is. To give one example, you might 
be correct to point out how “wilderness” areas are “giant, 
abstract” constructions within modern culture (p. 7), but I 
wonder if the “wild” does not, like the infinite in Levinas you 
cite, end up being too wild a concept to control under the 
nature/culture divide. In other words, while someone may 
understand why you question the use of “nature” in political 
ideologies, they may be less sympathetic to your suggestion 
that it’s unusable as an ontological category specifying that 
which is “non-human” or at the very least independent of 
language and cultural constructs. I guess what I’m asking is 
whether you consider your project at the level of a “mesh” 
of concepts (epistemology, to use the old language) or at the 
level of the “mesh” of what is (ontology).
Tim Morton: I’m touched that you think the book is clear. One 
thing I really like about Jane Bennett’s work is how lucid she 
is. Thinking that language is limited to the human is precisely 
part of the problem, no? dna is language. Human language is 
bacteria-filled breath moving out of my lungs, which evolved 
out of fish swim bladders. The not-so-great word “life” has to 
do with matter that is information, all the way down. Nothing 
is independent of language in this sense. This fact of matter 
as information (it’s even more the case as you get towards 
the Planck length in quantum theory) is deeply disturbing. 
We want it not to be the case, even if we are deconstructors.
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What I’m doing is very much at the level of ontology, and 
it’s becoming more that way. In preparation for The Ecological 
Thought I tried to read everything I could read about evolution, 
in particular the sort of neo-Darwinism (Dawkins and Dennett 
for instance) that most left humanists wouldn’t touch with 
a bargepole. Maybe I’m just perverse but I thought it would 
be good to find strange ideas in unusual places. I’m putting 
myself through quantum theory boot camp right now precisely 
because there is a deep ontology of physics that humanists 
(I used a bad word!) must understand and talk about. Physics 
implies ontology, even when it forbids it (as Niels Bohr et al. 
did, giving rise to the Standard Model of quantum theory).
The mesh is beyond concept in some sense—unthinkable 
as such, precisely because it is real. In the same way, phenom-
ena such as global warming and nuclear radiation, massively 
distributed across spacetime, defy the kind of false immediacy 
on which dichotomies between human and non-human 
depend. I really am arguing that there is no nature, not that 
the idea of nature isn’t working. You can sort of detect that 
it isn’t the case because of various linguistic and ideological 
problems, but these problems only exist because nature as 
such really does not exist…I very much oppose the idea that 
what environmentalism should be about is coming up with 
a new form of freshly convincing advertising language.
Peter Gratton: As we do this, there is quite a “hyper-object,” as 
you put it, heading toward the shores of the Gulf region of the 
southern United States. You talk about a “hyper-object” like 
plutonium as being a near-permanent production that will 
outlast us all. But this also, of course, is a spatial concept, right? 
Tim Morton: Yes! For instance, think of global warming. 
Global warming is happening all over the Earth right now, by 
definition, not just in your backyard. What does this mean? It 
means that the wet cold stuff that falls on your head in Boise, 
Idaho, is rigorously less real than something you can’t see 
directly, called global warming. Galileo et al. turned the no-
tion of “sunrise” into a convenient abstraction, good enough 
to be getting along with in certain circumstances, while we 
know that it’s far more “real” that the Earth is rotating. In the 
same way, global warming science turns the weather into a 
false immediacy, an abstraction that seems real because it’s 
wet and cold, for instance.
The bp oil slick off the coasts of Louisiana and Florida is yet 
another example of a hyperobject, an object which, as you say, 
radically undermines our ideas of being in charge, that the 
world is happening to “me,” and so on. In this respect radia-
tion is also spatial, since Chernobyl for instance taught us how 
it ignores national boundaries. In the same sense, evolution 
and quantum phenomena (radiation is one, strictly) are also 
massively distributed in spacetime. We can’t see them but 
they are far more real than species, or atoms. They are more 
material than supposedly solid things.
What these hyperobjects do is upgrade our ideas about mat-
ter, the hard way. In the future, if there is one, people (whether 
human or not I’m not sure) will look back on our age and 
pity our lack of materialism—our lack of a deep affinity for 
and even affection for matter. Oh sure, we are addicted to 
externalities, instant gratification and shiny plastic surfaces, 
and this gives us the bp slick, which gets everywhere, is far 
from bling-like, and is a real drag in the worst possible sense…
Peter Gratton: What do you make of this return to realism 
and/or materialism after the linguistic turn?
Tim Morton: It’s fascinating. I think I’m part of it, but in a 
modified way, which I’d like to explain here. The word “after” 
in the question concerns me—hey wait! Slow down! And I’m 
not sure about the kind of labeling the definite article does 
in the phrase “the linguistic turn.” This version of “linguis-
tic turn” might be a straw target—Saussure is very different 
from Lacan, who is very different from Foucault, and so 
on. Calling it “linguistic” might be because deconstruction 
found a home in English Literature departments more than 
in philosophy departments. When an English Literature 
person hears “linguistic turn” she’s going to think structural-
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ism, not deconstruction—the application of a certain form 
of linguistics to problems in the humanities.
Like I say the phrase might be a straw target. It might be 
the case that some philosophical milieux never went through 
a linguistic turn at all—thus making their use of the phrase 
disingenuous. The idea of “after” could easily mark a regres-
sion to naïve empiricism, dressed up in fancy language. The 
epistemology–ontology split could indeed be a feature of this 
kind of empiricism (consider the “fact–value” dichotomy, 
for instance). There’s a long-standing resistance to “theory” 
(i.e. Derrida) in England and in Anglo-American philosophy, 
where some speculative realism is coming from. I’m a little 
afraid that some of this might be just old wine in new bottles.
The idea that real things are non-linguistic or unspeakable 
reminds me of Doctor Johnson refuting Berkeley by kicking 
a stone: “I refute it thus.” To me, the sound of a boot contact-
ing some crystalline particles is not an argument. Beware, 
Derrida is not a nominalist or an idealist! Doctor Johnson’s 
boot would have had even more trouble with him…
In a sense new materialism is also “after” various forms of 
Marxism. And relativity and quantum theory. In these respects 
it’s very, very interesting. Are we finally beginning to realize 
that Newton didn’t have the last word on everything—that 
matter isn’t little shiny ping-pong balls acting externally on 
one another in predictable ways in a neutral box of absolute 
time and space?
Peter Gratton: We should turn to your concept of the “mesh,” 
which is picked both to denote on the one hand this “inter-
connection” while also not falling into a vitalism. Someone 
like Jane Bennett, for example, is willing to risk using the 
language of vitalism, though of course she is as interested as 
the “inorganic” in any life as she is in any supposed lifeform 
as the basis of existence. Where do you find yourself in this 
debate?
Tim Morton: Great question. Materialism is at a very interest-
ing point. To sum it up I think we are generating more and 
more ways to think matter without teleology. As in evolution, 
matter, even the laws of physics themselves, evolve, sometimes 
in irreducibly unpredictable ways. Causality and even math 
and logic might be immanent to the Universe, not outside 
it in any meaningful sense.
If you are honest, then you realize that materialism can’t 
mean believing in some hard little balls, totally separate 
from your mind, which underlie everything. This means that 
those of us who have called ourselves materialists and have 
used Marx must do some serious thinking. How far down 
into Marxism does the mechanistic view, based on Newton, 
go? How does this affect Deleuze and Guattari’s “Everything 
is a machine”? The other problem is that it’s traditionally 
been idealism, not materialism, that has used vitalism. The 
Naturephilosophers were all about some squishy, palpable 
snot-like stuff—protoplasm.
Mind you, it’s incontestable that the quantum universe is 
much more like something living than like a machine. It’s 
a profoundly ecological view, a kind of super-mesh in my 
terms (I’ll explain the mesh in a moment). In quantum theory 
the very existence of an entity such as an electron depends 
upon the environment around it—and so on around a mas-
sive mulberry bush without center or edge. From this point 
of view, even protoplasm is mechanical. The snot is located 
in spacetime, while quantum phenomena can’t be isolated 
in this manner. Quantum phenomena are entangled with 
the equipment that observes them (at that level, they are 
the same thing), whereas snot does its thing no matter what 
you’re using to measure it. If you really want something like 
a vitalist view you should go down towards the Planck length.
What is the case is much more like standing waves than 
little balls or even blobby balls. The new scanning tunneling 
micrographs of atoms display nice shiny eggs in rows, pre-
sumably because nanotech is about to make lots of money 
selling versions of them. I like the older field ion micrographs 
because they reveal a world of ripples and blobs. I know that 
there’s a wave–particle duality, sure, but it’s heuristically very 
helpful, at least, to unthink ping-pong balls via waves. Think 
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of view, even protoplasm is mechanical. The snot is located 
in spacetime, while quantum phenomena can’t be isolated 
in this manner. Quantum phenomena are entangled with 
the equipment that observes them (at that level, they are 
the same thing), whereas snot does its thing no matter what 
you’re using to measure it. If you really want something like 
a vitalist view you should go down towards the Planck length.
What is the case is much more like standing waves than 
little balls or even blobby balls. The new scanning tunneling 
micrographs of atoms display nice shiny eggs in rows, pre-
sumably because nanotech is about to make lots of money 
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of nonlocality, which is now uncontroversially a fact of our 
Universe. It doesn’t make sense from a ping-pong point of 
view. But it does make sense if, Spinoza-fashion, reality is one 
thing, modulated in a wavelike way. You can easily imagine 
two pieces of the same ripple glinting in the sunlight. On 
the other hand, two particles doing the same thing while 
arbitrarily far apart sounds suspiciously like a miracle.
Now, going up several scales to the level of life forms, we 
discover what I’m calling the mesh, which is simply the 
fact that life forms and non-life forms are entangled with 
each other inextricably, because of the nature of life forms 
themselves. I find this idea more persuasive at this level 
than vitalism, because it doesn’t depend on locating some 
ghostly source of “life.” The proximity, even at times identity, 
of the nonhuman with my humanness (and of everything 
in everything) is incontestable. For example, I drive around 
using crushed dinosaur parts as fuel. Most of the iron in the 
Earth’s crust is distributed bacterial waste, as is the oxygen. I 
am typing this because the mitochondria in my cells give me 
energy. They are bacterial symbionts hiding from their own 
global catastrophe, the one called oxygen. You are reading this 
because erv-3, a virus in your mom’s dna caused her not to 
spontaneously abort you because it coded for immunosup-
pressive properties of the placental barrier. And so on.
So perhaps vitalism is valid, but strangely at a far far deeper 
level than we used to assume, and not at all on the level of 
life forms!
Interview with Ian Bogost
“An ‘Applied’ Speculative Realism”
Ian Bogost is Associate Professor in the School of Literature, Com-
munication, and Culture at The Georgia Institute of Technology, 
where he’s a video game designer and interpreter, pushing the limits 
of game design in socially constructive ways. A sought-after speaker 
and writer, Bogost not only designs games meant to ameliorate 
social disorders, but also works to draw attention to the ways in 
which video games have an “expressive power” that demands our 
full due in an era when most American households have video game 
devices; the way that we play them makes them not just games 
anymore (if ever they were). Among three books he is now working 
on, Bogost is writing a philosophical text, Alien Phenomenol-
ogy, that extends his work in Unit Operations (2006) to think 
non-systemic conceptions of objects and their relations. The “flat 
ontology” he introduces in this new work, forthcoming later this 
year, seeks to recognize the strangeness of the world around us, a 
reality found not just in computational systems, but also in the 
world around and in us.
Peter Gratton: You write in your upcoming book, “As critics, 
our job is to amplify the black noise of objects to make the 
resonant frequencies of the systems of objects inside hum 
in credibly satisfying ways?” I guess I’ll begin by asking, why 
this satisfaction? In other words, what lead you to this project?
Ian Bogost: I’d been interested in Graham Harman’s object-
oriented philosophy since I first found out about it, which was 
perhaps half a year before the publication of Tool-Being. I’d 
followed this work with interest (it gets a citation in-passing 
in my first book Unit Operations), as did I his subsequent books 
and then the work of the “speculative realists.” I’d always had 
a hankering to do something further with this interest, as well 
as to return to my philosophical roots and to the concept of 
the unit operation. In particular, I had questions about how 
Harman’s thinking could help me understand particular 
objects, not just the nature of objects in general.
Then in 2007–2008, Nick Montfort and I were writing Rac-
ing the Beam, our book on the Atari Video Computer System. 
The book discusses the ways the hardware design of that 
machine directly influenced the games that were produced 
for it, and indirectly influenced conventions and genres of 
games even after different hardware affordances were com-
mon. We looked at the technical aspects of the machine in 
some detail, including its controllers and casing, its stock 
microprocessor and i/o bus, and its custom-designed graph-
ics and sound chip. And by doing so, I think we were able to 
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offer useful and surprising insights into the nature of the 
apparently simple videogames made for that system.
I’m proud of what Nick and I accomplished in Racing the 
Beam. But something bothered me: our treatment of the Atari 
focused only on the way the hardware influenced human 
creativity. An interesting topic to be sure, yet, one that didn’t 
give full credit to the strange experience of the system’s com-
ponents. I began learning to program the Atari around the 
same time we began research for the book. It’s a very strange 
computer, most notably because of the way it addresses the 
screen: the programmer must manually change settings on 
the graphics chip (it’s called the Television Interface Adapter, 
or tia) in tandem with the rendering of every scan line of 
the television picture. It’s natural (or it was for me anyway) 
to begin wondering: what’s it like to be a tia? Or a mos Tech-
nologies 6502 microprocessor? How would one characterize 
such a thing? Would it even be possible?
The Atari was just one moment in a larger set of these 
recognitions. Here’s one more example: A year before I’d 
spent a consulting windfall on a Leica m8 and got back into 
rangefinder photography. I found myself thinking about the 
way different optics see a subject, the results of which photog-
raphers sometimes call “rendering” or “drawing.” For example, 
I have a 1935 50mm f/2 Summar lens that produces images 
with a very particular atmosphere, thanks to a combination 
of factors inherent in its design. I can see how the lens sees 
when it exposes on emulsion or sensor, but how does the 
lens see without me? So, you could say that this project was 
borne from two parents, one a desire to concretize tool-being 
in some way, and the other a deep personal curiosity about 
the secret lives of objects.
Peter Gratton: “Alien phenomenology” attempts to offer a 
“pragmatic” or “applied” “speculative realism.” As part of 
this project, you offer three “modes” for doing speculative 
realism: (1) the practice of ontography: the production of 
works that bears witness to objects; (2) metaphorism, which 
is the production of works that speak to the “centered,” in-
ner lives of objects and the ways in which they reduce other 
things to their existence (just as humans do when we practice 
anthropomorphism, so cameras make the world in their 
own image); (3) and carpentry, which is expansive whereas 
the previous may be seen as reductive: constructing things 
that themselves speak to the perspective of objects. You offer 
these, I think, in order to talk about objects that are created 
by human beings (with all the caveats on “creation”), such 
as video games and back scratchers, without defining their 
being in terms of what human beings wanted them to be. 
Would that be correct? Is your “alien phenomenology” an 
alternative to classical, Aristotelian conceptions of the func-
tion of made goods?
Ian Bogost: It’s true that one of the motivations that lead me 
to Alien Phenomenology was a concern: how can one talk about 
man-made objects in the same way one discusses others, 
natural or abstract objects for example? Even if man-made 
things don’t pose an ontological problem (as indeed they 
don’t for Harman or for Latour), how do we contend with 
the constructed nature of such objects, the configured parts 
that make them whole? Indeed, we could say the same things 
about aggregate objects, whether you call them networks or 
assemblages or just plain objects. Here science is implicated 
as much as sociology or philosophy.
Mostly, as you suspect, it seems that these object live lives of 
their own, without us, even as we are in the middle of using 
them for our own ends. The tia in the Atari lives in a different 
universe, of sorts, from the player who pilots Pitfall Harry. It 
behaves by a different logic, even as it operates by the very 
same logic (there’s a puzzler). This is where the metaphor of 
the alien becomes very productive.
Clearly the for-ness of Aristotelian final causation is trou-
bled here. Is the tia for human entertainment? For moving 
videogame sprites? Is it for modulating rf signals? Is it for 
latching circuits? All of the above? Do previously material 
causes become final, or are all causes in some sense final? 
All objects, not just man-made ones, are subject to this puzzle. 
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When objects of different kind encounter one another, the 
problem becomes that of one making sense of the other. This 
is what I’m really after, and I want my approach to work for 
humans making sense of microprocessors as much as I do 
for sand dunes making sense of siroccos.
Peter Gratton: One means for thinking non-mechanistic 
conceptions of things has been vitalism, which is reinvigo-
rated in work of someone like Jane Bennett, or others who 
are the heirs of Deleuze. How does your thinking of “undead” 
objects offer a counter to this approach?
Ian Bogost: I’ve read and enjoyed Bennett’s recent book, but 
I have the same problem with vitalism as I do with panpsy-
chism: they are too human-centered to work as philosophi-
cal ground. I think Bennett does a very good job justifying 
anthropomorphism in Vibrant Matter, and indeed I offer 
my own position on the inevitability of anthropocentrism 
in Alien Phenomenology—all objects are thing-centric, and all 
must make sense of one another through metaphors of self...
here I’m borrowing directly from Harman’s idea of metaphor 
in Guerilla Metaphysics.
Whiteheadian panexperientialism is somewhat less objec-
tionable, although it’s really a term from Griffin’s reading of 
Whitehead, and maybe these matters of naming amount just 
to hair-splitting. But the problem with an umbrella-term for 
whatever it is that all things do is that it makes that very doing 
too homogeneous for my taste. This is where the idea of the 
alien comes in again—it’s a frame for object-withdrawal that 
accounts for the impenetrability of inter-object understand-
ing. It insures that whatever it is that objects experience, other 
objects may never even recognize it as experience.
Peter Gratton: Do think there’s a reason that there is a turn to 
realism now? Is there simply exhaustion with the previous 
philosophical approaches, or is there something else underway?
Ian Bogost: I was certainly exhausted with philosophy. By 
the letter of my training (all my degrees are in philosophy 
and comparative literature), I’m really a philosopher rather 
than a media theorist, even though I’m really only known as 
the latter. Part of that exhaustion came from disgust: a sense 
that philosophy and theory didn’t really care about the world 
at all, but only exclusive clubs of academic esoterics. In that 
respect, I don’t think it’s an accident that the return to real-
ism comes at a time when the academy (and particularly the 
humanities) are in crisis. I’ve written a much more extensive 
and pointed indictment of this problem elsewhere (http://
www.bogost.com/blog/the_turtlenecked_hairshirt.shtml), but 
for our purposes here I can boil it down to this: in order for 
humanism to reenter the world that it has forsaken, isn’t a 
strong dose of realism a requirement?
There’s something else going on too: at the same time that 
the humanities are struggling with their survival, the sciences 
appear stronger than ever. We’re even seeing some human-
ists adopt scientific or social-scientific approaches wholesale 
in the hopes that they might offer succor or even rescue 
(cognitive science is the commonest balm). But despite their 
history, the sciences are becoming ever more correlationist, 
focused outward rather than inward, concerned with human 
application and innovation more than with nature. I made 
this point in much more detail at the recent Object Oriented 
Ontology Symposium at Georgia Tech (it will appear in the 
book too), but it’s possible that the sciences are even more 
correlationist than are the humanities. Perhaps a latent sense 
of dread at this possibility is also at work.
I’m not suggesting that we must reject science, but that we 
may finally be forced to grapple with C.P. Snow’s two cultures 
problem for real. In the arts and humanities, “interdisciplin-
ary” usually means inbreeding: “French and German.” What 
happens when it must instead mean, say, media ecology and 
electrical engineering, or gastronomy and physics?
Peter Gratton: One worry that crops up time and again about 
“flat” ontologies such as yours is that it’s one thing to say that 
we need to describe relations outside of their correlation to 
human beings, but it’s another to say that those other rela-
Peter Gratton – Interview with Ian Bogost
114 115
Speculations I
When objects of different kind encounter one another, the 
problem becomes that of one making sense of the other. This 
is what I’m really after, and I want my approach to work for 
humans making sense of microprocessors as much as I do 
for sand dunes making sense of siroccos.
Peter Gratton: One means for thinking non-mechanistic 
conceptions of things has been vitalism, which is reinvigo-
rated in work of someone like Jane Bennett, or others who 
are the heirs of Deleuze. How does your thinking of “undead” 
objects offer a counter to this approach?
Ian Bogost: I’ve read and enjoyed Bennett’s recent book, but 
I have the same problem with vitalism as I do with panpsy-
chism: they are too human-centered to work as philosophi-
cal ground. I think Bennett does a very good job justifying 
anthropomorphism in Vibrant Matter, and indeed I offer 
my own position on the inevitability of anthropocentrism 
in Alien Phenomenology—all objects are thing-centric, and all 
must make sense of one another through metaphors of self...
here I’m borrowing directly from Harman’s idea of metaphor 
in Guerilla Metaphysics.
Whiteheadian panexperientialism is somewhat less objec-
tionable, although it’s really a term from Griffin’s reading of 
Whitehead, and maybe these matters of naming amount just 
to hair-splitting. But the problem with an umbrella-term for 
whatever it is that all things do is that it makes that very doing 
too homogeneous for my taste. This is where the idea of the 
alien comes in again—it’s a frame for object-withdrawal that 
accounts for the impenetrability of inter-object understand-
ing. It insures that whatever it is that objects experience, other 
objects may never even recognize it as experience.
Peter Gratton: Do think there’s a reason that there is a turn to 
realism now? Is there simply exhaustion with the previous 
philosophical approaches, or is there something else underway?
Ian Bogost: I was certainly exhausted with philosophy. By 
the letter of my training (all my degrees are in philosophy 
and comparative literature), I’m really a philosopher rather 
than a media theorist, even though I’m really only known as 
the latter. Part of that exhaustion came from disgust: a sense 
that philosophy and theory didn’t really care about the world 
at all, but only exclusive clubs of academic esoterics. In that 
respect, I don’t think it’s an accident that the return to real-
ism comes at a time when the academy (and particularly the 
humanities) are in crisis. I’ve written a much more extensive 
and pointed indictment of this problem elsewhere (http://
www.bogost.com/blog/the_turtlenecked_hairshirt.shtml), but 
for our purposes here I can boil it down to this: in order for 
humanism to reenter the world that it has forsaken, isn’t a 
strong dose of realism a requirement?
There’s something else going on too: at the same time that 
the humanities are struggling with their survival, the sciences 
appear stronger than ever. We’re even seeing some human-
ists adopt scientific or social-scientific approaches wholesale 
in the hopes that they might offer succor or even rescue 
(cognitive science is the commonest balm). But despite their 
history, the sciences are becoming ever more correlationist, 
focused outward rather than inward, concerned with human 
application and innovation more than with nature. I made 
this point in much more detail at the recent Object Oriented 
Ontology Symposium at Georgia Tech (it will appear in the 
book too), but it’s possible that the sciences are even more 
correlationist than are the humanities. Perhaps a latent sense 
of dread at this possibility is also at work.
I’m not suggesting that we must reject science, but that we 
may finally be forced to grapple with C.P. Snow’s two cultures 
problem for real. In the arts and humanities, “interdisciplin-
ary” usually means inbreeding: “French and German.” What 
happens when it must instead mean, say, media ecology and 
electrical engineering, or gastronomy and physics?
Peter Gratton: One worry that crops up time and again about 
“flat” ontologies such as yours is that it’s one thing to say that 
we need to describe relations outside of their correlation to 
human beings, but it’s another to say that those other rela-
Peter Gratton – Interview with Levi Bryant
117116
Speculations I
tions are equally valuable in some way. This is a question you 
raise obliquely in your discussion of ecological movements 
as still taking human beings as the primary actors, to which 
ecologists may reply, no, at the level of ontology, we’re fully 
on board with non-correlationist thought. But of course, this 
does not preclude the fact that ecological concerns are being 
raised because of the effect ecological devastation will have 
on human beings. What do you make of this repeated type 
of critique against flat ontologies?
Ian Bogost: For me it’s undeniable that positions adopting an 
extra-human perspective are plagued with a dilemma: how 
can a concern about that outside the human primarily service 
human interest? Ecological studies, animal studies, and other 
fields offer worthwhile perspectives, but they nevertheless 
assume the privilege of human existence. I’m not saying that 
we should gun the engines of our SUVs to more rapidly reach 
our slaughterhouses, but I do think flat ontology forces us to 
ask more sophisticated questions about the impacts of object 
actions on object logics. Is it even possible for humans to act 
in the interest of ferns?
One major philosophical difficulty for flat ontology is the risk 
of nihilism: if nothing is any more important than anything 
else, then it might seem that it doesn’t matter if anything does 
or doesn’t exist. But instead, I think object-oriented ontology 
is an existentially replete philosophy. A promiscuous ontol-
ogy, as Levi Bryant and I sometimes call it. Still, that doesn’t 
address the problem of the quality of existence.
Nothing about adopting flat ontology precludes one from 
living according to a code of values, or from adopting a politics 
of action, or from evangelizing in favor of such codes and ac-
tions. But if metaphysics, rather than epistemology or ethics, 
is first philosophy, then we also cannot shy away from difficult 
questions about the implications of any object’s acts. Do ob-
jects themselves have values? Does the Spanish moss or the 
waffle have its own ethics, and how would we know if it did? 
Ought we to force our human code onto all things, or ought 
we to withdraw into a sort of universal version of Star Trek’s 
Prime Directive? These questions are no longer ontological 
ones, and I don’t necessarily claim that flat ontology should 
be asked to answer them, no more than tugboats should be 
asked to conjugate verbs.
On the one hand, I see this as a valid and worthwhile future 
work (Alien Ethics, perhaps). But on the other hand, perhaps 
its time that positions grounded in ethics ought to be asked 
to reconcile their positions to ontology, rather than vice versa.
Interview with Levi R. Bryant
“Perhaps this Calls for a New Sort of Philosophy...”
Levi R. Bryant is Professor of Philosophy at Collin College, and is 
perhaps the most prolific online writers on speculative realism 
at his blog, Larval Subjects. He is the author of Difference and 
Givenness: Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism and the 
Ontology of Immanence, co-editor of the forthcoming The 
Speculative Turn with Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman, and 
author of a number of articles on Deleuze, Badiou, Zizek, Lacan, 
and political theory. Bryant was a practicing Lacanian analyst, 
and thus understands well the areas of contemporary Continental 
philosophy that he critiques as too irrealist. His “onticology” is the 
focus of his Democracy of Objects (forthcoming from Re.Press).
Peter Gratton: One of the virtues of speculative realism as 
a “movement” is how approachable its main thinkers are. 
There are pitfalls to this: when writing a late night post, one 
says things more quickly than one would in a journal article. 
But you also can write about things not necessarily in one’s 
area but is of philosophical concern to you. Thus I’d like to 
begin, as I did with Graham Harman, with a self-referential 
question about what you make of this new environment: do 
you find it a new way of doing philosophy? Or is it simply a 
return to the kind of dialogues and letter forms of writing 
philosophers did in previous eras?
Levi Bryant: I’m glad you asked this question because in 
many respects it gets right to the heart of the significance of 
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to reconcile their positions to ontology, rather than vice versa.
Interview with Levi R. Bryant
“Perhaps this Calls for a New Sort of Philosophy...”
Levi R. Bryant is Professor of Philosophy at Collin College, and is 
perhaps the most prolific online writers on speculative realism 
at his blog, Larval Subjects. He is the author of Difference and 
Givenness: Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism and the 
Ontology of Immanence, co-editor of the forthcoming The 
Speculative Turn with Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman, and 
author of a number of articles on Deleuze, Badiou, Zizek, Lacan, 
and political theory. Bryant was a practicing Lacanian analyst, 
and thus understands well the areas of contemporary Continental 
philosophy that he critiques as too irrealist. His “onticology” is the 
focus of his Democracy of Objects (forthcoming from Re.Press).
Peter Gratton: One of the virtues of speculative realism as 
a “movement” is how approachable its main thinkers are. 
There are pitfalls to this: when writing a late night post, one 
says things more quickly than one would in a journal article. 
But you also can write about things not necessarily in one’s 
area but is of philosophical concern to you. Thus I’d like to 
begin, as I did with Graham Harman, with a self-referential 
question about what you make of this new environment: do 
you find it a new way of doing philosophy? Or is it simply a 
return to the kind of dialogues and letter forms of writing 
philosophers did in previous eras?
Levi Bryant: I’m glad you asked this question because in 
many respects it gets right to the heart of the significance of 
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object-oriented ontology for disciplines outside of philoso-
phy. It is sometimes mistakenly suggested that OOO seeks 
to eradicate the human, when in fact OOO is interested in 
broadening the domain of philosophical inquiry to make 
room for nonhuman actors or objects in addition to humans. 
Since Descartes, philosophy has tended to obsess on a single 
relation or gap between humans and objects, focusing almost 
exclusively on how subjects or humans represent objects. 
In many instances, this tradition reduces objects to their 
representations by humans, treating objects as mere passive 
vehicles that carry these representations without contribut-
ing any differences of their own. OOO wants to escape this 
sort of representationalism and this exclusive focus on the 
relation between the human and the world in representation. 
And part of the reason OOO wishes to escape what Harman 
has called the “bland human-world gap” is that it believes that 
we cannot properly understand human collectives without 
taking into account the role that nonhuman actors play in 
these collectives. And here, above all, it’s important to avoid 
treating these nonhuman objects as passive vehicles for hu-
man representations.
Initially this seems unrelated to your question, but it helps 
to situate, I think, the question of what role the internet has 
played in the development of speculative realism and object-
oriented ontology. Here the key point would be that there is 
no such thing as a neutral medium. Rather, whenever agents 
interact through a medium, whether that medium be speech, 
writing, smoke signals, comics, video, music, clay, text mes-
saging, the internet, etc., the medium both affords possibili-
ties of interaction that would not be possible in any other 
medium, and constrains possibilities. In terms of McLuhan’s 
tetrad, we should always ask “what does the medium enhance 
or intensify?” and “what does it render obsolete or displace?”
A representational account of the internet would tend to 
reduce it to its status as a tool or implement for human prac-
tices and intention. Here the nonhuman actor—in this case 
the internet—becomes invisible or erased behind the human 
intention. The implement itself, one would say, is largely ir-
relevant as the tool is thoroughly explained in terms of the 
structure of human intentionality. Here we might think of 
Heidegger’s analysis of tools, where strangely tools in their 
being as objects don’t appear at all. Rather, we get an analysis 
of the “for-the-sake-of-which”, the “in-order-to”, the “in-which”, 
etc. The tool is merely a vehicle or carrier for these human 
intentions.
One thing OOO would like to understand is what differ-
ences objects contribute, over and above the human intentions 
thrown over them like a spider’s web. Like any object or set 
of objects, the internet constrains and affords possibilities of 
interaction among humans in unique ways. In Understanding 
Media, McLuhan writes that we should seek to understand how 
“…the medium…shapes and controls the scale and form of 
human association and action” (9). Additionally, we should 
seek to understand how the medium in-forms content. As for 
the scale and pace of human associations, and with respect 
to philosophy in particular, the blogosphere has tended 
towards overturning the hegemony of the academy or the 
university system. Traditionally philosophy has taken place 
in expensive and hard to obtain academic journals, difficult 
to find philosophy texts, and professional conferences that 
can be very expensive to attend. And by and large the “price 
of admission” in any of these venues has been an advanced 
degree of some sort. Further, in many cases articles in jour-
nals are seldom read, but you also get group networks of 
like-minded philosophers that begin controlling the content 
of journals, what articles will be published, what articles will 
not be published, and whose articles will be published.
The blogosphere significantly challenges these institutions 
by bringing people together that come from both inside and 
outside the academy, and by enabling the possibility of philo-
sophical movements that emerge outside of the gatekeepers 
of the journals and conferences. 
It is unlikely, for example, that SR would have taken the 
form it has taken had the blogosphere not existed. To be sure, 
certain books might still have been published, but rather than 
coagulating into a loose movement it’s likely they would have 
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nals are seldom read, but you also get group networks of 
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by bringing people together that come from both inside and 
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of the journals and conferences. 
It is unlikely, for example, that SR would have taken the 
form it has taken had the blogosphere not existed. To be sure, 
certain books might still have been published, but rather than 
coagulating into a loose movement it’s likely they would have 
Peter Gratton – Interview with Levi Bryant
120 121
Speculations I
been aberrant texts soon forgotten. This is because the Con-
tinental philosophy journals and conferences are currently 
dominated by certain forms of philosophy inimical to both 
the style and content of SR. However, with the internet it be-
came possible to form collectives and discussions outside of 
the academy that brought the work of very diverse thinkers 
together under a single banner. This led to the formation of 
special issues of journals and entire journals devoted to SR, 
the hosting of conferences, and the founding of presses to 
publish this work. A number of graduate students, in their 
turn, became interested in variants of this thought, pestering, 
I imagine, their professors and dissertation directors to let 
them work on these issues, thereby forcing establishment 
academia to pay more attention to this movement rather than 
dismissing it out of hand. All of this from a nonhuman actor.
Does the content of philosophy change when written in 
a blog format? A blog entry is still a form of writing so our 
initial hunch might be that the medium has no effect on the 
content. However, one only need try the experiment of writ-
ing all sentences in 45 words or less to see what a profound 
effect media can have on content. We can think of books as 
very slow moving conversations. One reason people wrote 
books was that their interlocutors were not immediately 
available. Here we might think of Leibniz’s New Essays on the 
Human Understanding which was written as a point by point 
rejoinder to John Locke. Leibniz abandoned the book when 
Locke died. The point, however, is that the book is a labor of 
time. The structure of time on the internet, by contrast, is very 
different. Where a book might be written over the course of 
years, a blog entry is written in an hour or so and presented to 
the public warts and all. Where generally responses to a book 
are very slow to come, responses to a blog entry can be very 
quick and ongoing. As a consequence, internet philosophiz-
ing tends to lead to a very quick evolution of thought where 
positions change rapidly. Perhaps this calls for a new sort 
of philosophy, where one doesn’t so much embody a fixed 
position as engage in a developing tendency of thought not 
unlike the evolution of a species over time.
Peter Gratton: The students in course have read Meillassoux’s 
After Finitude, Heidegger’s work in Being and Time and “The 
Thing,” as well as various works from Michael Dummett for 
an analytic conception of language and its own referential 
nature. We have also been following up on Graham Harman’s 
work on Latour and “object oriented philosophy.” Perhaps one 
way to begin would be to ask why you have chosen the word 
“onticology” to represent your own “object oriented” work.
Levi Bryant: I think there is a ludic dimension to object-
oriented ontology, and this comes through in my choice of 
the term “onticology” as the name for my position. The term 
“onticology” or “science of objects” for my ontology is a bit of 
a practical joke, a thumbing of the nose, not unlike Derrida’s 
call for a “grammatology.” Heidegger famously distinguished 
between the ontic and the ontological. The ontic refers to 
ordinary objects, to physical objects, to material objects, 
whereas the ontological refers to the meaning of being and 
that which bestows the being of beings. For Heidegger we 
are doomed to miss the question of being if we remain at 
the level of the ontic. Rather we must ascend to the heights 
of being and withdraw from the ontic to grasp the question 
of the meaning of being in all of its mysteriousness.
The term “onticology” suggests a refusal of this move, a 
refusal to ascend to the heights of the being of beings, so as 
to remain at the level of the world and objects. If this move 
is advisable, then this is because we have always already been 
forgetting objects. Objects become invisible to us, reduced as 
they are to passive vehicles or carriers of our representations 
and intentions. I suppose that, contra Heidegger, I intend the 
term “onticology” to suggest that it is not the forgetting of 
being that is the problem, but the forgetting of objects that’s 
the problem. We must refuse the Protagorean imperative 
whereby man is the measure of all things and the Narcissus 
that this imperative entails, so that we might encounter the 
teaming world of objects.
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the level of the ontic. Rather we must ascend to the heights 
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Peter Gratton: What is interesting in your work is that it’s 
very influenced by Latour, but you don’t go in quite the same 
direction as he does with regard to relations as the whole story 
of existence. But on the other hand, you don’t quite follow 
Harman’s work all the way in terms of what he calls “the allure” 
or the “something more” of objects. Thus a simple question: 
what strikes you as a major difference in your account from 
Harman, or if I was a tabloid interviewer, I’d write, “what do 
you think Harman has gotten so awfully wrong?”
Levi Bryant: I am, of course, deeply sympathetic to Harman’s 
work and find constant inspiration in it, nor do I think he’s 
gotten anything awfully wrong. I would say that my onticol-
ogy differs fundamentally from Harman’s ontography on 
two fundamental points: First, Harman’s objects are utterly 
concrete and actual, without any hidden potentials. For me, 
by contrast, the proper being of an object is not to be found 
in its actuality, but in its potentiality. I conceptualize objects 
as “difference engines” or “generative mechanisms,” which 
is to say that I think them as powers or capacities of doing or 
acting in the world. I thus argue that objects are split or are 
split-objects. On the one hand, you have the actualized qualities 
or properties of an object which I call the “local manifestation” 
of the object, while on the other hand you have the powers or 
capacities of an object which I refer to as its “virtual proper 
being.” The substantiality of an object is not to be found in its 
qualities, but rather in the ensemble of its powers or capacities. 
This entails that we never directly encounter an object be-
cause no object ever actualizes the totality of its powers in all 
the ways in which those powers can become manifest. Rather, 
there is always a hidden excess or reserve of potentiality that 
dwells within the object. This is why I refer to the qualities 
of an object as local manifestations of the object. They are 
actualizations of the object at a particular point in time and 
under determinate conditions or relations to other objects. 
It follows then that qualities are acts on the part of an object. 
Qualities or properties are not something an object has, but 
are something that an object does when it relates to other 
objects in the world.
To illustrate this idea, do a pseudo-phenomenological 
analysis of a colored object. Generally we think of a particular 
color as a quality that an object has or possesses. Onticology, 
by contrast, argues that color is something an object does. It 
would be better to speak of an object “coloring” than to speak 
of an object as being colored. If you doubt this, look very care-
fully at an object in the sunlight. Perhaps, for example, a blue 
coffee mug. As the clouds pass by, as the leaves rustle in the 
wind, the color of the mug changes! Now it is a deep shade 
of blue. Now it is a brilliant blue. Now it is a flat blue. Night 
approaches and the cup turns black. The color of the cup is 
not something that the object has, but rather is a power of the 
cup. The cup has “blue power”. It has the power of “blue-ing”. 
And this power differs from any of the local manifestations of 
this power. The power ranges from black to brilliant blue and 
all the shades in between. The shades that are selected in this 
phase space are a function of the relations it enters into with 
photons of light. We never directly encounter the object qua 
power, but only effects of this power in local manifestations.
The same point can be made with respect to water. The hard-
ness of water is a function of the speed or velocity at which 
it is approached. I can slip my hand through the water of an 
ocean as I ride along in a motor boat, but if I jump from a high 
flying plane the water will be as hard as cement. These are 
powers of the water manifested under determinate conditions. 
Likewise, the water is capable of undergoing phase transitions. 
Thus, under incredibly high pressure water becomes dense 
and solid like ice. Similarly, water can of course freeze and 
become hard. And again it can be a liquid or steam. Again, these 
are all local manifestations of the power of water. Onticology 
recommends that we understand objects in terms of what 
they can do, that we think of objects as acts or doings, rather 
than as beings that possess or own properties. This, I take it, 
is at odds with Harman’s thesis that objects are completely 
actual or concrete. However, I am never entirely sure we are 
in disagreement here, for Harman also argues that objects 
withdraw from all relation, such that they hide behind their 
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qualities. This sounds a lot like potentiality to me.
Second, I’ve always had difficulty understanding Harman’s 
problem of causality. Harman argues that objects can never 
relate to one another and therefore encounters a problem 
with causation. I’ve always had a difficult time understanding 
why non-relation follows from the thesis that objects with-
draw from one another. With Harman I accept the thesis that 
objects withdraw from one another, but I think I articulate 
this in a different way. Within the framework of onticology, 
withdrawal denotes the manner in which the object qua po-
tency is in excess of any of its local manifestations. There is 
always more to the object than any of its local manifestations 
at a particular point in time and under particular determinate 
conditions. Yet this doesn’t, for me, entail that objects don’t 
interact. They interact at the level of their qualities or local 
manifestations, evoking particular qualities in one another.
Peter Gratton: What I think is really interesting in your work 
is the way you reject the linguistic turn without giving up 
on all of its insights about language. You have a fully worked 
out conception of language that at the same time does the 
referencing that objects already do themselves. Is that correct?
Levi Bryant: I think that there is much of value in the lin-
guistic and semiotic turn and that it would be a mistake to 
throw out the linguistic and semiotic philosophy developed 
in the last one hundred or so years. The problem with the 
linguistic turn is that it tended to erase objects underneath 
language or the signifier. Once again, objects became mere 
vehicles or carriers for linguistic differences, contributing 
no differences of their own. This harkens back to Aristotle’s 
distinction between form and matter. Matter was treated by 
Aristotle as a passive media that received active form. Think 
about making bricks. You have the clay, then you put it in the 
mould and you get the brick. The clay simply takes on the 
form of the mould. The linguistic turn has strongly tended in 
the direction of this form/matter schema, treating objects as 
passive matters awaiting the form-giving activity of language.
With respect to the linguistic turn, my strategy is to propose 
a delicate shift in perspective. Rather than thinking in terms 
of objects passively receiving form by language, I instead 
propose that we think in terms of entanglements of objects. If 
the shift from a logic of in-forming to entanglement is advis-
able, then this is because entanglements allow us to think in 
terms of all entangled objects contributing differences of their 
own as they weave themselves together, rather than thinking 
in terms of only one agency contributing all the important 
differences. The philosopher Karen Barad suggests that we 
think these sorts of entanglements in terms of “diffraction 
patterns” in her book Meeting the Universe Halfway. A diffrac-
tion pattern is what occurs when waves intersect with one 
another. You throw a pebble into a pond and then you throw 
another pebble into a pond. Both pebbles create concentric 
patterns of waves. At some point these waves intersect creating 
a distinctive pattern as a result of the differences embodied 
in both of the waves. This is the perfect metaphor. Rather than 
thinking of one object overdetermining all the other objects 
by actively giving form to those objects, we should instead 
think of objects on a flat ontological plain among one another 
creating distinctive diffraction patterns as their differences 
interact with one another.
This is my strategy for thinking about language. I treat lan-
guage as one object relating to other non-linguistic objects. 
The question then becomes one of how these differences 
get woven into one another in distinctive ways. Rather than 
language overdetermining non-linguistic objects, we instead 
get a sort of struggle of differences as non-linguistic objects 
disrupt language in various ways and as symbolic objects 
disrupt non-linguistic objects in a variety of ways.
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qualities. This sounds a lot like potentiality to me.
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viewer for Post Continental Voices (Zer0 Books, 2010), which 
is an excellent set of interviews from some of the younger voices 
in the field and has a well-conceived introduction that takes the 
measure of a certain change taking place in what he calls “Post 
Continental” philosophy.
Peter Gratton: First, why don’t you tell us a bit about your 
own research…?
Paul Ennis: In the book, and my work more generally, I am 
trying to take the measure of some kind of shift. The label 
‘post-continental’ is a pretty general one but I hope people read 
it as developing ‘on top’ of continental thinking rather than a 
simple process of supersession. As I note in the introduction 
to Post-Continental Voices many of the people interviewed are 
still tied, to varying degrees, to the continental tradition. In 
my own research I’m trying to do a hermeneutics of the real 
and I am trying to work out what it means to be a ‘continental 
realist.’ Hence my dissertation has the rather blunt name 
‘Continental Realism.’ Like a lot of the younger generation 
I struggle to track of all the changes that are happening in 
academic philosophy. These days philosophy moves at a stun-
ningly rapid pace. Badiou and Deleuze are talked about as if 
they’d lived in the nineteenth century. Speculative realism 
is already discussed in the past tense. Derrida seems to come 
from the ancestral realm itself.
But with all this rapid change I think we might end up losing 
some of the good in the old (broadly antirealist) continental 
tradition. I like to call my position ontic phenomenology or 
phenomenological realism, but I’m also sympathetic to the 
term ‘transcendental realism’ that is cropping up more and 
more. These are just different ways of saying that I think it is 
possible to keep bits of the transcendental/phenomenological 
method as we become increasingly realist. But that I think 
we should become more realist means that my natural home 
will likely not be in ‘traditional’ phenomenology. In a way 
I’m between worlds.
I think the job of the ontologist is to find ways to articulate 
how the ‘real’ [the things ‘out there’] mix it up with the ‘ideal’ 
[the mental states ‘in here’]. I really respect the new realism 
that has tried to establish a flat ontology. There is no vertical 
ontological totem pole. If there is an axiom shared among 
people I like to read then that is probably it. My best hopes 
would be to contribute to this task by seeing what it looks when 
we reintegrate the subject back into this evolving picture. I 
do think that the ideal/phenomenal is ‘within’ reality i.e. is 
realized with/in the real, but I also find it hard to see how I 
discuss the real with coming at it from ‘my end.’ Until I solve 
this I’ll have to keep the phenomenological/transcendental 
method before I become a fully fledged realist. 
Peter Gratton: What interests me is that you have one foot firmly 
planted in the phenomenological tradition that Heidegger, 
for good or bad, represents. Do you think there is still a need 
for airing out the “pre-Continental” voices (that is, coming 
from before anyone recognized a “Continental” tradition)?
Paul Ennis: I do think my position is odd. I lead a double life. 
Offline I exist in a pretty strong and old-school phenomenology 
department (University College, Dublin). Whenever I bump 
into people at a conference and tell them which department 
I am in they tend to associate it with phenomenology. 
So for the most part, in my ‘normal’ graduate work, I read 
people like Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and 
Derrida. Our latest reading group is on Hegel. As far as I am 
aware nobody in my department works on Deleuze or Badiou 
and certainly not speculative realism! This might shock some 
people who would probably see phenomenology as belonging 
to the history of ideas and this is also something people tell 
me all the time when I tell them I work on Heidegger. When 
I read about anti-correlationism I have a pretty good under-
standing of who is under attack because I spend all my time 
reading what Meillassoux considers the correlationist tradition. 
I think, and you can see it in the responses to Meillassoux so 
far, that he is a little unfair. But then again he seems to know 
this. If I had discovered After Finitude a year or two later I 
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might even have bypassed phenomenology and worked on 
something more contemporary but in the long run I think 
it is better that I will have the more traditional background.
But one major bonus of anti-correlationism for the cor-
relationists is that, despite the critique, Meillassoux respects 
the transcendental method and he even insists that the pas-
sage to the absolute must be internal to that tradition. This 
means people will start revisiting correlationist texts and 
looking at them with fresh eyes. I think something that will 
happen more and more is that people will come to review 
the continental tradition. They will either come out on the 
side of the correlationists or the anti-correlationists but, in 
classic Hegelian fashion, this is a necessary fusion and per-
haps precisely what is needed. It might not be framed as a 
confrontation between correlationism/anti-correlationism 
but perhaps as realism/antirealism, empirical/transcendental 
and so on. Meillassoux zeroes in on that mood and I think 
that is why After Finitude has proved so popular.
Peter Gratton: And yet you also have another foot firmly 
planted in the new realism movement, blogging about it 
often and as editor of Speculations. To mix up the metaphors 
a bit, are you able to bring some harmony to these pre and 
post-Continental voices in your head?
Paul Ennis: It is difficult but no more confusing than how it 
feels to engage with Anglo-American/analytic philosophers. 
It is really a case of ‘translation’ and learning to recognize 
how people say the same things in a different register. A major 
issue has been trying to play catch up with the background 
figures. If you want to read Harman you need some Latour, 
if you want to read Grant you need some Schelling, if you 
want to read Meillassoux then Badiou is helpful, and if you 
want to read Brassier some Deleuze is necessary. But I think 
it is healthy to get mixed up in all this. Since getting into 
speculative realism I can no longer read Heidegger the way 
I did before. You start to discover just how wildly different 
the world can look if you start with Deleuze instead of Der-
rida. Rather oddly it has made me turn back to the classics 
of phenomenology in recent months. 
For the most part I always try to operate somewhere on the 
middle ground (except when it comes to certain issues: I can 
get quite worked up about ‘inflationary’ narratives or about 
what Meillassoux calls the ‘religionizing of reason’). But I 
know that I am doomed to misinterpret positions and to slip 
up from time to time. Philosophy can be quite harsh in that 
sense. You need about four or five thick skins to keep going. 
But here is where the name phenomenological realism is 
handy. It signals to people, I hope, that my allegiance is not to 
any kind of faction or tradition. You can see this in the name 
speculative realism itself: it is an ‘umbrella’ term for four 
thinkers with not so much in common (in the positive sense, 
critically they are much closer). For instance Meillassoux is a 
materialist and not a realist, but it doesn’t really matter. These 
terms are just handy terms for expressing a whole bunch of 
assemblages. We should not get too hung up on them. 
But the best way to harmonize those voices is to attend pa-
pers, reading groups and social events populated by people 
who are not doing what you are doing. You will feel like an 
idiot and you probably won’t understand much, but you’ll 
soon discover that you do have a position of sorts. There is 
no point is refining your phenomenology with, say, Sartre 
as a foil. You have to sharpen it in dialogue with people who 
think phenomenology is pointless. If you can’t at least convince 
them that it has some merit then something has gone wrong. 
And we are lucky in this regard today because we have been 
bequeathed with problems rather than dogmas. Even a casual 
cross-tradition conversation will reveal a shared attitude that 
there is much work to be done and that the time of exegesis 
is perhaps coming to an end for a short period.
Peter Gratton: Let’s turn more specifically to Heidegger. There 
has been, at least in the Anglo-American tradition, a copious 
amount of work on Heidegger and the question of realism 
(Hubert Dreyfus’s edited collection on Heidegger has a least 
four essays on the topic). Yet, of course, this work also sug-
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gests that Heidegger is not an easy fit for the double test of 
what traditionally has been the two-pronged test of realism: 
independence and existence.
Paul Ennis: I think that Heidegger is not an easy fit for the 
test of realism because he spent his entire career trying to 
circumvent all these tidy categories. This is what I think irked 
Europeans when they encountered the American pragmatist 
reading of Heidegger. It is weird, but it is quite possible here to 
read Heidegger (or any major continental thinker) and never 
have to deal with the issue of realism/antirealism because the 
ideal or phenomenal is assumed to take precedence. It doesn’t 
help that one can just point to the ontic part his distinction 
and say ‘there be the real.’ It is the ultimate get-out clause. 
Harman has, of course, made sure that nobody can pull that 
move so easily these days and he has done much to rescue 
Heidegger from becoming staid.
There is a very important sense that there are no singular 
(or independent) things in (the early) Heidegger. Things ‘are’ 
only in so much as they are used or in so much as they are 
equipment. He reserves the word existence for Dasein alone. 
There are many reasons for this: Dasein is the questioner 
whose being is an issue for it, stones don’t care…they lie 
around like the geometric points of the Cartesian world. So 
Dasein has or owns its existence to put a positive spin on it. 
One might say that Dasein is special because it knows that 
it exists (although not exactly why!).
Now Dasein’s special role is that of worlding and even articu-
lating being. Dasein, one might say, is the meaning giver—in 
this sense Heidegger is close to his mentor Husserl and his 
discussion of sense-bestowal. So Dasein and being are in a 
kind of relationship of recognition. All the ‘real’ things only 
make ‘sense’ because they are within the world(s) produced 
by the many Daseins. One could conceivably imagine a world 
without Dasein but there would be no meaning produced in 
this world and technically it wouldn’t even be a world. So it all 
comes down to whether you think the real can still be made 
sense of without Dasein—without world. 
Peter Gratton: In some sense, the tension in Heidegger is 
that once we think the “independence” of some entity, it’s 
difficult then to appraise its “existence”….
Paul Ennis: You touch on the classic problem for Heidegger—
and Hegel too. If you are the one thinking the independent 
object then you are adding something additional to that 
object, in Hegel’s words the medium (i.e. you) is ‘reshaping’ 
the object. So how can you claim to be discussing the purely 
independent object? Heidegger would add drawing on Kant 
that even the attribution of existence to some-thing is com-
ing from your end. The concept existence is not something 
one finds in objects (existence is not inherent in objects—it 
belongs to a very special being known as Dasein)—it is 
something we use to articulate our world, i.e. to make sense 
of things. As such, when Heidegger is disparaging people 
about talking about the existence of objects, this is not meant 
as an attempt to downgrade things but to show that (as the 
worlding or the house of being) it is you who is bringing that 
‘layer’ of existence into the picture and in order to help you 
make sense of being in the world. The things are there, but 
without you they would not ‘exist’ but they do not need you 
to go about their business!
Peter Gratton: You’ve scoped out well the terrain that we’re 
trying to cover in this course. It seems the crucial problem 
is that we often mix up “meaning” and “existence,” and a lot 
of the problem of any discussion of “realism” is the fact that 
the word “real” is equivalent in English and a slew of other 
languages for “it’s meaningful.” I wonder if you could discuss 
the nature of this “aporia.” Just to define the term, as Derrida 
and others use it, it’s a Greek term that means “without-a-path” 
or “dead-end,” and Derrida held that in discussing certain 
concepts we will be led to certain impasses or dead-ends 
that can’t be surmounted. Thus, for example, one may say 
that in Heidegger we reach the limits of his thought with 
the “arche-fossil,” that is, with some entity that is neither a 
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that in Heidegger we reach the limits of his thought with 
the “arche-fossil,” that is, with some entity that is neither a 
Peter Gratton – Interview with Paul Ennis
132 133
Speculations I
thing (in his later sense) nor another Dasein (I’ll leave aside 
the animal for now…) And I think you’re right to point out 
the different Heidegger here in the US than in Europe. In my 
own training, I tended to take up the Heidegger of Europe: 
the deconstructionist of the history of philosophy. But of 
course, in the US for years, Heidegger has been brought, by 
Hubert Dreyfus and others, to bear on contemporary debates 
in analytic philosophy, not least on the question of realism. 
But it seems, coming back to your suggestion about language, 
that Anglo American philosophy just uses Heidegger to aug-
ment the concepts on hand, and thus we don’t seem to have 
an advance over the question of the arche-fossil. In any event, 
I’ll end this question by keeping it simple: how would you 
define realism if for a phenomenologist like yourself, since 
as you suggest Heidegger can’t discuss the “independence” 
of things…
Paul Ennis: I think a major problem is the temptation to fit 
people into neat categories. We argue endlessly as to whether 
Hegel is an idealist or Derrida is a realist…It can be inter-
esting but with a thinker like Heidegger it is not a case of 
discovering whether he a realist or an idealist because he 
is simply not engaged in that kind of debate. He has a very 
peculiar, singular direction and it is foremost an ontological 
rather than an epistemological issue. It is worth nothing that 
Heidegger would probably have shrugged his shoulders at the 
aporia of the arche-fossil. I can imagine him saying ‘It is all 
very well talking about this ancestral realm but what does it 
tell me about Being?’ Since the ancestral realm is the ‘time 
before being’ then it does not operate within the horizon that 
Heidegger is working—but I think, just to cover Heidegger a 
little, it would be more the case that the ancestral realm does 
not have temporality. So you can still have the ‘real’ and even 
assign it a ‘linear’ time and perhaps even a progressive stamp 
but this is an ontic concern and it does not help him answer 
the question of the meaning of being. Heidegger has a space 
for the real, the ontic, and so on but for Heidegger it is not 
all that important (for his concerns at least).
I would add that since the ancestral realm is without being 
we can also add, and here Heidegger I think makes sense, that 
this is because there is no-one around to articulate being (so 
it might be sort of there in un-actualized ‘form’). My own 
personal take is that we are but one aspect to the world but 
since human existence is by no means necessary then real 
things would carry on but without that interesting dimen-
sion we contribute. For me the phenomenal and the real are 
happening alongside each other. It goes back to the totem 
pole i.e. being able to think ontology flatly. 
Peter Gratton: I don’t want to take up too much of your time, 
and you’ve helped quite a bit already, but I would just fol-
low up with a question about this last part: I worry that in 
Meillassoux and your answer here—and when I say “worry,” 
I mean I don’t know what to do with it myself—is this split 
between the real and phenomenal. For those who don’t know 
(and there are many people reading this not in the course) 
Meillassoux argues that there a “chaotic in-itself” fully de-
scribable through the mathematics of set theory. This would 
be his “real,” if one could put it that way. On the other hand, 
you would have the phenomenal: the world as it appears to us. 
Here you suggest something similar: sure, we can talk about 
meaning, but only in terms of the phenomenal; reality itself 
is ana-logos (without language or reason) and the moment 
we attempt to describe it we bring it into the phenomenal. 
Is this a fair summary? What I mean is that you say, look, we 
don’t need to choose sides: we can have our Heidegger and 
we can have our mathematical and other considerations of 
the in-itself. And Heidegger would be, I suppose, really good 
at giving description beyond Kant to your equipmental being 
in the world, and thus leave a certain division of labour to 
those who would describe the Real in scientific terms.
Paul Ennis: This pretty much sums it up for me quite well. 
I’m not particularly interested in antagonistic philosophy 
i.e. picking a side and arguing it to the end. These are some 
problems that require phenomenology and some that require 
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mathematics. There might even be some kind of problem that 
requires a blending of the two. So I am often searching for 
a middle way between the two—to divide the labour as you 
put it. There is also the problem that many people simply 
cannot follow Meillassoux or Badiou when it comes to the 
mathematics. So we might need to draw on something else 
to explain their point as when theoretical physicists write 
popular science books and leave out the mathematics. 
For instance as a phenomenologist I tend to think that it is 
not my task to describe the real (as it is ‘in-itself’). I am happy 
to defer to scientists or mathematicians when it comes to 
what happens in the real, but I also want to hear what meta-
physicians have to say about it. Why not after all have many 
voices trying to articulate the real? But personally I have 
never been able to shake that basic skepticism that when 
they tell me about it they must translate the ‘real’ somehow. 
They have to bestow sense on this pure real and, of course, it 
is now implicated in our coordinates. I would say it is now 
implicated in the phenomenal. It has become phenomenal. 
The hard part for most people is to avoid claiming that the 
real has now been eradicated! 
There is an old description of phenomenology that I picked 
up years ago that might be helpful here: Imagine for a mo-
ment that intentionality is a torch. The torch illuminates 
all kinds of things and if you think of the light emitted as 
including language, meaning and so on then the area that 
gets ‘trapped’ within its luminescence is the phenomenal. 
But we can move the torch around and uncover all kinds of 
things that were not lit up. This is how I tend to think of the 
idealist versus realist position. The idealist thinks the torch 
is all powerful and the realist thinks the torch over-estimates 
itself. We should just see this process as it is: The torch is at 
once in the real and lighting up aspects of the real. 
Comparing the object in Alain Badiou’s ‘materialist Platonism’ and Graham Harman’s object 
oriented ‘speculative realism’ might at first seem an esoteric 
exercise in joining dots across great lengths. On the one 
hand, Badiou’s approach to objects in the Logics of Worlds 
(low) operates through the Platonic codetermination of 
thought and being via axiomatically deduced mathematical 
structures—because what can be thought mathematically is, 
the object can therefore be fully deduced. On the other hand, 
Harman’s theory is grounded in objects (cars, rocks, ice cream, 
Harry Potter, Gandalf, etc.) that withdraw in their compete 
reality from the thinking subject—or indeed any other ob-
ject, including their inanimate cohorts. For Harman objects 
present us with an inaccessible, withdrawn reality which can 
never be fully exhausted; and, like black holes in astronomy, 
one can only circle around whilst speculating about the 
depths within. Thinking the object in Badiou’s philosophy 
in contrast to Harman’s thinking of the object thus seems 
to run aground at the very first hurdle: at the level of their 
fundamental decision regarding how ontology should be 
situated. Add to this the fact that Badiou identifies himself 
as a materialist and an atomist, whereas Harman rejects both 
of these paradigms, and we appear to have two philosophies 
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that could work more as a differential heuristic than as a site 
of productive philosophical exchange. 
Yet despite all these factors rendering a criss-crossed read-
ing of these two thinkers seemingly unlikely, they also share 
some common ground. Both the atomic relationism utilised 
by Alain Badiou to secure objects, and also the securisation 
of the integrity of individual objects and their parts in Har-
man’s philosophy, both rely on some sort of infinite relation 
to secure finite being; whether that is ‘inaccessible’ infinitude 
for Badiou, or the infinite regress for Harman. It will thus 
be argued that Harman’s aversion to mathematisation has 
no obvious basis within his object oriented philosophy, but 
rather rests in the philosophy’s ambiguity regarding ‘ideal’ 
structures; an ambiguity, which vice versa dogs low in its vast 
array of metaphors between its ‘ideal’ mathematical objects 
and it’s phenomenal examples. The similar trajectories of the 
two ontologies point, then, to the unresolved question of the 
nomological structure of the world. To proceed to this point it 
is necessary to first examine Badiou’s axioms of materialism, 
noting how he secures (1) individual objects via the tran-
scendental index; and (2) the way the infinite relation folds 
into the ontological realm of ‘inaccessible infinity’. The next 
section compares this to Harman’s aversion to relationism, in 
that for him there is always more to a withdrawn object than 
the sum of its relations. Harman rather shifts the problem 
to an infinite regress within the relations of the parts of the 
object to itself. The conclusion outlines some possible future 
avenues for thinking both objects and change.
Badiou’s Axioms of Materialism
Alain Badiou’s low presents two axioms of materialism, which 
attempt to secure individual objects and their procedures for 
change in the onto-logical domain of being-there. They are:
1. Objects appear as ones in a world
2. The ontological closure of a world implies its logical 
completeness
(1) On account of Badiou’s first axiom—objects appear as ones 
in a world; that is, where being is localised—it is important 
to place this somewhat strange understanding of material-
ism in distinction to how materialism is generally thought. 
Scientific materialism for the most part wishes to reduce 
reality to its smallest constituent parts, whether that be mol-
ecules, atoms, electrons, or sub-particular strings, thereby 
occluding thinking the reality of objects on different scales. 
On the other hand, for Badiou everything that “appears” as 
one—although it is important not to be fooled by the use 
of these “metaphorical” verbs; we are not talking phenom-
enology here—simply is one. For Badiou this is axiomatic 
not because of folk inferences from the phenomenal world 
as presenting singular objects, but rather because ones can 
be thought, for his Platonism they thus exist. To take one of 
his more perplexing examples, insofar as the neo-classical 
columns in Hubert Robert’s painting can be thought as one, 
they thus are one—despite the fact that it is unlikely that any 
reductionist, materialist function could be assigned to the 
arrangement of colour and stroke. In the same way Badiou 
would also consider a star as a one, a helium atom in the star 
as one, and an anarchist in part of an anarchist collective as 
one. Their relations to one another assure the ascending and 
descending scale of objects that can be considered as ones. 
And significantly, in comparison to Being and Event (b&e), the 
oneness of these atoms are not established through an act of 
counting against their ontological multiplicity (by their being 
simply counted as one2 in a representative structure). Rather, 
the oneness of atoms in being-there is grounded via the ‘tran-
scendental index’ of objects to one another: where one object 
inhabits a maximum intensity of existence, and one object 
the minimal, thereby placing a series of objects in relation 
to one another through an ‘envelope’ and simultaneously 
assuring their existence as individual objects. At this stage in 
the exposition identity and difference are given as part of the 
axiomatic of the appearance of ones, because mutatis mutandis 
without difference to determine identity ones could not exist. 
Exactly how their differences are determined is, however, left 
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open at this stage. The transcendental structure he describes 
is thought in mathematics as a complete Heyting algebra.3 
And yet, the properties which allow this scale to operate—and 
he insists that this be thought in the absence of subjective 
evaluation—necessitates a theory of relation, which attains 
objectivity of its own accord. 
(2) In the third part of the Greater Logic on relation Badiou 
presents the second thesis of materialism: “The Ontological 
Closure of a World Implies its Logical Completeness.”4 Utilis-
ing sheaf theory, Badiou posits that all relations between two 
atoms can be observed from the standpoint of a third. And 
the relation between this third and another atom can then 
be evaluated from yet another third position, and so on and 
so on. Badiou makes this move to allow a relational guaran-
tee in the absence of the gaze of a subject, whilst at the same 
time—like in b&e—avoiding any recourse to something like 
the One of Aristotle’s unmoved mover, or similar theological 
premises. He argues that the sequence of relations does not 
just tend to infinity but reaches actual infinity. Since there is 
no temporality in the logics of being-there the relation whilst 
constructed linearly in its exposition can be thought of as 
immediately infinite. As such, in a familiar move for read-
ers of b&e, at infinity there is a partitive excess of belonging 
over inclusion. Once the relation reaches actual infinity, the 
parts within that infinite relation reach an excess over the 
elements and thus retroact (ontology → logical being) such 
that the necessity of any final gaze is made redundant by the 
folding of infinity upon itself. This ontological substratum 
of infinite multiplicity is “inaccessible” (or “forever with-
held”5 in John Milbank’s reading) because the infinite is the 
withdrawn determination of the world. 
These ideas mark a return to various philosophical/theologi-
cal speculations on the infinite as grounding finite being. But 
Badiou introduces an asymmetry into the relation, in that for 
him even though the One does not exist—ontology is infinite, 
inconsistent multiplicity—it still provides the conditions for 
the ones of atoms to ‘appear’. Or, at least, the conditions of 
how they logically appear,6 with their inaccessible multiplicity 
lurking beneath the surface. But as this brief exposition has 
shown Badiou is a self-declared relationist, in the sense that 
for an event to locally actualise change the entire infinite 
network of relations has to retroact upon the situated world of 
those atoms. His insistence at the start of the low that worlds 
are only ever local7—thus avoiding the implications of total-
ity, even in the logical realm—are not obviously concomitant 
with the infinite relation he posits; other than perhaps in the 
sense that after Cantor the infinite was pluralized. 
If we were to imagine Harman checking a score sheet of 
Badiou’s philosophy of the object, then, this is what I imagine 
he would write:
1. Badiou is a relationist in that individual objects are never 
more than their situation in a series of relations – con
2. Badiou’s ‘atoms’ bear more resemblance to objects than the 
reductionist notions of normal materialism, whether they be 
thought of as atoms, protons, quarks, or superstrings – pro
3. There is an infinite withdrawal (inaccessible infinitude) 
in Badiou’s theory of objects which forms the ontological 
heart of his theory – ?? 
It remains to be demonstrated how Harman also arrives at a 
similar infinite regress as the inaccessible/withdrawn heart 
of his theory of objects and how it differs from Badiou’s.
Harman Contra Relationism
In speculating about objects, Graham Harman extends Hei-
degger’s analysis of the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand 
distinction of ‘tool-being’ to posit a system of vicarious cau-
sation between objects. Because for Harman all objects are 
withdrawn in their full being from one another, they cannot 
be exhausted by the relations in which they are entangled, 
such that—on the contrary in relationism—each individual 
could be defined fully by the total network in which it is em-
bedded. Against his antagonist Whitehead he writes: “insofar 
as an object is more than its relations it must stand apart 
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ity, even in the logical realm—are not obviously concomitant 
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Harman Contra Relationism
In speculating about objects, Graham Harman extends Hei-
degger’s analysis of the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand 
distinction of ‘tool-being’ to posit a system of vicarious cau-
sation between objects. Because for Harman all objects are 
withdrawn in their full being from one another, they cannot 
be exhausted by the relations in which they are entangled, 
such that—on the contrary in relationism—each individual 
could be defined fully by the total network in which it is em-
bedded. Against his antagonist Whitehead he writes: “insofar 
as an object is more than its relations it must stand apart 
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from any supposed monism of the world-as-a-whole, since a 
homogenous universe of this kind merely gives us the most 
radical form of relationism.”8 Reacting against this tendency 
he observes: “The philosophical world has just spent an entire 
century nurturing everything that pertains to contexts and 
wholes. It is individual rocks and flowers that are now cry-
ing for our attention; this is now the more fertile cropland 
for twenty-first-century philosophy. And it is my view that 
Heideggerian tool-being, interpreted properly, is the swift-
est vehicle to propel us toward a new theory of objects.”9 A 
memorable example given in Tool-Being (tb) is of a washing 
machine sitting on the icy surface of a frozen lake. Although 
the two objects are touching, with the strength of the ice 
counteracting the gravitational pull of the washing machine 
sitting on top, neither realities of the objects are exhausted in 
the interaction. There is always more to the washing machine 
than the forces exerted upon the lake can detect. And vice 
versa there is more to the lake than the washing machine 
can detect; whose encounter with it remains at the level of 
its resisting surface. Harman writes: “the appliance reacts 
to some features of the lake rather than others—cutting its 
rich actuality down to size, reducing it to the that relatively 
minimal scope of lack-reality that is of significance to it.”10 So, 
for instance, the fact that the water below might be poisonous 
to fish would not only be undetectable, but irrelevant to the 
washing machine. 
Universalise this analysis and we have a general theory of 
the withdrawal and inexhaustion of all objects in the universe 
from one another. Rather than a uniform lump of matter 
constituting the homogenous substance of the universe, we 
are left with an invisible realm where there is always more to 
objects than can be detected by other objects. The ontological 
difference is rendered as immanent to objects: ontological 
being lurks behind the ontical appearance of objects. Yet 
Harman is also keen to remind his readers that “this is not 
a ‘two-world theory’ of the usual kind, in which a supposed 
real world inhabits one plane of reality and human images 
another. If we speak of a real hammer that withdraws from all 
relation, this hammer is still the relational product of pieces 
that are still more deeply withdrawn; these hammer-pieces 
in turn are relational compounds of other withdrawn real 
objects, and thus presumably to infinity.”11 
Harman’s criticisms of Xavier Zubiri are instructive here 
for understanding what he means by an object. For the ex-
amples of large scale, phenomenal objects such as washing 
machines, whilst not outside of his theory, at the same time 
are not totally representative of it. The question that arises 
in object-oriented philosophy, in which total relationism is 
rejected, is what constitutes an object, i.e. where an individual 
object’s limits lie and how composite objects are assembled to 
take on an integrative reality of their own? Harman criticises 
Zubiri’s notion of substantial unities between certain objects. 
For instance, where hydrogen and chlorine can be consid-
ered in a substantial unity as hydrochloric acid, or where 
two metals in a knife remain in a stable state; but whereas at 
the same time “the same thing cannot be said of the relation 
between a single person’s heartbeat and thumbprint, or be-
tween the large and small intestines.”12 The question, then, is 
what constitutes a substantive unity which coheres an object 
as one? Rejecting the Aristotelian substance philosophy of 
Zubiri, Harman advocates a properly ontological solution 
in which every relation forms a new autonomous object. As he 
puts it: “two vicariously linked real objects do form a new 
object, since they generate a new internal space.”13 As such, 
alongside the fact that any seemingly integral object such 
as a washing machine can be decomposed into an infinite 
regress of objects of which it is constituted (right down to its 
atoms), then, equally, relations between seemingly non-integral 
composites, if they have a relation at all form a new object. 
Even a human perceiving a tree forms a new object, which 
in itself constitutes a reality inexhaustible in its relation to 
any other object or observer. It thus transpires that object 
oriented philosophy is more relational than it first appears; 
if every new relation forms an object, it only resists the total 
relationism it rejects through the horizon of withdrawal it 
concomitantly posits, where there are ontologically necessary 
holes within the relational matrix.
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In comparing Harman’s theory with Badiou’s in low the 
number of similarities, despite their obvious differences, is 
surprising. To take Badiou’s example of the lone anarchist 
amongst the group of anarchists: that group can only cohere 
as a group inasmuch as their relation—a localised relation; 
in relation to other localised relations—coheres them as a 
single unity with which they can take on a rank of inten-
sity according to the transcendental index. Obviously, this 
contradicts Harman to the extent that they have no with-
drawn reality as objects; their ontological multiplicity that 
Badiou posits has no objective, localised existence, even if 
it can ambiguously retroact upon worlds. Nevertheless, on 
a fundamental level there seems nothing to stop Harman’s 
philosophy of relation and objective withdrawal being thought 
through mathematical logics. Harman has written that he has 
“scepticism toward Badiou’s program of a return to classical 
philosophy by way of mathematics.”14 And yet, scepticism or 
not, there is no immediately apparent reason other than a 
preference for certain types of philosophical pathways why 
Harman’s theory could not be mathematised in much the 
same way as Badiou’s logics of worlds. The Heideggerian 
commitments of Harman appear only as a launch pad for 
a philosophy that leaves Heidegger far behind.
Perhaps the biggest difficulty lies in the question of access 
to the withdrawn being of objects. For since Harman insists 
upon access to the withdrawn being of objects as only pos-
sible through some sort of metaphorical intuition, to what 
extent is this dependent on everyday language? Why would 
mathematics equally not be able to access the relations? 
Since there is a parallelism between relations—which we 
can think—and their withdrawn objects—which we can-
not—mathematics would not be used to try and exhaust the 
withdrawn aspect of an object, which could be denoted in 
much the same way as the void in Badiou’s philosophy: as a 
symbolic marker for nothing. Rather, more problematic would 
be the sense in which mathematics is thought and deployed, 
because intuitionist and other constructive paradigms would 
not escape the injunction against correlationist thought. On 
the other hand, Badiou’s Platonic conception of mathemat-
ics as having immediate access to being is more fruitful for 
avoiding the correlationist trap. Although it is the case that 
in Badiou’s conception of the object there are no withdrawn 
objects—he saves this for ontological multiplicity—and his 
use of mathematics in his theory of being-there exhausts 
objects relationally, I cannot see any reason why this is con-
sequent upon mathematics per se as much as upon Badiou’s 
particular thinking through mathematics.
Perhaps a more convincing argument can be found by 
arguing negatively. If it really were the case that even a Pla-
tonic form of mathematisation was said to fail to access being, 
the alternative seems to be to endow the structures within 
everyday language with some privileged ability to intuit the 
meta-physical structure of reality. If this were the case, then 
Harman would be more Heideggerian than I read his theory as. 
Yet, equally, if it were true that in the next book there is a turn 
to using diagrams to explicate points then that alone would 
point in the direction of language not possessing unique access 
to the relations which form objects. Of course, there is large 
gap between mathematics being used to model a theory—in 
which case it is just an extension of it translated into a syn-
tactically parsimonious form—and the use of mathematics 
proper, which should be judged, as it always historically has 
been, to undermine our commonsense understanding of the 
world derived through everyday language.
Whether Badiou starts with a decision in favour of axiomatic 
set theory, or Harman begins with the tool analysis does not 
seem to be critical. Rather, the final sticking point seems to be 
the extent to which a Platonic meta-physics is really actualised 
in contingent, phenomenal worlds,15 and if/where its limits 
are? To a certain extent, the fact that Badiou can begin from 
mathematical axiomatics and Harman from phenomenol-
ogy and both arrive at a relatively similar thinking of objects 
indicates that the gap—if there is one—cannot be all that 
great. There is surely a fruitful direction for future research 
lying somewhere at the intersection of these two thinkers.
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First I would like to thank Nathan Coombs for his generosity in considering my work alongside 
that of Alain Badiou, one of the foremost philosophers in 
Europe today. More than this, there is a sense of even-hand-
edness in Coombs’s respective accounts of Badiou’s position 
and my own: he does not aggressively take sides, and shows 
genuine interest in cross-fertilizing the two positions. Hence 
it is more relaxing to write this response than is usually the 
case in such situations. I will begin with the easiest parts of 
Coombs’s article and gradually move toward the more difficult 
passages, a procedure requiring me to respond to his points 
in a different order from that in which they were made.
Coombs begins by admitting that there are glaring surface 
differences between my position and Badiou’s. Badiou ap-
proaches objects by way of a “Platonic codetermination of 
thought and being” (I would simply disagree with Badiou 
that this codetermination is Platonic). By contrast, Coombs 
notes, my position involves “objects....that withdraw in their 
complete reality from the thinking subject.” This is certainly 
accurate, with the possible caveat that the list of objects he 
offers (“cars, rocks, ice cream, Harry Potter, Gandalf”) subtly 
effaces the difference I maintain between two kinds of objects: 
real and sensual. Only real objects withdraw. There are plenty 
Response to Nathan Coombs
Graham Harman
Associate Provost for Research Administration
and Associate Professor of Philosophy
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of sensual, non-real objects that do not withdraw in the least, 
but are fully present to the mind and simply encrusted with 
superfluous qualities.1 Readers have often mistaken my long 
and inclusive lists of objects qua objects for a perfectly flat 
ontology in which genuine things are on the same footing as 
unicorns. But this is the position of the early Bruno Latour2 
(among others), not of object-oriented philosophy.
Nonetheless, Coombs aptly notes the basic difference be-
tween me and Badiou. Regardless of this difference, Coombs 
sees two points of union between us. The first is that “both 
the atomic relationism utilised by Badiou to secure objects, 
and also the securisation of the integrity of individual objects 
and their parts in Harman’s philosophy, both rely on some 
sort of infinite relation to secure finite being; whether that is 
‘inaccessible’ infinitude for Badiou, or the infinite regress for 
Harman.” Note that this supposed point of agreement (reli-
ance on infinite relation) would require me to make greater 
concessions than Badiou, since Badiou already incorporates 
relation into the heart of his theory of objects, while I hold 
that objects are not inherently constituted by relations at all. 
The second supposed point of union is that, just as Badiou 
already sings the praises of mathematisation, I should feel 
obliged to do so as well. For in Coombs’s view: “Harman’s 
aversion to mathematisation has no obvious basis within his 
object oriented philosophy, but rather rests in the philoso-
phy’s ambiguity regarding ‘ideal’ structures...” And though he 
states in passing that the same ambiguity is found in Badiou’s 
Logics of Worlds,3 Coombs’s call for mathematisation clearly 
plays more into Badiou’s hands than into my own. Despite 
Coombs’s balanced tone, he ultimately holds that it is I who 
must change: by admitting that my philosophy is relation-
dependent after all, and that there is no good reason for me 
to oppose a mathematised conception of objects.
In the section “Harman Contra Relationism,” Coombs gives 
a fine compact summary of my position. He gets the point of 
the “icy lake” example from Tool-Being,4 and notes the central 
claim that all objects withdraw from each other and not just 
from human or animal awareness. He also understands the im-
portance of my claim (against Xavier Zubíri5) that naturalness 
should be no part of the definition of objects. But when I say 
that every relation forms a new autonomous object, Coombs 
concludes that object-oriented philosophy is therefore more 
relationist than I am willing to admit. Yet this is incorrect, 
due to a series of distinctions that my critics and sometimes 
even supporters seldom note. For the past hundred years it 
has been customary to distinguish between the “internal” 
and “external” relations of any given thing. In a relationist 
ontology, all relations are internal: a thing has no reality apart 
from its relations with other things, ultimately yielding a 
holistic model of the cosmos in which all things are mutually 
defined by one another. For object-oriented philosophy, just 
as for many forms of empiricism, all relations are treated as 
external to their terms. All things withdraw absolutely from 
their relations. Since relations do exist, every philosophy 
(including mine) must account for them in some way. But 
this does not mean that every philosophy is a relationism. 
That is true only for theories of internal relation.
Now, my position also draws a further distinction within 
external relations: a droll (but not facetious) rift between the 
foreign and domestic relations of a thing. My foreign relations 
include my interactions with friends and family, the city of 
Cairo, the numerous trees on Brazil Street, the mosquitoes 
that stalk me, and the tidal forces of the moon. Surely all these 
things can affect me and often do. But these effects require 
work; they do not occur automatically just because I and these 
things both exist. Stated differently, objects withdraw from 
their foreign relations. It is certainly true that I would perish 
if all oxygen were now sucked away from Egypt by a black 
rainbow, but note that what would perish in that case is me, 
not me in my relation with oxygen, which ex hypothesi would 
be absent. Consider further the cores of nuclear reactors and 
all the lethal snakes and grams of poison that currently exist. 
Any of these objects can affect me if brought into sufficient 
proximity, but that does not mean that they are affecting me 
simply because they exist. The default state of reality is that I 
am protected by firewalls from the objects lying outside me. 
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In short, although foreign relations often find devious ways 
to corrupt and destroy their terms, this must be taken as a 
special case in need of explanation. Like all other objects I 
am withdrawn from the world, deeper than any relation I 
have with anything else.
The domestic relations of objects are somewhat different, 
though less than might be supposed. My domestic relations 
involve the very pieces of which I am composed: heart, liver, 
kidneys, red and white blood cells, neural pathways, dna, atoms, 
protons, and so forth. Clearly I need these relations in order 
to exist, in a way that I am not even dependent on oxygen: for 
I myself am irreducible to my relation with oxygen, which 
can therefore affect me only through its effects on my pieces. 
That is to say, only by destroying the relations between my 
lungs, blood cells, and brain can the absent oxygen cause me 
difficulty, not through direct effect on me as a whole. However, 
even though I am causally dependent for life on the arrange-
ment of my pieces, I am in no way ontologically dependent 
on them. Though it may sound strange, even my relations 
with my own components are external relations. This can be 
seen from a case of “redundant causation,” in which various 
cells in my body are removed or replaced, without evident 
impact on me as a whole. Further, it seems obvious that I can 
shave or cut my hair while still remaining the same person. 
So too, the one-armed or one-legged Harman would still be 
Harman after an accident. My heart could be removed and 
replaced with an artificial heart without destroying who I am. 
The point is this: object-oriented philosophy adamantly 
excludes all forms of internal relation. And in this way it 
differs markedly from Badiou, who depicts reality in a way 
wholly dependent on internal relations. For instance: “there 
exist relations immanent to any being which is inscribed in 
the world.”6 And though there is much complexity in Badiou’s 
treatment of the respective roles of appearing, objects, and 
multiplicity, of the logical and the ontological, and the atomic; 
and despite his (unconvincing) claim in Logics of Worlds that 
he has succeeded in thinking objects without subjects, I find 
no sense in which Badiou liberates objects from internal 
relations. The issue is worthy of extensive treatment, but can 
only be hinted at here.
That leaves the topic of mathematisation.Coombs notes my 
scepticism on the topic,7 but sees it as beside the point. For 
in his view “there is no immediately evident reason other 
than a preference for certain types of philosophical pathways 
why Harman’s theory could not be mathematised in much 
the same way as Badiou’s logics of worlds.” Coombs plausibly 
implies that my favored pathway is that of Heidegger, but he 
also absolves me of this bond by stating that “the Heideg-
gerian commitments of Harman appear only as a launch 
pad for a philosophy that leaves Heidegger far behind.” In 
many ways it is good to leave Heidegger far behind, and I am 
relieved that Coombs does not over-identify my position 
with Heidegger’s own. He hints that my greatest danger from 
alliance with Heidegger would be to lapse into the German 
thinker’s view that “the structures within everyday language 
[have] some privileged ability to intuit the meta-physical 
structure of reality.” Coombs assumes or at least hopes that 
I am not making this error, and optimistically records the 
rumor (which is true) that there are numerous diagrams in 
one of my forthcoming books.8 But this use of diagrams does 
not contradict my resistance to mathematised ontology. By 
no means am I saying “everyday language good, mathematics 
bad,” and hence it is irrelevant when Coombs cites the old 
scientistic trope that mathematics has always been able to 
“undermine our commonsense understanding of the world 
derived through everyday language.” After all, I too am op-
posed to the commonsense understanding of the world, as 
any reader of my rather strange books must instantly realize.
My view of everyday language, contra Coombs, is that it 
tends to reduce the world to hackneyed, prefabricated cat-
egories. What I espouse instead is a method of metaphorical 
language, which speaks of things indirectly, or says them 
without saying them: namely, by alluding to them. But this 
claim should not be identified in overly literal fashion with 
a preference for the poems of Hölderlin over the scientific 
breakthroughs of Einstein and Bohr, which moreover is not 
Graham Harman – Response to Nathan Coombs
148 149
Speculations I
In short, although foreign relations often find devious ways 
to corrupt and destroy their terms, this must be taken as a 
special case in need of explanation. Like all other objects I 
am withdrawn from the world, deeper than any relation I 
have with anything else.
The domestic relations of objects are somewhat different, 
though less than might be supposed. My domestic relations 
involve the very pieces of which I am composed: heart, liver, 
kidneys, red and white blood cells, neural pathways, dna, atoms, 
protons, and so forth. Clearly I need these relations in order 
to exist, in a way that I am not even dependent on oxygen: for 
I myself am irreducible to my relation with oxygen, which 
can therefore affect me only through its effects on my pieces. 
That is to say, only by destroying the relations between my 
lungs, blood cells, and brain can the absent oxygen cause me 
difficulty, not through direct effect on me as a whole. However, 
even though I am causally dependent for life on the arrange-
ment of my pieces, I am in no way ontologically dependent 
on them. Though it may sound strange, even my relations 
with my own components are external relations. This can be 
seen from a case of “redundant causation,” in which various 
cells in my body are removed or replaced, without evident 
impact on me as a whole. Further, it seems obvious that I can 
shave or cut my hair while still remaining the same person. 
So too, the one-armed or one-legged Harman would still be 
Harman after an accident. My heart could be removed and 
replaced with an artificial heart without destroying who I am. 
The point is this: object-oriented philosophy adamantly 
excludes all forms of internal relation. And in this way it 
differs markedly from Badiou, who depicts reality in a way 
wholly dependent on internal relations. For instance: “there 
exist relations immanent to any being which is inscribed in 
the world.”6 And though there is much complexity in Badiou’s 
treatment of the respective roles of appearing, objects, and 
multiplicity, of the logical and the ontological, and the atomic; 
and despite his (unconvincing) claim in Logics of Worlds that 
he has succeeded in thinking objects without subjects, I find 
no sense in which Badiou liberates objects from internal 
relations. The issue is worthy of extensive treatment, but can 
only be hinted at here.
That leaves the topic of mathematisation.Coombs notes my 
scepticism on the topic,7 but sees it as beside the point. For 
in his view “there is no immediately evident reason other 
than a preference for certain types of philosophical pathways 
why Harman’s theory could not be mathematised in much 
the same way as Badiou’s logics of worlds.” Coombs plausibly 
implies that my favored pathway is that of Heidegger, but he 
also absolves me of this bond by stating that “the Heideg-
gerian commitments of Harman appear only as a launch 
pad for a philosophy that leaves Heidegger far behind.” In 
many ways it is good to leave Heidegger far behind, and I am 
relieved that Coombs does not over-identify my position 
with Heidegger’s own. He hints that my greatest danger from 
alliance with Heidegger would be to lapse into the German 
thinker’s view that “the structures within everyday language 
[have] some privileged ability to intuit the meta-physical 
structure of reality.” Coombs assumes or at least hopes that 
I am not making this error, and optimistically records the 
rumor (which is true) that there are numerous diagrams in 
one of my forthcoming books.8 But this use of diagrams does 
not contradict my resistance to mathematised ontology. By 
no means am I saying “everyday language good, mathematics 
bad,” and hence it is irrelevant when Coombs cites the old 
scientistic trope that mathematics has always been able to 
“undermine our commonsense understanding of the world 
derived through everyday language.” After all, I too am op-
posed to the commonsense understanding of the world, as 
any reader of my rather strange books must instantly realize.
My view of everyday language, contra Coombs, is that it 
tends to reduce the world to hackneyed, prefabricated cat-
egories. What I espouse instead is a method of metaphorical 
language, which speaks of things indirectly, or says them 
without saying them: namely, by alluding to them. But this 
claim should not be identified in overly literal fashion with 
a preference for the poems of Hölderlin over the scientific 
breakthroughs of Einstein and Bohr, which moreover is not 
Graham Harman – Response to Nathan Coombs
150 151
Speculations I
my personal preference at all. Rather, my preference is for 
what Thomas Kuhn calls paradigm-shifting knowledge over 
“normal” knowledge, though I interpret this difference in a 
somewhat unusual fashion. Kuhn defines normal science 
as the routinized solving of puzzles within a horizon of un-
questioned background assumptions: a paradigm.9 At rare 
revolutionary moments in science (and this does sound very 
Badiouian) there is a paradigm shift in which facts are no 
longer accumulated in piecemeal fashion, but the scientist’s 
very conception of her subject matter is vastly transformed. 
My reading of Kuhn’s paradigm is not the “sociological” 
one that it represents an irrational collective framework 
beyond rational redress. Instead, I hold that the paradigm 
represents the object of knowledge beyond any amassing of 
definite qualities that can be discerned in it. I also hold that 
this is not an especially new idea, but a venerably classical 
one. For this is precisely what Socrates means whenever he 
insists that we must know what virtue, justice, or friendship 
are before we know what qualities they have. And moreover, 
since we philosophers are merely lovers of wisdom rather 
than wise, we will never fully know what virtue, justice, and 
friendship are, unless we become gods. This incessant need 
for a knowledge beyond qualities is the central paradox of 
Plato’s philosophy, and refutes in advance any claim that 
Plato joins Parmenides in upholding the codetermination 
of thought and being. But returning to Coombs, the point is 
this. My intention is not to uphold poetry and the fine arts 
against mathematics and the sciences (I am an avid reader 
of the history of science). Instead, my claim is that given the 
incommensurability between objects and any translation of 
them, or between real and sensual objects, our approach to 
reality must be through allusion rather than through direct 
formal modelling. I am opposed above all to the idea of the 
codetermination of thought and being, and here it will be 
evident why it is difficult to link Badiou’s position with my 
own. I have no objection to formalisation, as long as it does 
not claim to exhaust the reality of the things themselves and 
makes no pretensions to the absolute. But then this would 
not be much of a formalising enterprise. It would amount 
simply to the helpful use of diagrams for organizing difficult 
thoughts, as in my forthcoming book.
In closing I make a few final points. Coombs says of my 
position that “there is a parallelism between relations—which 
we can think—and their withdrawn objects—which we can-
not.” I would put this differently. Relations for me are objects, 
after all, and cannot be thought directly any more than any 
other object can. What can be thought, in my position, are 
sensual objects as translations of real ones: we directly en-
counter sensual palm trees and donkeys, but even the mighty 
power of mathematics cannot give us the real ones, which 
forever withdraw beyond view. When Coombs suggests that 
mathematics need not claim to exhaust withdrawn being, 
this is potentially reassuring. However, this is not the sense 
one gets from reading an excellent pro-formaliation book 
such as Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude, where we find 
the very Badiouian statement that “all those aspects of the 
object that can be formulated in mathematical terms can 
be meaningfully conceived as properties of the object in 
itself.”10 And I find no reassurance at all in Coombs’s further 
claim that instead of trying to exhaust the withdrawn reality 
of objects, mathematics would “[denote them] in much the 
same way as the void in Badiou’s philosophy: as a symbolic 
marker for nothing.” There can be no treatment of objects 
more opposed to my own than to view them as symbolically 
denoted instances of void. My objects do not merely haunt 
the known as inconsistent residue. Objects for me withdraw 
into their own genuine and very specific reality, and engage in 
duels with one another no less than with human formalizers. 
And this is yet another reason why I cannot bring myself to 
agree with Coombs that both Badiou and I “arrive at a rela-
tively similar thinking of objects” and “that the gap—if there 
is one—cannot be all that great.” Nonetheless, I again find 
myself in grateful agreement with Coombs’s final sentence: 
“There is surely a fruitful direction for future research lying 
somewhere at the intersection of these two thinkers.”
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Networkologies: A Manifesto, Section I
Note to the Reader 
[The following essay presents excerpts from the soon to be completed work in progress 
entitled Networkologies – A Manifesto: Towards A New Philosophy of Networks. This 
book is the second and central book in the projected networkologies series. The 
manuscript for the first book in the series, The Networked Mind: A New Image of 
Thought for a Hyperconnected Age, is complete, and currently being proofread in 
preparation for solicitation for publication. This text provides the preparatory context 
for a philosophy of networks by placing this endeavor within the context of 
philosophical and scientific debates of the twentieth century. By means of 
examinations of recent developments in artificial neural networks, cognitive 
neuroscience, and contemporary continental philosophy and critical theory, The 
Networked Mind works to demonstrate the need for the philosophy of networks 
developed in Networkologies – A Manifesto. 
A network is a diagram for the thinking of relation. This diagram, which does not 
merely describe relation, but performs it, can help us to understand the structure, 
dynamics, and potentials of our networked age. Networkological thought works to 
extract the potential meanings, concepts, programs, and perspectives which the 
network diagram makes available to us, and it is with this in mind that the primary 
commitment of a philosophy of networks must be to the thinking of relation, and to 
understanding what relation could mean in regard to the network diagram. 
The text is written in manifesto form, and as such uses mostly propositional language 
and minimal citations, so that the entirety of the system can be presented in 
microcosm. The graphic format of the text aims to demonstrate what a 
networkological text looks like, a matter which is discussed in the text itself. 
The first section of the manifesto, which comprises the body of this article, is divided 
into two parts: orientations (comprised of principles and forms, and 
diagrammatology. Within the section on orientations, the principles segment 
describes the basic principles which guide the networkological project, while the 
forms segment describes the manner in which these principles manifest themselves 
within the presentation of networkological thought. The section entitled 
diagrammatology describes the network diagram itself in its many permutations, so as 
to demonstrate how an entire worldview can be extracted therefrom. Forthcoming 
sections of the manifesto then perform the work of developing an ontology and ethics 
based on the intersection of the network diagram with the notions of the oneand amd 
the commitment to relation, which are the primary ontological and ethical notions, 
respectively, which structure the networkological endeavor.] 
Networkologies
a manifesto
The network is increasingly one of the fundamental metaphors whereby we 
have described the character of our age. Despite this, there has yet to be a 
philosophy of networks, a philosophy which takes the network as its 
foundation.1 A networkological approach aims to address this fact.
A network is a diagram for the thinking of relation. This diagram, which does 
not merely describe relation, but performs it, can help us to understand the 
structure, dynamics, and potentials of our networked age.
Our age is one in which relation is increasing, reified entities are being 
reworked, and previously existent relations are becoming ever more evident. 
These changes, which have given rise to what might be called the ‘networked 
age,’ are partially due to the rise of the Internet, the World Wide Web, global 
capitalism, etc. But such changes cannot be reduced to the sum of their parts, 
they are always the result of the interplay of material and ideal, actual and 
virtual.
From the networkological perspective, the entire world can be viewed as 
composed of networks. A chair is a network, and so are atoms, concepts, 
words, societies, organisms, brains, economies, etc. Understanding the 
different types of networks, their modes of structuration, appearing, 
interaction, and potentials, is the work that needs to be done to create a 
philosophy of networks.
To paraphrase a famous philosopher – “To those who look at the world 
networkedly, the world will look networkedly back.”2 This is the fundamental 
wager of the networkological endeavor. The networkological perspective takes 
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and minimal citations, so that the entirety of the system can be presented in 
microcosm. The graphic format of the text aims to demonstrate what a 
networkological text looks like, a matter which is discussed in the text itself. 
The first section of the manifesto, which comprises the body of this article, is divided 
into two parts: orientations (comprised of principles and forms, and 
diagrammatology. Within the section on orientations, the principles segment 
describes the basic principles which guide the networkological project, while the 
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based on the intersection of the network diagram with the notions of the oneand amd 
the commitment to relation, which are the primary ontological and ethical notions, 
respectively, which structure the networkological endeavor.] 
Networkologies
a manifesto
The network is increasingly one of the fundamental metaphors whereby we 
have described the character of our age. Despite this, there has yet to be a 
philosophy of networks, a philosophy which takes the network as its 
foundation.1 A networkological approach aims to address this fact.
A network is a diagram for the thinking of relation. This diagram, which does 
not merely describe relation, but performs it, can help us to understand the 
structure, dynamics, and potentials of our networked age.
Our age is one in which relation is increasing, reified entities are being 
reworked, and previously existent relations are becoming ever more evident. 
These changes, which have given rise to what might be called the ‘networked 
age,’ are partially due to the rise of the Internet, the World Wide Web, global 
capitalism, etc. But such changes cannot be reduced to the sum of their parts, 
they are always the result of the interplay of material and ideal, actual and 
virtual.
From the networkological perspective, the entire world can be viewed as 
composed of networks. A chair is a network, and so are atoms, concepts, 
words, societies, organisms, brains, economies, etc. Understanding the 
different types of networks, their modes of structuration, appearing, 
interaction, and potentials, is the work that needs to be done to create a 
philosophy of networks.
To paraphrase a famous philosopher – “To those who look at the world 
networkedly, the world will look networkedly back.”2 This is the fundamental 
wager of the networkological endeavor. The networkological perspective takes 
the notion of relation and works to elevate it to the notion of a concept, 
diagram, and project.
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orientations [principles] Relation, Process, 
Reification, Refraction [forms] Method, Discipline, Text, 
Context, Immanence, Networkologies, Groundings 
diagrammatology Diagram, Precision, Intensity, Topology, 
Combination, Symmetry, Difference, Identity, Societies, Combinatories, 
Dynamics, Systems, Genetics, Levels 
[Forthcoming Sections:] 
matrixology [extension and appearance] Matrix, Extension, Mattering, 
Actuality, World, Self-Differing, Paradox, Quandry, Obstacle, Opening, 
Potential, Privacy, Mind, Complexity [mnemosystemics and combinatorics]
Memory, Intertwining, Form, Structure, Virtuality, Manifestation, Governing, 
Understanding, Affection, Mentalities, Machines, Life, Memory System, 
Evolution, Persons, Perception, Awareness, Excess, Qualities, Experience, 
Horizon, Excess, Brains, Consciousness, Modulation, Self-Consciousness, 
Wideware, Quasi-Life, Plexes, Culture, Semiotics, Mediology, Meaning, 
Psychology, Emotions, Mental Structures, Emotional Structures, Psyche, 
Metabolics, Reflection, Intuition, Praxis, Knowledge, Objects, Metaphysics, 
Adaptation, Problematics, Critique, Experimentation, Landscape, Meta-
Understanding, Philosophy, Meta-Philosophy, Relationalism, Fundament, 
Synergy [freedom and opening] Freedom, The Virtual, Universe, Opening, 
Generation 
network ethics [metaleptics] Ethics, Value, Attribution, Proto-
Value, Control, Development, Regulation, Diversity, Learning, Programming, 
Cultural Evolution, Supra-plexes, Meta-Evolution, Paranoia, Paranoid Social 
Structures, Capitalism, Limitation, Meta-Robustness, Liberation, Choice, Trust, 
Exchange, Leap, Metalepsis, Historicity, Call, Embeddedness [practics] Maxim, 
Practics, Heuristics, Evaluation, Duty, Example, Pain, Pleasure, Harm, 
Curiosity, Therapeautics, Clinic, Diagnostics, Social Practics, Network Analysis, 
Science, Democracy, Socialism, Competition, Political Practics, Cross-Activism, 
site map
Articulation, Crossing, Discourse of the Oppressed, Access, Pedagogy, 
Education, Academics, The Public Intellectual, Ways of Knowing, Obsolescence, 
Hope, Art, Inspiration, Aesthetics, Production, Creation, Pataphysics, Decision, 
Modernity, Catastrophe, Appeal, Pax Capitala, The Age of Networks, god, 
Relationalism, Commitment 
                                                    [principles]
Relation. A network is a diagram for the thinking of relation. That is, a 
network shows how entities relate. A network does not merely describe relation, it 
performs it. Networkological thought works to extract the potential meanings, 
concepts, programs, and perspectives which the network diagram makes 
available to us, and it is with this in mind that the primary commitment 
of a philosophy of networks must be to the thinking of relation, and to 
understanding what relation could mean in regard to the network 
diagram. This is not to deny the existence of relatively isolated elements in the world, 
so long as these are seen as ultimately related to the contexts and processes of their 
production. The networkological approach is, however, against any theory which 
presupposes fundamental divisions between mind and body, epistemology and ethics, 
the social and the natural, science and culture, or any approach which views any given 
binary opposition, reified entity, or limited list of hypostatized terms as ultimate or 
fundamental, for any term or entity is merely an aspect of what is. The only ultimate
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Process. The networkological approach, as a philosophy of relation, is also 
necessarily a philosophy of process, for relation needs to be 
understood not only spatially, but temporally as well. From such a 
perspective, any entity which has individuated itself from a 
ground is necessarily related to that ground, and to other entities 
to which it may be related at a different level of scale or 
abstraction. No entity is ever absolute, but rather an element of 
more encompassing frames of reference, and no product is ever 
more fundamental than the processes of its production. Since all 
networks, no matter how static they appear, have at some point been produced, all 
networks and network elements are necessarily dynamic, examples of relational 
entities-in-process, any one of which is an x-in-process. 
Reification. When an entity is viewed in a way which is separate from 
processes of its production, this is known as reification. Reification gives rise to forms 
of knowledge and understanding which are based upon firm separations, hypostatized 
entities, otherworldly or transcendent standards of value, rigid categories, unrelated 
histories, etc. Following Alfred North Whitehead, who describes reification by means 
of the notion of the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness,’3 the networkological 
endeavor views reification as a necessary step towards understanding what is, but one 
which is vastly overutilized, and in a manner which has many potentially harmful 
effects. The forms which reification takes, which will be examined in greater detail in 
later sections, include serial repetition, hyper-objectification, hyper-linking, hyper-
resonance, over-grounding, and transcendence. In its many forms, the networkological 
enterprise therefore seeks to limit the damage which reification creates in its many 
forms.
Refraction. The attempt to think relation in 
regard to the network diagram manifests itself in the 
networkological endeavor from many possible angles and 
levels of scale. As expressions of the whole from which 
they emerge, each entity and network in the world are 
ultimately perspectives thereupon, and in this sense, each 
part contains, in its way, the whole of what is. The 
networkological approach is therefore not only 
networkological 
principles:
   relation,    
   process,
   holography,
   fractality,
   inter-mediation,





relational/processural, but also holographic. This holography extends to all levels of 
scale, such that within the bounds of all that we know that exists, the holographic 
principle not only holds but, in a weak and relative sense, holds in a manner which is 
fractally self-similar in nature. That is, within the limits of the existent at either end 
in regard to the open, all networks are the product of networks at a micro-scale, and 
produce other networks at a macro-scale. Furthermore, in their relational, 
processural, holographic and fractal intertwinings, all entities mediate all other 
entities, if in differing degrees, both in regard to each other, as well as in regard to 
the whole of what is. This intermediation is what constitutes space and time, as well 
as mind and matter, for mind is the mediation of matter by itself, just as matter is 
the actualized localization of mind in space and time. Each of these abstractions 
indicates an aspect of the manner in which matter is virtually present in other matters 
in the whole of what is. Both these abstractions and the matters they describe are 
expressions of the manner in which the nested networks of all that is comes to 
experience itself via relation by means of a process of self-differentiation known as 
emergence. From this perspective, the ethico-epistemo-ontological commitment to 
relation which founds the networkological endeavor articulates itself in regard to the 
five corollary principles articulated above, namely, those of process (relation-in-
time), holography (relation-in-space), fractality (relation-in-level), inter-mediation 
(relation-in-virtuality), and emergence (relation-in-differing). It is based on these 
principles that the networkological approach articulates its relation to the wider world 
of nature, meaning, matter, mind, and society.
                                                           [forms]
Method. The networkological enterprise aims to describe a philosophical 
system which can help us understand what is. In what follows, the formal aspects of 
this system will be explained. Due to its commitment to relation and process, as well 
as to the project of reducing the harmful impact of excessive reification on human 
cultural relations to the world, the networkological 
approach is transgressive of traditional atomizations, 
distinctions, and reifications which often serve to 
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projects. Not only does the networkological perspective work to transgress traditional 
reifying formulations, but it also implies a method of critique thereof, a method of 
analysis. Any reified entity (ie: the subject, the signifier, production, being, etc.) or 
distinction (ie: mind/body, subject/object, etc.) will necessarily be broken down by
networkological critique, and re-related to the wider contexts within which it exists 
and from which it has emerged. Networkological critique blasts apart reified entities, 
revealing the dynamic networks contained within. Drawing inspiration from the 
analytical methods of Gilles Deleuze, Gilbert Simondon, G.W.F. Hegel, Karl Marx, and 
Henri Bergson, the goal of networkological critique is to demonstrate the relations 
hidden behind, beneath, within, and around what others view as elementary. For 
while some networks may work to reify particular networks or parts thereof, the 
networkological approach views any reified structure as ultimately a derivative of the 
process of its own production.
Discipline. Networkological critique is necessarily transgressive of traditional 
disciplinary boundaries. Ranging freely from physics to metaphysics, societal analysis 
to abstract math, literature to art and culture, politics to ethology, networkological 
philosophy is necessary committed to a polyform perversity in regard to conventions, 
strictures, and norms. 
Text. Networkological texts are necessarily polyform, and seek to increase 
potential modes of relation between texts and their interactors. Networkological 
texts aim to use many different voices and forms of writing, such that many different 
types of interactors can access these texts. Reified categories which 
dictate that certain forms of writing need to be used to express 
certain types of ideas are simply not applicable to our networked age. 
This does not mean, however, that networkological texts dispense 
with all forms of division or separation of elements within them. 
Rather, these texts often increase the atomization of their 
components so as to allow a greater multiplicity of the forms of their potential 
(re)combination by potential readers. In this manner, networkological texts are 
symbolic assemblages which take Bertolt Brecht’s imperatives for theater and apply 
them to the realm of theoretical text. Working to undermine the mythologization of a 
text as a unified whole, parts of a text are separated out so as to allow for multiple 
forms of their potential interrelation. Brecht’s dictum of a “radical separation of the 




text. With this aim in mind, networkological texts are structured such that images, 
citations, captions, and written bits all float, while various textual, graphical, and 
organizational devices are deployed so as to the assist the potential de- and re-linkage 
of parts. Furthermore, because networked diagrams show as much as they say, 
performing the thought they describe, networkological texts make extensive use of 
diagrams and images. The goal is to present ideas visually as much as verbally. The 
result is a text which is perhaps uniquely suited to the reading styles at work in our 
hypervisual age. Networkological texts are 
multi-planar products, inspired by the ‘surfing’ 
employed when users jump between websites, 
windows, screens, texts, captions, images, and 
devices in our hypermediated times. The activity 
of reading today is suffused with surprise jumps, tunnels, fragments, and layers of text 
and image, and networkological texts aim to capture aspects of this not only in what 
they say but also what they do. This is not only so as to be in sync with the needs of 
our times, but to also experiment to find more relational forms of textual 
structuration. Beyond books and websites, the goal is to push through distraction to 
new forms of ideational proliferation and association. Networkological writing
therefore aims to interact with its readers in a manner which is inherently multiple 
and complex. While not all networkological texts may employ all of these means at 
any one time, it is imperative that the networkological enterprise as a whole do so. 
Context. Many of the philosophies and theories which have influenced the 
development of the networkological perspective were written in a particular context, 
namely, in France during the period immediately before and after the failed 
revolution of 1968. The movements associated with this period in France, which 
generally go under the names of structuralism and post-structuralism (the critique and 
continuation of structuralism), have had an enormous influence on nearly all fields of 
the humanities within the English-speaking world in the last twenty to thirty years. 
Most of the philosophies in question, however, were written before the massive 
technological and social changes which have brought about a new era, that of the 
internet, an age of networks. It is hard to underestimate the massive changes which 
the internet has and will bring to our whole way of being in the world, of which 
reading, writing, and philosophy indicate one small part. It would be naïve to think 
that we can simply do philosophy in the same way as before. While structuralism and 
post-structuralism were written during the rise of what many have called late-
“radical separation 
of the elements”     
- Brecht
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capitalism, we need new models to help think our new age. While there are many 
ways in which the networkological perspective differs from the post-structuralism 
which preceded it, the most immediately apparent, particularly on a textual level, is 
that of access. Post-structuralist texts in particular were often written in a manner 
which aimed to combat the increasing 
commodification of knowledge by means of an 
effort to make the concepts presented in these 
works difficult to reify and commodify. The 
primary goal of this was to stop this form of 
thinking from being reduced to sound-bites, and 
the philosophers to stars (as often happened in 
France at the time). But we live in different 
days. Few contexts could be more different than 
France in 1968 and the global English netscape of the early twenty-first century.  No 
longer is there much of a danger of philosophers becoming stars, nor do we really 
imagine that the difficulty of a text is likely to stop efforts to reify its content. Rather 
than try to escape the influence of commodification on our forms of knowing by means 
of defensive structures, we need instead to understand what this commodification 
might mean, and what hidden potentials for philosophy and action it may conceal. 
Evolution does not go backwards, and if we are to take what is good in the age of 
networks use it to fight that which is harmful, we need to understand these mutations 
so as to go through and beyond them, rather than nostalgically yearn for what has 
been left behind. It is for this reason that the networkological endeavor aims to 
update the writing of philosophy and theory so as to fit the needs of the age of the 
internet. Rather than avoid sound-bites and accessible discourse, the networkological 
perspective aims to proliferate the separation of the elements, to use different sorts 
of discourses for different aims, just as networked systems alter their approach based 
on the circumstances in which they find themselves. A 'one-size-fits-all' approach to 
discourse hardly indicates an approach in sync with the proliferation of discourses, 
perspectives, and connections inherent to our ever more networked age. It is for this 
reason that the networkological approach will not sacrifice the development of novel 
terminologies, so necessary for the imagining of new worlds, nor accessible discourse, 
so necessary to bring theory beyond the realm of universities and academic writing. 
Within the cultural context within which this text was written, the university is where 
our society sends thoughts to die, and where it sends dangerous minds when it wants 
to put them out to pasture. From such a perspective, writing a text accessible to the 
“a network is a 
diagram for the 
thinking of relation. 
it does not merely 
describe relation, it 
performs it.” 
non-specialist, which speaks to multiple audiences, which explains implied context in 
a manner which does not support the contemporary separation of texts into exegetical 
and novel, is a political act. Academics who defend their writing as deep because 
inaccessible retain a myth that a writer must be one or the other, but if the age of 
networks has taught us anything about authorship and the self, it is that we are always 
plural. It is in this sense that just as networkological texts aim to proliferate the 
separation between the elements of which it is composed, so does networkological 
discourse aim to operate at multiple levels. Speaking in philosophical jargon in some 
circumstances and slang in others, drawing examples from obscure areas in the 
sciences in some cases and pop culture in others, switching tones and modes of 
address within the same text and sometimes within the same paragraph or sentence, 
the networkological approach to discourse is based on relevance to context rather 
than an ultimately atavistic notion that there is only one form in which philosophy can 
and should be written.  
Immanence. Due to its commitment to the development of a fully relational 
way of looking at the world, the networkological perspective aims to develop a 
completely immanent or ‘flat’ philosophical system. This has two primary 
implications. The first is an injunction against any term which implies some sort of 
reified, transcendent entity needed to provide for the coherence of its system. This 
approach, known as ‘old fashioned metaphysics,’ will be avoided, and new forms of 
metaphysics, immanent and relational forms, will be substituted in its place. 
Metaphysics is unavoidable, for there are many aspects of the world which cannot be 
known directly, but only by means of their effects. And as we will see later in this 
inquiry, metaphysics is also a part of all knowledge. Thus, it is not a question of 
avoiding metaphysics, but of the extent to which one does metaphysics, and how. For 
the networkological endeavor to be relational, it is essential that its metaphysical 
terms are defined relationally, rather than in a reified manner. Beyond this, the 
second implication of its desire to produce a flat and immanent system is that the any 
metaphysical terms which are developed must not conflict with the findings of 
contemporary science. This is not to overvalorize science, but simply to argue the 
need for what Freidrich Nietzsche might call a ‘this-worldly’ type of metaphysics 
which can form a part of a this-worldly philosophy. To be consistent with the findings 
of science is not to necessarily agree with the way scientism frames the world, and 
more will be said about this later in this work. But for now let it be said that science is 
one of the ways in which our actions come into greater sync with the world, and one 
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capitalism, we need new models to help think our new age. While there are many 
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circumstances and slang in others, drawing examples from obscure areas in the 
sciences in some cases and pop culture in others, switching tones and modes of 
address within the same text and sometimes within the same paragraph or sentence, 
the networkological approach to discourse is based on relevance to context rather 
than an ultimately atavistic notion that there is only one form in which philosophy can 
and should be written.  
Immanence. Due to its commitment to the development of a fully relational 
way of looking at the world, the networkological perspective aims to develop a 
completely immanent or ‘flat’ philosophical system. This has two primary 
implications. The first is an injunction against any term which implies some sort of 
reified, transcendent entity needed to provide for the coherence of its system. This 
approach, known as ‘old fashioned metaphysics,’ will be avoided, and new forms of 
metaphysics, immanent and relational forms, will be substituted in its place. 
Metaphysics is unavoidable, for there are many aspects of the world which cannot be 
known directly, but only by means of their effects. And as we will see later in this 
inquiry, metaphysics is also a part of all knowledge. Thus, it is not a question of 
avoiding metaphysics, but of the extent to which one does metaphysics, and how. For 
the networkological endeavor to be relational, it is essential that its metaphysical 
terms are defined relationally, rather than in a reified manner. Beyond this, the 
second implication of its desire to produce a flat and immanent system is that the any 
metaphysical terms which are developed must not conflict with the findings of 
contemporary science. This is not to overvalorize science, but simply to argue the 
need for what Freidrich Nietzsche might call a ‘this-worldly’ type of metaphysics 
which can form a part of a this-worldly philosophy. To be consistent with the findings 
of science is not to necessarily agree with the way scientism frames the world, and 
more will be said about this later in this work. But for now let it be said that science is 
one of the ways in which our actions come into greater sync with the world, and one 
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of the primary goals of the networkological enterprise is to increase this sync. 
Relational philosophy, including metaphysics, and non-reified forms of scientific 
practice can and should both be a part of this endeavor. While there are many 
controversies about how to interpret science, the networkological endeavor will 
employ aspects of the discourse produced by science in an effort to create a this-
worldly, immanent philosophy which does not contradict the best aspects of the way 
in which scientific practices have worked to increase the sync between human action 
and the world. All of which means, of course, that aspects of the networkological 
endeavor can be brought into question by future scientific discoveries. The fact that 
many of its aspects can become obsolete is a necessary admission on the part of 
relational approaches to the world. That said, even when parts of the networkological 
approach need to be reworked due to future scientific discoveries, or other types of 
change within our relation to the world which we cannot have foreseen, the general 
relational commitments which structure the networkological approach point the way 
in which future scientific and cultural discoveries could be integrated into the general 
relational perspective articulated therein. In this sense, the networkological 
perspective is in some sense realist in its relation to science, so long as we do not take 
the term realism to mean a belief in the impoverished view of reality put forth by 
scientism. Rather, this approach to realism is grounded in the belief in unavoidability 
of metaphysics, and the benefits of some forms of metaphysics and scientific practices 
over others. Thus, the realism put forth by the networkological approach is also 
necessarily speculative, a type of speculative realism. The full meaning of these terms 
in relation to scientism will be developed in full later in this text. 
Networkologies. Beyond text and discourse, the networkological 
position takes a transgressive relation to the standard divisions that structure 
philosophy. Philosophy has traditionally fractured its investigation of the world into a 
series of domains, such as epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, and ethics. In its 
commitment to thinking relation, the 
networkological perspective does not see these 
as anything more than various lenses upon the 
relation-in-process of all that is. While the 
details of the concepts structuring the 
networkological enterprise will be discussed in detail later in this text, the brief 
sketch which follows will help describe the overall relationality of the form of this 
conceptual network. The networkological perspective manifests its commitment to 
grounding (ethico-), 
giving rise to (onto-), 
manifestation (epistemo-)
relation epistemologically by means of its concept of the open, ontologically by its 
concept of the oneand, and ethically by its concept of the call to robustness. As with 
all networkological terms, these concepts do not indicate domains or realms as much 
as aspects, sides, moments, or perspectives, such that multiplication of conceptual 
names and terms should therefore be seen as so many holographic views on the 
emerging relation of what is. Thus, each of the primary sides of the networkological 
philosophical system has its own way of relating to other terms, in that the 
commitment to relation (ethico-) grounds the oneand (onto-) and the open (epistemo-
), the oneand gives rise to the open and the commitment to relation, and the open 
provides the perspective whereby we can see the oneand and the need for the 
commitment to relation, that is, it manifests them. Any examination of one of the 
terms will lead ultimately to the others. 
Furthermore, when we examine each of 
these terms in greater detail, we will see 
that they then shatter, fractally giving 
rise to conceptual sub-networks which 
repeat their inter-mediation at further levels of scale. From an epistemological 
perspective, for example, the open gives rise to more refractions of key terms as they 
interact with fragments of the others already mentioned. This manifests according to 
three forms, namely, the undecideability known as the fundamental obstacle, the 
ontological quandary of potential, and the  ethical demand known as the  appeal of 
the other. Moving from the epistemological to the ethical, we see how the call to 
robustness (freedom, ethics from the future) requires an attentiveness to this appeal 
of the other (attention, ethics in the present), resulting in the commitment to relation 
(decision, ethics in the past), which grounds the system as a whole. And from an 
ontological perspective, the oneand, which gives rise to space and time, actual and
potential, also gives rise to emergence. Emergence then displays relation under the 
aspect of potential, just as relation displays emergence under the aspects of the 
actual, while both of these are manifestations of self-differing in the process of 
coming to be as relation-in-process/emergence-in-relation. Continuing this line of 
thought by further dividing its approach to what is (the onto-), the networkological 
perspective describes the foundation of all that is in regard to its existence by means 
of the term matrix. The investigation of matrix and its modes of appearance, 
including, the open, the oneand, and the other, gives rise to the series of perspectives 
known as matrixology. The modes of appearance of matrix include emergence, 
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of the primary goals of the networkological enterprise is to increase this sync. 
Relational philosophy, including metaphysics, and non-reified forms of scientific 
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approach need to be reworked due to future scientific discoveries, or other types of 
change within our relation to the world which we cannot have foreseen, the general 
relational commitments which structure the networkological approach point the way 
in which future scientific and cultural discoveries could be integrated into the general 
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the term realism to mean a belief in the impoverished view of reality put forth by 
scientism. Rather, this approach to realism is grounded in the belief in unavoidability 
of metaphysics, and the benefits of some forms of metaphysics and scientific practices 
over others. Thus, the realism put forth by the networkological approach is also 
necessarily speculative, a type of speculative realism. The full meaning of these terms 
in relation to scientism will be developed in full later in this text. 
Networkologies. Beyond text and discourse, the networkological 
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commitment to thinking relation, the 
networkological perspective does not see these 
as anything more than various lenses upon the 
relation-in-process of all that is. While the 
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sketch which follows will help describe the overall relationality of the form of this 
conceptual network. The networkological perspective manifests its commitment to 
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manifestation (epistemo-)
relation epistemologically by means of its concept of the open, ontologically by its 
concept of the oneand, and ethically by its concept of the call to robustness. As with 
all networkological terms, these concepts do not indicate domains or realms as much 
as aspects, sides, moments, or perspectives, such that multiplication of conceptual 
names and terms should therefore be seen as so many holographic views on the 
emerging relation of what is. Thus, each of the primary sides of the networkological 
philosophical system has its own way of relating to other terms, in that the 
commitment to relation (ethico-) grounds the oneand (onto-) and the open (epistemo-
), the oneand gives rise to the open and the commitment to relation, and the open 
provides the perspective whereby we can see the oneand and the need for the 
commitment to relation, that is, it manifests them. Any examination of one of the 
terms will lead ultimately to the others. 
Furthermore, when we examine each of 
these terms in greater detail, we will see 
that they then shatter, fractally giving 
rise to conceptual sub-networks which 
repeat their inter-mediation at further levels of scale. From an epistemological 
perspective, for example, the open gives rise to more refractions of key terms as they 
interact with fragments of the others already mentioned. This manifests according to 
three forms, namely, the undecideability known as the fundamental obstacle, the 
ontological quandary of potential, and the  ethical demand known as the  appeal of 
the other. Moving from the epistemological to the ethical, we see how the call to 
robustness (freedom, ethics from the future) requires an attentiveness to this appeal 
of the other (attention, ethics in the present), resulting in the commitment to relation 
(decision, ethics in the past), which grounds the system as a whole. And from an 
ontological perspective, the oneand, which gives rise to space and time, actual and
potential, also gives rise to emergence. Emergence then displays relation under the 
aspect of potential, just as relation displays emergence under the aspects of the 
actual, while both of these are manifestations of self-differing in the process of 
coming to be as relation-in-process/emergence-in-relation. Continuing this line of 
thought by further dividing its approach to what is (the onto-), the networkological 
perspective describes the foundation of all that is in regard to its existence by means 
of the term matrix. The investigation of matrix and its modes of appearance, 
including, the open, the oneand, and the other, gives rise to the series of perspectives 
known as matrixology. The modes of appearance of matrix include emergence, 
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commitment to 
relation
(grounds . . .) 
emergence-in-relation/
relation-in-process
                  
future, present, variance, invariance, separation, connection, aspect, element, 
context, etc. When emergence occurs in matter in the past, it is called actual, while 
the term potential is used when emergence in matter has yet to occur. And when 
emergence gives rise to itself, and hence relation, it is known as self-differing, 
emergence-in-process, or simply as emergence, for emergence always contains itself 
at a higher dimensional level, it is what gives rise to the production of layers of 
difference and relation as such. Moving to the ethical, the extraction of guides for 
action of individuals and collectives from the analysis of networks in the world is 
known as network ethics, just as the analysis of the potentials inherent in the 
network diagram is known as diagrammatology. Because diagrammatology describes 
the network diagram in its most basic form, it is from this aspect of the 
networkological perspective that we will begin, though in principle any of these 
divisions of the networkological enterprise could act as a point of entry. In light of all 
that is stated above, we can see that the networkological perspective recasts the 
traditional philosophical divisions, such that ontology through a networkological lens 
becomes matrixology, epistemology becomes diagrammatology, while the study of the 
implications of these are considered by network ethics. The rest of this text will work 
to fill out precisely what the concepts just described mean. 
Groundings. All of the concepts and terms employed by the networkological 




(gives rise to . . .)
of relation, including process, holography, fractality, inter-mediation, and emergence. 
Each concept is necessarily a holographic and fractal intermediation of the relation-in-
process of the whole, indicative of the manner in which emergence manifests itself as 
relation within philosophy. When terms are contained, nested, or intertwined within 
each other, these points of self-containment do not indicate self-contradictions, as 
might be assumed from a non-relational perspective, but rather describe the structure 
of the networkological enterprise itself. For in fact, these nestings 
indicate foldings between levels of the networkological enterprise, 
thereby manifesting its topological form, the manner in which its 
terms and concepts layer and intertwine around the self-
containing self-differing which is emergence-in-relation / relation-in-process.  
Emergence is fundamentally non-totalizing, it moves within itself while standing still, 
as relation-differing and differing-in-relation. It is how relation manifests itself in time 
as that which is not one with itself. Emergence is always nested within itself, giving 
rise to itself, such that self-containment is not something to be eliminated as much as 
understood. Emergence as a temporal structure is thus perhaps best described by 
means of means of 4...n-dimensional, non-orientable surfaces such as a cross-cap or 
Klein bottle, so long as these shapes are only seen as illustrations of a process which is 
fundamentally plural, composed of non-linear networks 
of relation-in-process at multiple levels of scale, of 
which non-orientable diagrams describe a mere part. 
From such a perspective, however, we can begin to see 
the manner in which the networkological perspective 
grounds itself by means of a process of ‘eating its own 
tail,’ one which follows the temporal and logical structure of emergence in its process 
of differing with itself. For in fact, all that is is the result of that which contains itself 
fracturing and differentiating itself and then re-relating to and recontaining itself at 
multiple levels of scale. Within all that exists, threads of potential emergence remain, 
indicating the network that connects the potential of all to all, if at differing degrees 
of intensity. Understanding the topologies of such intensity in relation to what is is a 
large part of what is entailed in the networkological enterprise itself, which will now 
move through a series of linked investigations into precisely how this complexity 
manifests from a networkological perspective on our world. While the presentation of 
the networkological perspective in this text moves from diagrammatology through 
matrixology to ethics, ultimately, it could have begun anywhere, for the parts all 
contain the whole in miniature. The entirety of the system is what grounds it, by 
“emergence always 
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Klein bottle, so long as these shapes are only seen as illustrations of a process which is 
fundamentally plural, composed of non-linear networks 
of relation-in-process at multiple levels of scale, of 
which non-orientable diagrams describe a mere part. 
From such a perspective, however, we can begin to see 
the manner in which the networkological perspective 
grounds itself by means of a process of ‘eating its own 
tail,’ one which follows the temporal and logical structure of emergence in its process 
of differing with itself. For in fact, all that is is the result of that which contains itself 
fracturing and differentiating itself and then re-relating to and recontaining itself at 
multiple levels of scale. Within all that exists, threads of potential emergence remain, 
indicating the network that connects the potential of all to all, if at differing degrees 
of intensity. Understanding the topologies of such intensity in relation to what is is a 
large part of what is entailed in the networkological enterprise itself, which will now 
move through a series of linked investigations into precisely how this complexity 
manifests from a networkological perspective on our world. While the presentation of 
the networkological perspective in this text moves from diagrammatology through 
matrixology to ethics, ultimately, it could have begun anywhere, for the parts all 
contain the whole in miniature. The entirety of the system is what grounds it, by 
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means of what it gives rise to via its movement within itself. And as we will work to 
show, what it gives rise to is itself, the networkological perspective, by means of the 
intertwining of the oneand of emergence-in-relation / relation-in-process and the 
threeand of the network diagram in its many forms. 
Diagram. The networkological project is an attempt to develop the concepts 
implicit in the network diagram. A network is an iconic sign of the relational aspects 
of the world. The three primary components of a network diagram are the node, or 
individual, the link, or relation, and the ground, or context, from which these 
emerge. When a node emerges from a ground, we say that it has 
individuated, and when a link emerges between nodes, it has 
connected them. Networks, nodes, links, and grounds may be static or 
dynamic, heterogeneous or homogeneous. Nodes may encompass all of 
an element, or only an aspect thereof. Links may be uni-, bi-, or 
multi-directional, precise or fuzzy (indicative of what Ludwig Wittgenstein would call 
a ‘family resemblance’5), single or multi-threaded, etc. Networks include any and all 
of these permutations. From this diagrammatic germ – node, link, ground - the entire 
networkological project springs. 
Precision. Any aspect of a network may be precise or fuzzy. Fuzziness does 
not necessarily indicate messiness, for in fact, it can be measured quite precisely in 
mathematical terms. Rather, fuzziness may indicate states such as partial belonging 
(ie: a shade of green is so many degrees between blue and yellow), a 






number of a group of traits are shared by all members of a network, even if not all 
traits are present in all members or in equal degree), or loose coupling/sync between 
parts. Fuzziness also often indicates a state from which more precise formations 
emerge, and to which they may return. Most networks and their parts are fuzzy to 
varying degrees, for in fact it is rigidity and precision which are in fact rare conditions 
within the world. 
Intensity. Among networks and their elements, there are 
differences in intensity in regard to the rest of what is. Such intensity 
can be measured relationally in a variety of forms. The number of 
levels of emergence within a network is called its depth. The number 
of networks and/or the components which are intertwined with each 
other on a given level indicates that level’s interior diversity (or 
breadth), while networks and/or components from without indicate 
that network’s exterior diversity. The complexity of a network is determined by a 
combination of the degree of diversity (both interior and exterior), the degree of 
depth, and the contribution of the potential of each component in question. 
Determinations of degree can only be made retroactively and relationally by networks 
which come to know the network in question.
Topology. Networks may take different shapes, and these are generally 
referred to as indicating a network’s topology. Topology is the name of a branch of 
mathematics that deals with the way surfaces can vary so long as they are not torn or 
broken. Likewise, network topologies indicate the manner in which networks can be 
reshaped without being broken into smaller parts. Many 
topologies are constrained by the nature and number of links 
between nodes. Some nodes may have only a few links to other 
nodes, while others, often called hubs, have many. The 
distribution of hubs often alters the potential topologies of a 
given network. While many topologies are possible, some standard network topologies 
include grid, chain, bus, star, multi-hub, distributed, self-similar/fractal, 
star/centralized/hierarchical network, etc. Some networks have balanced topologies, 
while others are more contractive or expansive at particular sites.  Many networks 
join to others at such sites, for the contraction and expansion of aspects of the world 
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varying degrees, for in fact it is rigidity and precision which are in fact rare conditions 
within the world. 
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levels of emergence within a network is called its depth. The number 
of networks and/or the components which are intertwined with each 
other on a given level indicates that level’s interior diversity (or 
breadth), while networks and/or components from without indicate 
that network’s exterior diversity. The complexity of a network is determined by a 
combination of the degree of diversity (both interior and exterior), the degree of 
depth, and the contribution of the potential of each component in question. 
Determinations of degree can only be made retroactively and relationally by networks 
which come to know the network in question.
Topology. Networks may take different shapes, and these are generally 
referred to as indicating a network’s topology. Topology is the name of a branch of 
mathematics that deals with the way surfaces can vary so long as they are not torn or 
broken. Likewise, network topologies indicate the manner in which networks can be 
reshaped without being broken into smaller parts. Many 
topologies are constrained by the nature and number of links 
between nodes. Some nodes may have only a few links to other 
nodes, while others, often called hubs, have many. The 
distribution of hubs often alters the potential topologies of a 
given network. While many topologies are possible, some standard network topologies 
include grid, chain, bus, star, multi-hub, distributed, self-similar/fractal, 
star/centralized/hierarchical network, etc. Some networks have balanced topologies, 
while others are more contractive or expansive at particular sites.  Many networks 
join to others at such sites, for the contraction and expansion of aspects of the world 
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world around them. Conceptualizing these 
contractive and expansive aspects, and the manner in 
which they interconnect, is to understand how networks bring 
complexity into the world. Beyond this, the topology of a network indicates an 
enormous amount of information on the way a network may respond to external 
factors, particularly in dynamic networks in the world. Quantitative network analysis 
is the field which has worked to isolate specific parameters of networks, and use them 
to analyze the behavior of networks in fields from biology to economics.6 According to 
network researchers from a wide variety of fields, a consensus has been reached that, 
within the realm of dynamic network analysis, distributed, ‘small-world,’ self-similar
networks are those which are most robust in the widest array of circumstances.7 Star-
networks, which are highly efficient and centralized, and often highly useful in 
surviving periods of extreme crisis, are ultimately less robust in the long-run, despite 
short-run utility, for they strangle the diversity and newness necessary for stability in 






systems, and which may be roughly termed democratic and paranoid, respectively, 
have much to teach us in regard to network ethics.8
Combination. Networks may interlink in a wide variety of ways. Each node 
within a network may be a whole network in itself, or a network may have sub-
networks within it which encompass more than one node, 
but not the entire network. These contained, or nested
networks, allow for the formation of sub-networks, often 
called components or modules. When a single component 
dominates the network of which it is a part, it is called a 
great component. When networks do not fully encompass 
one another, but they share certain nodes, links, or ground, we say that they are 
layered on each other. In relation to dynamics, networks may impact the functioning 
of one another, in which case, we say that they are coupled with each 
other. Coupling may be rigid or loose, and when coupling is loose and over 
a distance, we say that the networks in question are coupled by 
resonance between them. And just as networks can be loosely coupled or 
in a resonant relation with each other, the same holds between nodes as 
well. When entire components of networks resonate together, whether 
tightly or loosely, we say that they are in sync. 
Symmetry. Networks are closely related to the notion of symmetry. 
Whenever there is something which is the same or similar (a critical mass of 
characteristics in common) amongst a group of entities, this relationship of invariance 
can be represented by a network. Commonality of any sort can therefore be thought 
of as a symmetry, for symmetries indicate aspects of an element which, despite 
morphisms or transformations, remains the same. 9 Thus, any rule, law, principle, or 
heuristic within a given system can be thought of as a symmetry. For example, water 
is still H2O even when frozen or boiled, so that we can therefore say that H2O has 
symmetry at the molecular level over changes in temperature and 
pressure. A language maintains roughly the same grammatical 
rules despite changes in phrases and sentences, so these rules 
indicate a symmetry in regard to changes in writing and speech, 
even though there are more fuzzy sorts of symmetry in regard to 
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changes of quantity within mathematics. Physicists often describe the universe as 
exhibiting a symmetry in regard to the conservation of energy. Even dynamic 
structures such as a whirlpool can be seen as governed by symmetry. With tools such 
as phase or state space diagrams10, any regularity within even highly complex forms of 
motion can be plotted as a node, or attractor, which then acts as a point or axis of 
symmetry within a relatively simple network diagram: all that is needed is a change in 
perspective. The expansion, contraction, alteration, and disparation of symmetries 
indicate the manner in which relative forms of invariance give structure to worlds of 
various sorts. Symmetry, as well as symmetry breaking11 or emergence, indicate two 
key ways of understanding the changes within networks in physical, symbolic, 
mathematical, and many other varied types of worlds.12
                           simple symmetries: 360˚, 90˚, 45˚
state space diagram of a 
simple pendulum with 
three attractors (two 
ends of the pendulum 
swing and the center 
point at rest)
Difference. Just as 
networks depict what unites, they 
may also depict that which divides. 
Networks that describe sameness or 
similarities can therefore be called 
symmetrical or invariance 
networks, while those which are 
used to describe difference will be 
called asymmetrical, variance, or
difference networks. When 
symmetries are broken, they give rise 
to boundaries between states which 
are no longer invariant in relation to each other, 
as well as points of juncture where these 
boundaries meet. These points of juncture, 
which emerge either due to the intersection of 
boundaries or because they indicate a 
disturbance within a ground 
which may eventually give 
rise to a boundary, are 
known as events, or singularities. Pure singularities are nodes 
with nothing in common, not even a shared ground, and as such 
are an abstraction from singularities in the world, for any singularity we could know 
about must have some relation to other singularities, shared grounds, and the world 
around it. When singularities float within a ground of dynamic flux, they may create 
state space diagram of a complex 
dynamic system governed by a Lorenz 
attractor (note the two symmetry-




a phase diagram for H2O with 
boundaries, territories, triple 
point, and critical point: notice 
how some phases emerge or 
vanish depending on how one 
‘moves’ through the diagram 
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motion can be plotted as a node, or attractor, which then acts as a point or axis of 
symmetry within a relatively simple network diagram: all that is needed is a change in 
perspective. The expansion, contraction, alteration, and disparation of symmetries 
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patterns of flow within this ground, but singularities may also divide up the ground 
into aspects thereof, and even bring about the formation of links of difference 
between the singularities. Such links indicate boundaries between these aspects of 
the ground, called territories. A ground divided into territories is known as a plane, 
and territories may be co-planar or multi-planar. While it is possible to think of 
singularities as breaking the symmetry of the ground within which they emerge, such 
an event can also be thought of as an intersection of separate grounds, that of the 
singularity and that of the ground, into a single plane. From such a perspective, any 
singularity indicates the presence of one ground within another, and thus, depending 
on the perspective, all planes can be seen, in this sense, as multi-planar. 
Identity. When territories in a difference network, whether co- or multi-
planar, are united by additional networks that link elements, flows, or networks 
between them, they give rise to intertwined networks that describe specific 
parameters of sameness and difference. This unique type of network, called an 
identity network or simply an identity, describe entities 
which maintain certain traits while others vary under changing 
circumstances. H2O, for example, is both the same 
(molecularly) and different (inter-molecularly) over changes in 
temperature and pressure, therefore requiring an identity 
network to describe this ability to both change and stay the 
same. A more abstract entity, such as ‘catholicism,’ can be 
multi-dimensional color-space diagram 
in which x, y, and z axes are mapped to 








seen to function in a similar, if perhaps more fuzzy, manner. All identities have 
certain conditions under which they cease to be the same thing, but these conditions 
vary, depending on the structure of meta-identity networks which determine these 
conditions. When a meta-identity network is static, we call it a set, and when it is 
dynamic, we call it a category (the foundations of modernist mathematics, and post-
modern mathematics, respectively).13 When a class of entities (ie: H20) is described by 
an identity network, we say that it is a substance, and when a single entity is 
described by such a network (ie: a particular molecule of H20, catholicism) we say this 
entity is an object. Ultimately this distinction is relative, for some entities may be 
classes or individuals, depending upon the networks to which it is currently connected 
in a given instance (ie: H20 as an element of a table of chemicals, H20 as a description 
of the molecular structure of all the water in the world). When an identity is linked to 
a particular segment of the extended networks of spacetime, independent of what 
else is located in that particular segment of spacetime, it is called a location, but 
when an identity is linked to a particular segment of matter, independent of location, 
we say it is a material object, or thing. Identities which are neither located nor 
materialized can still exist as networks within a mind which can think them, and can 
continue within minds that posses the ability to store them in memory. Such objects 
are known as mental objects, of which there are two types, ideas, or impressions, 
object
a sample identity 
network
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an identity network, we say that it is a substance, and when a single entity is 
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when an identity is linked to a particular segment of matter, independent of location, 
we say it is a material object, or thing. Identities which are neither located nor 
materialized can still exist as networks within a mind which can think them, and can 
continue within minds that posses the ability to store them in memory. Such objects 
are known as mental objects, of which there are two types, ideas, or impressions, 
object
a sample identity 
network
176 177
Speculations I Christopher Vitale – Networkologies
and abstract conceptions of ideas, meta-ideas known as concepts. When networks of 
ideas are linked by a mind, we say they are associated, and when associations reach 
the level of structuration of identity networks, these second-order ideas are concepts. 
A common everyday object of experience often links all these networks and more, and 
needs to be broken down into all its relevant networks in order to be fully understood.
Societies. Societies are organized networks of networks, and include entities 
such as organisms, languages, etc. The simplest form of society is an aggregate, for 
example, a pile of sand. But more complex aggregates 
include layered intersections of networks, known as a 
combinatories, but beyond this, there are also societies of 
combinatories, known as hypercombinatories, as well as 
societies of combinatories which control societies of 
aggregates. These complex intertwinings of combinatories 
and aggregates, known as complex societies, indicate 
some of the most complex entities on the planet. Societies 
of humans, for example, and their various extensions 
(signs, objects, etc.) are perhaps the most complex 
network formations on earth, involving networks of 
networks of symbol systems, associations, organisms, raw materials, energetic flows, 
etc. Humans internalize various materials, process them, and produce them in a cycle 
which continually fractures entities to produce raw materials for new creativity. In the 
process, humans give rise to not only themselves, but meta-systems, such as semiotic 
structures and systems of objects. Linking symbolic, locational, energetic, material, 
mental, economic, and varieties of other types of networks layered and nested within 
and on top of each other, societies are perhaps the most intricate networks we know. 
Combinatories. When networks intersect with each other, they often 
impact aspects of each other. In such circumstances these intersections give rise to 
compound networks known as combinatories. The networks they give rise to, which 
are both at another level of scale and which 
govern the modes of interrelation of the orignal 
networks in question, are known as 
combinatorials. A combinatorial occurs when 
different matters affect each other by means of 









combinatorials. A combinatorial occurs when different matters affect each other by 
means of a form of processing which occurs between the networks in question.  The 
simplest 
type of combinatory is ephemeral, and occurs when networks intersect such that there 
is a temporary influence between them. Many combinatories, however, persist over 
time, developing complex combinatorials between them. There are many types of 
combinatories, and the combinatorials that govern these can be single or multi-level, 
rigid or fuzzy, static or dynamic. Two general poles govern the types of combinatories 
that exist – the machinic and the complex. Machinic combinatories link many objects 
with each other according to series of rules whereby the parts determine the 
potentials of the whole. An engine, for example, is such a combinatory, as is a 
contemporary digital computer. Such devices rarely surprise us, for they are designed 
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the level of structuration of identity networks, these second-order ideas are concepts. 
A common everyday object of experience often links all these networks and more, and 
needs to be broken down into all its relevant networks in order to be fully understood.
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energetic systems which are metastable, thereby providing conditions which are 
between order and disorder within the environment of that combinatory. Languages, 
for example, are complex combinatories, and it is the relation of language to humans, 
just as it is the relation of humans to the sun, which allows both humans and their 
languages to continually surprise us, for the sun, humans, and language are metastable 
systems, each in their own way. The most complex type of combinatory, however, is 
one which links dynamic sets of elements to others by means of a combinatorial which 
is itself a complex combinatory. This is called a hypercombinatory, or mind. Minds 
link a series of elements together, at another level of scale, via a set of processes or 
rules, and then actualize one of several potential actions. When a mind is observed by 
another conscious mind, either from within or without, these potentials are mapped 
out by a system which connects the first set of elements to the second set by a series 
of processes or rules. When hypercombinatories organize a complex combinatory, we 
say this complex society is alive. Combinatories go from the simple to the complex, 
and understanding the varied types of combinatories in our world is essential to 
understanding the potentials inherent within aggregates of networks.
Dynamics. Networks may be dynamic in a wide variety of ways. Grounds may 
be static and homogenous, or they may indicate mixtures of constituents or conditions 
of viscosity, varied density, and flows. Grounds can combine and flow into each other, 
flows may condense into nodes, or nodes may emerge from the 
interaction of a ground with entities beyond it. Nodes may individuate 
and de-individuate from a ground, alter patterns of flow around them, 
and resonate with each other by means of the disturbances carried by 
constituents of the ground from which they emerge. Nodes may link or 
de-link from each other, and if these links are themselves dynamic, they 
may increase or decrease the amount of flow moving between nodes, increase or 
decrease the fuzziness of the connection between nodes, allow for branching and 
multiple pathways to emerge within links, etc. Singularities may individuate, merge, 
or link and de-link to other singularities to produce or collapse new boundaries or 
territories. Networks or their components can also go in and out of varying states of 
resonance or sync. Determining dynamics and its extent requires that there be some 
standard in regard to which change can be determined. Every network, from the 
simplest to the most complex, can be linked up with a network known as a metric
which can establish conditions to determine distance between the separate elements 






a temporal metric can be used to establish nettime.
Systems. All dynamic networks require a  
relation to a difference in the distribution of 
potentials, either within themselves or their 
contexts. Under metastable14 conditions, flows of 
the various forms of this potential, or unleashed by 
this potential, may organize into locations in which 
networks may emerge in a sustained fashion, 
thereby creating dynamic networks. To describe 
dynamic networks, we will need to rework the 
terms employed in more static network diagrams. When dynamic, 
a ground is referred to as field composed of flows, each which 
may be hetero- or homogenous. When a field is relatively 
bounded, it is known as a system. Nodes and links may be 
heterogeneous to the flows in a given field, in which case they may create obstacles, 
boundaries or channels within this flow. Systems produce and 
reproduce themselves by means of energetic potential, stored 
or in motion, and when flows of such potential congeal, we 
speak of these concretized forms of potential flow as stocks. 
Stocks may themselves then circulate, creating meta-flows 
within a system in addition to ground-flows. Beyond stocks, 
there may also be meta-stocks known as currency, and meta-
meta-stocks known as capital. Examples of currencies include 
molecular-ATP in many living organic cells, or money in 
economic networks. Examples of capitals may include status, machinery in a factory 
(labor congealed in the form of a labor amplifier), or fat stores within an animal. Most 
systems remain robust when there are multiple capitals circulating within a system, 
but the economic system known as capitalism, a variation on the star-network
topology, indicates a cancerous condition in which one type of capital attempts to 
reduce all others, via resonance or conversion, into its type, in a manner which is 
ultimately harmful to the robustness of the system. Much more will be said about this 
in the section on network ethics. 
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energetic systems which are metastable, thereby providing conditions which are 
between order and disorder within the environment of that combinatory. Languages, 
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just as it is the relation of humans to the sun, which allows both humans and their 
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link a series of elements together, at another level of scale, via a set of processes or 
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another conscious mind, either from within or without, these potentials are mapped 
out by a system which connects the first set of elements to the second set by a series 
of processes or rules. When hypercombinatories organize a complex combinatory, we 
say this complex society is alive. Combinatories go from the simple to the complex, 
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resonance or sync. Determining dynamics and its extent requires that there be some 
standard in regard to which change can be determined. Every network, from the 
simplest to the most complex, can be linked up with a network known as a metric
which can establish conditions to determine distance between the separate elements 
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genetically, that is, in relation to the historical and/or logical process whereby a 
network emerges, or individuates, from its surroundings. While all networks have a 
particular history, all networks can also be seen as composed of elements of the 
logical genetic chain of moves, from simplest to most complex, 
which exist as potentials within the network diagram. The 
genetic approach attempts to give a general description of the 
potentials of networks as a series of logical moments. If the 
network diagram consists, in simplest form, of the three terms 
node, link, and ground, then genetics needs first understand 
how it is that a node, link, or ground come to be. From a logical perspective, then, 
the first stage of network development would be that of indifference, a condition in 
which everything is possible, but nothing in particular has taken shape. Indifference 
indicates neither symmetry nor asymmetry, sameness nor difference, but that from 
which these notions emerge. When something emerges which differs from 
indifference, we say that an event has occurred in relation to a ground. Event and 
ground are co-constitutive, for they indicate the emergence of difference from within 
indifference, and each can be thought of as the ground to the event of the other, and 
vice-versa, depending on the perspective in question. Within a given ground, however, 
multiple events may emerge, and the degree to which these events interact, either 
with themselves or with the ground surrounding them, may vary. Events may be 
ephemeral or relatively stable, and when events endure over time they may enter in 
relation with other events with which they share one or more grounds. If these events 
in any way relate, we say that they then share a structure, and these events can then 
be seen as elements of that structure. The aspects of an element which has something 
in common with a structure is known as a node, that which connects nodes is a link, 
and the structure as a whole is a network. Thus the emergence of any of these three 
indicates the emergence of the other two. Nodes may be completely determined by a  
network, and hence identical to their elements, or only slightly determined by a 
network, indicative of a large distinction between node and element. Ultimately, the 
determination of relation between any of these terms depends upon the networks 
from which these elements are understood.
Levels. Nodes, links, and grounds are differentiated via the notion of 
individuation, or emergence. A node individuates from a ground, links individuate from 





network may involute into a series of disconnected links, links into a series of nodes, 
and nodes back to ground. Involution and individuation are two sides of the same 
process, and in many networks-in-process, we see network elements transforming into 
each other on a regular basis. None of the terms used to describe networks, such as 
ground, node, field, structure, link, topology, module, layer, individuation, etc., are 
elements which exist separately from each other, for they are only defined 
relationally. That is, as theorists such as Manuel Castells 
have argued, a node is ‘where a curve intersects itself’,15
or, as some theorists have argued, ‘ a node is a shortened 
link, a link an extended node.’16 We can also say that a 
node is where a ground curves into itself, for each node 
that individuates from a ground is itself a network at another level of scale, just as 
every network is itself a node, all the way up and down at every level of scale until 
one reaches the open. What then is a level of scale? It is a differentiating link between 
a node and a node – or, depending on one’s perspective, a network and a network, 
ground a from ground, a link from link - distinguishing one from another as part from 
whole, container from contained, layer from layered.  Mathematicians often speak of 
a singularity as the presence of one dimension in another,17 and so it is with networks, 
in that each structure can indicate, depending on the perspective, an interpenetration 
of levels. While levels may have a relation of verticality with each other, this is not a 
necessity. A level is a sheet or zone of emergence, that from which nodes, links, 
grounds, and networks individuate. Furthermore, these elements are not only 
elements, but also moments, for a node is always a noding, a link always a linking, a 
ground always a grounding, and a network always a networking, for relation is always 
in-process. The dynamic separation and intersection of levels or dimensions of 
difference within the world is emergence, relation in the process of self-differing. At 
each point in which levels indicate the manner in which emergence contains or layers 
upon itself, and whenever it folds upon itself in this manner, emergence is then in the 
process of relating to itself, of suturing together the dimensions of itself which it has 
caused to diverge from itself in the first place. The spatio-temporal paradoxes which 
result from many prior attempts to describe aspects of emergence are the result of 
the non-relational manner in which these attempts try to describe its fully relational 
structure. Any attempt to define emergence ultimately returns to where it began, but 
with an infinite and multiplicitous twist, and this torsion is precisely emergence itself. 
It is from emergence that the networkological project comes to be, at the site of 
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elements and connections. Any philosophy which aims to describe the structure of 
relation must perform this very torsion itself, as this text will attempt to do. The 
networkological perspective attempts to enact this torsion in its unfolding of the 
potentials of the network diagram, a diagram which performs relation in its very 
structure. And yet, it is not enough for the diagram to be relational, for the unfolding 
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1 The closest to a philosophy of networks in the existent literature is the work of Bruno Latour 
and his associates (ie: John Law) on ‘actor-network theory.’ However, what is primary for 
these theorists, compared to this work, is not networks, which are ultimately a supporting 
structure, but actants. There are other theorists, however, which can be seen as clear 
precursors of the networkological enterprise, even if networks were for them not the 
foundation of their theoretical enterprise. Gilles Deleuze is certainly a theorist for whom 
network forms are essential (for more, see my blog post from December 30, 2009, entitled 
“Deleuze as Networkologist: ‘The Logic of Sense’ and the Networkology of Events,” at  
http://networkologies.wordpress.com /2009/12/30/ deleuze-as-networkologist-the-logic-of-
sense-and-networks-of-events/. For more on Whitehead and Leibniz as networkological 
thinkers, see my blog post from Dec. 27, 2009, entitled “Manifoldness: Spacetime as 
Hypernetwork with Leibniz, Whitehead, and Riemann,” as well as my post from Nov. 15, 2009 
entitled “World as Medium: Or, How Self-Differing Substance Makes Strange Bedfellows of 
Whitehead, Hegel, and Deleuze” (these and other related posts available at http:// 
networkologies.wordpress.com). For more on Latour’s actor-network theory, see Bruno Latour, 
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2007).    
2 “To him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back.” Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, Reason in History (New York: Prentice Hall, 1996), 13. 
3 See Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Free Press, 1997), pp. 
51-8. 
4 Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theater, (New York: Hill and Wang, 13th Edition), 37.  
5 For more on the notion of family resemblance in Wittgenstein, see Philosophical 
Investigations, (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 35-7.    
6 For a general introduction to quantitative network analysis, see Linked: How Everything is 
Connected to Everything Else and What it Means, by Albert-Lásló Barabási (New York: Plume, 
2003). An intermediate level text is Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks Between Order 
and Randomness, by Duncan Watts (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003), while a more 
advanced text is The Structure and Dynamics of Networks, by Albert-Lásló Barabási, Mark 
Newman, and Duncan Watts (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2006).    
7 For more on distributed networks, see Barabási, op.cit., 143-162, 219-226. 
8 For more on the political ramifications of network topologies, see Philip Ball, Critical Mass: 
How One Thing Leads to Another (London: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2006), 295-371 
9 For more on symmetry as invariance, as well as its relation to group theory, see Leon M. 
Lederman and Christopher T. Hill, Symmetry and the Beautiful Universe (Amherst: Prometheus 
Books, 2008), 1-116. 
10 For more on state and phase space diagrams and their uses, see Klaus Mainzer, Thinking in 
Complexity: The Computational Dynamics of Matter, Mind, and Mankind, 5th Edition,  (Berlin: 
Springer, 2007), 30-43. 
11 For more on symmetry breaking, see Lederman, op.cit., 189-202.  
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elements and connections. Any philosophy which aims to describe the structure of 
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structure. And yet, it is not enough for the diagram to be relational, for the unfolding 







































Cover Image: The image used for the cover is a modified version of ‘Little Rock Lake Trophic 
Web: Cannibal Image 2,’ The image was produced with FoodWeb3D, written by R.J. Williams 
and provided by the Pacific Ecoinformatics and Computational Ecology Lab (www.foodwebs 
.org, Yoon et al. 2004). The image itself can be found at Yoon, I., R.J. Williams, E. Levine, S. 
Yoon, J.A. Dunne, and N.D. Martinez. 2004.  Webs on the Web (WoW): 3D visualization of 
ecological networks on the WWW for collaborative research and education. Proceedings of the 
IS&T/SPIE Symposium on Electronic Imaging, Visualization and Data Analysis 5295:124-132. 
 
Acknowledgement: I’d like to thank the Santa Fe Institute in Santa Fe, New Mexico, for making 




1 The closest to a philosophy of networks in the existent literature is the work of Bruno Latour 
and his associates (ie: John Law) on ‘actor-network theory.’ However, what is primary for 
these theorists, compared to this work, is not networks, which are ultimately a supporting 
structure, but actants. There are other theorists, however, which can be seen as clear 
precursors of the networkological enterprise, even if networks were for them not the 
foundation of their theoretical enterprise. Gilles Deleuze is certainly a theorist for whom 
network forms are essential (for more, see my blog post from December 30, 2009, entitled 
“Deleuze as Networkologist: ‘The Logic of Sense’ and the Networkology of Events,” at  
http://networkologies.wordpress.com /2009/12/30/ deleuze-as-networkologist-the-logic-of-
sense-and-networks-of-events/. For more on Whitehead and Leibniz as networkological 
thinkers, see my blog post from Dec. 27, 2009, entitled “Manifoldness: Spacetime as 
Hypernetwork with Leibniz, Whitehead, and Riemann,” as well as my post from Nov. 15, 2009 
entitled “World as Medium: Or, How Self-Differing Substance Makes Strange Bedfellows of 
Whitehead, Hegel, and Deleuze” (these and other related posts available at http:// 
networkologies.wordpress.com). For more on Latour’s actor-network theory, see Bruno Latour, 
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2007).    
2 “To him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back.” Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, Reason in History (New York: Prentice Hall, 1996), 13. 
3 See Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Free Press, 1997), pp. 
51-8. 
4 Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theater, (New York: Hill and Wang, 13th Edition), 37.  
5 For more on the notion of family resemblance in Wittgenstein, see Philosophical 
Investigations, (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 35-7.    
6 For a general introduction to quantitative network analysis, see Linked: How Everything is 
Connected to Everything Else and What it Means, by Albert-Lásló Barabási (New York: Plume, 
2003). An intermediate level text is Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks Between Order 
and Randomness, by Duncan Watts (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003), while a more 
advanced text is The Structure and Dynamics of Networks, by Albert-Lásló Barabási, Mark 
Newman, and Duncan Watts (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2006).    
7 For more on distributed networks, see Barabási, op.cit., 143-162, 219-226. 
8 For more on the political ramifications of network topologies, see Philip Ball, Critical Mass: 
How One Thing Leads to Another (London: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2006), 295-371 
9 For more on symmetry as invariance, as well as its relation to group theory, see Leon M. 
Lederman and Christopher T. Hill, Symmetry and the Beautiful Universe (Amherst: Prometheus 
Books, 2008), 1-116. 
10 For more on state and phase space diagrams and their uses, see Klaus Mainzer, Thinking in 
Complexity: The Computational Dynamics of Matter, Mind, and Mankind, 5th Edition,  (Berlin: 
Springer, 2007), 30-43. 
11 For more on symmetry breaking, see Lederman, op.cit., 189-202.  
                                                        
Cover Image: The image used for the cover is a modified version of ‘Little Rock Lake Trophic 
Web: Cannibal Image 2,’ The image was produced with FoodWeb3D, written by R.J. Williams 
and provided by the Pacific Ecoinformatics and Computational Ecology Lab (www.foodwebs 
.org, Yoon et al. 2004). The image itself can be found at Yoon, I., R.J. Williams, E. Levine, S. 
Yoon, J.A. Dunne, and N.D. Martinez. 2004.  Webs on the Web (WoW): 3D visualization of 
ecological networks on the WWW for collaborative research and education. Proceedings of the 
IS&T/SPIE Symposium on Electronic Imaging, Visualization and Data Analysis 5295:124-132. 
 
Acknowledgement: I’d like to thank the Santa Fe Institute in Santa Fe, New Mexico, for making 




1 The closest to a philosophy of networks in the existent literature is the work of Bruno Latour 
and his associates (ie: John Law) on ‘actor-network theory.’ However, what is primary for 
these theorists, compared to this work, is not networks, which are ultimately a supporting 
structure, but actants. There are other theorists, however, which can be seen as clear 
precursors of the networkological enterprise, even if networks were for them not the 
foundation of their theoretical enterprise. Gilles Deleuze is certainly a theorist for whom 
network forms are essential (for more, see my blog post from December 30, 2009, entitled 
“Deleuze as Networkologist: ‘The Logic of Sense’ and the Networkology of Events,” at  
http://networkologies.wordpress.com /2009/12/30/ deleuze-as-networkologist-the-logic-of-
sense-and-networks-of-events/. For more on Whitehead and Leibniz as networkological 
thinkers, see my blog post from Dec. 27, 2009, entitled “Manifoldness: Spacetime as 
Hypernetwork with Leibniz, Whitehead, and Riemann,” as well as my post from Nov. 15, 2009 
entitled “World as Medium: Or, How Self-Differing Substance Makes Strange Bedfellows of 
Whitehead, Hegel, and Deleuze” (these and other related posts available at http:// 
networkologies.wordpress.com). For more on Latour’s actor-network theory, see Bruno Latour, 
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2007).    
2 “To him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back.” Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, Reason in History (New York: Prentice Hall, 1996), 13. 
3 See Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Free Press, 1997), pp. 
51-8. 
4 Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theater, (New York: Hill and Wang, 13th Edition), 37.  
5 For more on the notion of family resemblance in Wittgenstein, see Philosophical 
Investigations, (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 35-7.    
6 For a general introduction to quantitative network analysis, see Linked: How Everything is 
Connected to Everything Else and What it Means, by Albert-Lásló Barabási (New York: Plume, 
2003). An intermediate level text is Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks Between Order 
and Randomness, by Duncan Watts (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003), while a more 
advanced text is The Structure and Dynamics of Networks, by Albert-Lásló Barabási, Mark 
Newman, and Duncan Watts (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2006).    
7 For more on distributed networks, see Barabási, op.cit., 143-162, 219-226. 
8 For more on the political ramifications of network topologies, see Philip Ball, Critical Mass: 
How One Thing Leads to Another (London: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2006), 295-371 
9 For more on symmetry as invariance, as well as its relation to group theory, see Leon M. 
Lederman and Christopher T. Hill, Symmetry and the Beautiful Universe (Amherst: Prometheus 
Books, 2008), 1-116. 
10 For more on state and phase space diagrams and their uses, see Klaus Mainzer, Thinking in 
Complexity: The Computational Dynamics of Matter, Mind, and Mankind, 5th Edition,  (Berlin: 
Springer, 2007), 30-43. 
11 For more on symmetry breaking, see Lederman, op.cit., 189-202.                                                          
12 The three diagrams in this section are public domain images, retrieved on 11:00 p.m., Feb. 
28th 2010, from the following sources: pendulum state-space diagram(http://www.scholarpedia  
.org/article/Image:Terman_pendulum.jpg), phase-space diagram of water(http://en.wikipedia  
.org /wiki/File:Phase-diag.svg), and color-space (http://www.mathworks.com/access/ 
helpdesk/help/toolbox/images/color7.gif). 
13 For more on the analysis of the history of mathematics by means of the terms modernism and 
post-modernism, see Jeremy Gray, Plato’s Ghost: The Modernist Transformation of 
Mathematics (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008), 18-33. For more on set theory in its 
historical context, see ibid., pp. 157-169. For more on category theory in its historical context, 
see Ralf Krömer, Tool and Object: A History and Philosophy of Category Theory (Basel: 
Birkhäuser Basel, 2007), xxi-xxxvi.  
14 For an extended philosophical meditation on the ramifications of metastable energetic 
conditions, see Gilbert Simondon, L’individuation psychique et collective: A la lumière des 
notions de Forme, Information, Potentiel, et Métastabilitié (Paris: Editions Aubier, 2007). For 
an examination which focuses more on the scientific end of things, see Ilya Prigogene and 
Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature (New York: Bantam, 
1985).  
15 “A node is the point at which a curve intersects itself,” Manuel Castells, The Rise of the 
Network Society: Volume One (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2000), 501.  
16 I am quite sure that this notion is not my own, but I am currently unable to locate the 
source, a matter which will hopefully be addressed in future editions of this text.  
17 For more on the notion of a singularity as the presence of one dimension in another, see 
more on the manner in which the complex plane was generated in the history of mathematics, 
as well as the manner in which complex or ‘imaginary’ numbers are used in contemporary 
quantum physics to understand the structure of the wave function in the Schrödinger equation. 
For more on the history of the complex plane, see Paul Nahin, An Imaginary Tale: The Story of 
√-1 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1998), 31-66. For more on the uses of this idea in physics 
in regard to the wave function, see Bruce A. Schumm, Deep Down Things: The Breathtaking 
Beauty of Particle Physics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2004), 154-168.  
Adrian Ivakhiv – Review of Deleuze/Guattari & Ecology
185184
Deleuze/Guattari & Ecology
edited by Bernd Herzogenrath




Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Their concepts feel knotted and 
tangled, as if they are working their fingers through matted 
conceptual soils thick with philosophical roots and tubers, 
earthworms and fossils, that emerge in refrains and crescen-
dos never reaching a unison chorus but, rather, bubbling up 
into temporary congealments, only to slide out into oozing 
bursts of liquid and foam, semen and spittle, organic pulsation 
and machinic propulsion, tremolo strings and cacophonous 
percussion. There are rhizomes threaded through their work, 
yes, but there are nomadic war machines too, allied against 
states and doctrines, but against nature as well, if nature be a 
domain set apart from society or, indeed, from the resonant 
machinery of matter. (Which, for Deleuze and Guattari, it isn’t.)
Earlier efforts to appropriate d&g for environmental theory—
by phenomenologists like Edward Casey and Robert Mugerauer, 
anthropologists like Stephen Muecke, and ecophilosophers 
like Dolores LaChappelle—worked with individual conceptual 
threads, such as the rhizome or the nomadic spatialities of 
smoothness and striation, but a more complete accounting 
of d&g’s ‘ecologics’ has had wait for their works to be more 
fully translated and thoroughly digested. Such an ecologics 
 here is a suggestively 
ecological quality to the writings 
of French philosophers Gilles T
has begun to be developed in the work of Mark Bonta and 
John Protevi, Manuel DeLanda, and others. 
Over the last few years, three anthologies have appeared, 
one as a special issue of the on-line journal Rhizomes, and 
the other two collections both edited by German cultural 
theorist Bernd Herzogenrath, An (Un)Likely Alliance: Thinking 
Environment(s) with Deleuze/Guattari (Cambridge Scholars Press, 
2008) and the book being reviewed here. All three evince a 
similar multiplicity of orientations: some pieces labor to 
develop a Deleuzo-Guattarian ecology, with lesser or greater 
degrees of success, while others pick up a conceptual brick or 
two from d&g and send it on its own flight vector, for instance 
analyzing a cultural or political phenomenon in its terms, but 
without fully developing a contextual terrain for it. In each 
case also, the overall mix tends toward an uneven Babel of 
disparate voices than a convergent synthesis of approaches, 
though this may be a fact of life in Deleuzo-Guattarian studies. 
The strength of the three volumes, taken together, is that they 
place Deleuze/Guattari in communication with ecological 
theories of various kinds, and that they frequently perform 
this connective labor with the aid of conceptual tools already 
in motion, such as those provided by von Uexkull, Maturana 
and Varela, Bateson, Prigogine, Flusser, Luhmann, and others. 
To the extent that a convergence appears on the horizon 
of Deleuze/Guattari and Ecology, it is around that ‘resonant 
machinery of matter’: the world, filtered through a Deleuzo-
Guattarian sieve, is the lively and uncontainable one of 
desiring-production, a world of becomings, connections, and 
organic-machinic-socio-psychic assemblages. Bernd Herzo-
genrath’s lucid introduction sets this theme up in terms of 
Guattari’s ‘generalized machinics’ and Deleuze’s ‘intelligent 
materialism,’ that is, the latter’s recognition of the autopoietic 
intelligence of matter. The next three chapters follow up with 
ambitious and challenging, if divergent, attempts to articulate 
such a machinic ecology. 
Manuel DeLanda’s ‘Ecology and Realist Ontology’ is an odd 
selection to follow Herzogenrath’s introductory overview, 
as it immediately throws the reader into the full density of 
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mathematical, topological, and cybernetic concepts DeLanda 
has been developing for several years, albeit a little unan-
chored in a shared language. DeLanda makes a case for a 
materialist philosophy of ecology (as opposed to one ‘rooted 
in literary criticism, semiotics, or hermeneutics’), specifically 
a ‘philosophy of difference,’ and for a ‘realist ontology that 
does not depend on essences’ but instead grapples with the 
morphogenetic capacities of matter. Like a few of the other 
chapters here, however, DeLanda’s case remains very much 
his own, and it will not be clear to all readers where exactly it 
remains faithful to Deleuze and Guattari and where it veers 
away from them.
Ronald Bogue’s ‘A Thousand Ecologies’ would have been a 
better chapter to begin with, as it provides a useful overview 
of D/G’s main ecologically applicable concepts – the refrain, 
territorialization, machinic desiring-production, D/G’s ‘quali-
fied’ and open holism, and their call, at the end of What is 
Philosophy?, to create ‘possibilities of life or modes of existence’ 
that would constitute a ‘new earth’ and a ‘people to come.’ 
Usefully, Bogue refers these back to Arne Naess’s definitions 
of ecology, ecophilosophy, and ecosophy, and concludes that 
d&g, while not ecologists, do promote a ‘view of nature as a 
complex of interactive organism-environment systems’; that 
they qualify as ecophilosophers only in a loose sense of the 
word; and that ‘they are ecosophers in that the ethics of their 
thought informs their views of the relationships of humans 
to the world,’ views which are complex with regard to technol-
ogy and the valorization of wilderness and intrinsic value of 
organisms, but which are qualifiedly holistic, pluralistic, and 
anthropocentric (though I would question the latter, as it’s 
based on a single rather uncharacteristic definition of the 
term). In other words, they are ecosophists of a sort, though 
not the usual kind. 
In the book’s longest chapter, ‘Structural couplings: Radical 
constructivism and a Deleuzian ecologics,’ Hanjo Berressem 
ambitiously attempts to push d&g further into the ‘radical 
constructivist’ systems-theoretical direction that implicitly 
underlies much of their work. The result, as Berressem lays 
it out, is an expansive conceptual alliance between Deleuze’s 
philosophy, Guattari’s ecopolitics, and the various systems 
theories of cognitive biologists Maturana and Varela, com-
munication and social theorists Luhmann and Flusser, cy-
berneticists von Forster, von Glasersfeld, Bateson, and Wilden, 
and land artist Robert Smithson, among others. Berressem 
envisions the resulting assemblage as a ‘radical ecologics,’ a 
Haeckelian ‘systems theory of the living’ that is inclusive of 
the whole machinic world of social, economic, linguistic and 
biological ‘machines’ in addition to the virtual, the field of pure 
potentiality. He further characterizes it as a ‘radical haecol-
ogy’ that, as a didactics, would aim to make ‘the operations of 
“structural couplings” conscious’; as a science, would ‘generate 
knowledge about structural couplings’ and develop ‘routines 
that allow for regulated responses to structural disequilibria’; 
as a practice, would implement ‘parameters within which the 
equilibrium between the autopoietic systems and their media 
can be kept, both locally and globally’; as an artform, would 
provide ‘blocks of sensation’; and as a philosophy, would 
create ‘concepts that radically link immaterial concepts and 
material movements’ (89). Despite its density, the chapter is 
a rich and rewarding theoretical treatment that emphasizes 
connections over tensions or potential incongruencies.
While less ambitious in their scope, the next handful of 
chapters (by Gary Genosko, Verena Andermatt Conley, Jona-
than Maskit, and Dorothea Olkowski) explore a diversity of 
angles on theoretical themes. Genosko examines Guattari’s 
Three Ecologies in order to answer the question ‘why three?’ and 
answers it through a reduction to a single idea—subjectivity 
as a common principle, which he (rightly, I think) takes to 
be Guattari’s ‘most original contribution to the theorization 
of ecology’—that is expressed at three levels: the macro level 
of the biosphere, the intermediate level of social relations, 
and the micro or molecular level of human subjectivity. 
Guattari may indeed have had something like the macro-
intermediate-micro in mind, but this does raise the objection 
that neither of his three ecologies need be purely macro or 
micro: environmental ecologies can be pretty fine-tuned and 
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local, while subjective or mental ecologies can be global, and 
arguably are becoming ever more so. An alternative concep-
tualization of the three ecologies might have been to take the 
material and the social as complementary poles, in the sense 
that Whitehead perceived each act of experience to harbor 
its interior or ‘subjective’ pole and its exterior or ‘objective’ 
pole, and then to bring in the third element of ‘perceptual’ 
or ‘mental ecology’ as a kind of intermediate, ecosemiotic 
and intersubjective realm of material engagements and 
enactments from out of which the two other poles emerge. 
This kind of intermediary realm may be what Genosko has 
in mind in focusing on ‘subjectivity.’
Maskit, in ‘Subjectivity, Desire, and the Problem of Consump-
tion,’ concurs with Genosko’s assessment of the importance 
of Guattari’s focus on subjectivity. If environmentalism can 
be defined as ‘there are too many people using up too much 
stuff too quickly for it to regenerate itself’ (129), and the best 
way to approach the problem is to focus on consumption (as 
opposed to population control or resource regeneration), 
and if the common strategies for doing this have been either 
ethical (personal responsibility, shame) or policy oriented 
(incentives and constraints), then Guattari’s approach has 
been distinctive in asking how we can restructure capitalist 
subjectivity. Maskit’s list of suggestions, unfortunately, is a 
little anticlimactic: ‘Don’t watch television. Question all as-
sertions that a practice is impossible. Know the people who 
produce your food. Figure out how to get from point a to point 
b without driving or flying.’ (140). He notes, interestingly, 
that ‘some of these things look like ascetic practices’ (141), 
which perhaps is part of the problem: if capitalist subjectiv-
ity lures us with its promises of desires and pleasures avail-
able through the marketplace (138), how can such an ascetic 
counter-subjectivity attract the numbers it needs to make a 
significant environmental impact? 
Most of the book’s remaining chapters provide case studies 
or readings of specific phenomena or artistic forms in light 
of Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts. John Protevi’s ‘Katrina’ is an 
exemplary study of Hurricane Katrina in terms underpinned 
by Deleuzian and Delandaesque complex-systems analysis 
(though the Deleuzo-Guattarian conceptual links are not 
explicitly articulated, which leaves the reader to judge these 
links for themselves). 
Stephen Zepke’s ‘Eco-Aesthetics: Beyond Structure in the 
World of Robert Smithson, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guat-
tari’ traces parallel and roughly contemporaneous shifts or 
‘breaks’ in Smithson’s artistic practice and Deleuze’s philoso-
phy. Occurring roughly between 1967 and 1969, these shifts 
take both men from a ‘conceptual mapping of structures’ 
(which in Smithson was a concern with art institutions and 
conceptual interventions) to a more direct engagement with 
the ‘material machinery of production’, that is, the material 
and compositional forces of the Earth. The turning point for 
Smithson, according to Zepke, came in his encounter with 
Nature-as-entropy in Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New 
Jersey (1967), which was followed by a trip to the deserts of 
the southwest and an ostensible rediscovery of himself as a 
kind of ‘schizo-artist’ who composes matter, in Smithson’s 
words, ‘to give evidence of this experience...of the original 
unbounded state,’ a place where ‘words and rocks’ become 
‘de-differentiated according to an entropic logic by which 
“mind and matter get endlessly confounded”’ (206). Deleuze, 
meanwhile, arrived at the same space, with the aid of Spinoza 
and Artaud, sometime between Difference and Repetition and 
his 1970s collaborations with Guattari. Zepke interprets both 
men’s shifts as breakthroughs marking an entry into the 
production and ‘emergence of Nature itself,’ by which art 
(and perhaps philosophy) ‘is transformed into eco-aesthetics, 
and the way in which eco-aesthetics can open for us a new 
future’ (213). 
Bernd Herzogenrath traces a similar shift in musical 
composition from the musical representation of nature in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century classical music, as in-
stanced in the work of American composer Charles Ives, to a 
‘reproduction of the processes and dynamics of the weather 
as a system “on the edge of chaos”’ in the compositional 
practice of Thoreauvian composer-anarchist John Cage, and 
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eighteenth and nineteenth century classical music, as in-
stanced in the work of American composer Charles Ives, to a 
‘reproduction of the processes and dynamics of the weather 
as a system “on the edge of chaos”’ in the compositional 
practice of Thoreauvian composer-anarchist John Cage, and 
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finally to an ‘ecology of music’ in the work of contemporary 
Alaska-based composer John Luther Adams. In Ives, both 
music and nature are metaphorical, with the ‘weather of 
music’ and nature itself representative of an Emersonian 
Over-soul, while in Cage music itself becomes ‘meterologi-
cal,’ with chance processes, including those representing the 
weather, dictating the performance of a musician. But Cage, 
for Herzogenrath, remained within a modernist frame of the 
artist making ‘clear-cut objects’ (228). Adams, on the other 
hand, comes closest to a pure ‘sonic geography’ in which 
music does not imitate nature, but rather ‘taps into nature’s 
dynamic processes themselves for the generation of sound 
and light’ (226). Like Zepke, Herzogenrath is making a case 
for a particular kind of compositional practice in which the 
machinery of nature and the machinery of music become 
one; but the objection can still be raised that each of these 
compositional practices involves some translation (in Latou-
rian terms) from one domain to another, so that there isn’t a 
collapse of what were two domains into one, but the creation 
of something new through a productive process which, in all 
three cases, remains a form of compositional practice.
Mark Halsey’s ‘Deleuze and Deliverance: Body, Wildness, Eth-
ics,’ reads John Boorman’s 1972 film Deliverance as a Deleuzo-
Guattarian ‘descent,’ as Halsey puts it, of ‘rationality (the 
Cartesian subject), law (right), and the trappings and habits 
spawned by urbanity (sedentary life, the rise of the Urstaat),’ 
followed by a ‘return’ of ‘bodies (molecular), wildness, and 
the singular experience of an ethics.’ Halsey interprets the 
decision of Lewis and Ed—two of the Atlanta businessmen 
on a canoeing trip whose brutal wilderness encounter with 
two Appalachian mountain men results in the murder of one 
of the latter—to bury the murdered man’s body, rather than 
reporting it to the police, as a Nietzschian-Deleuzian ‘ethical 
act.’ This sets Lewis up as a prophet of Deleuzo-Guattarian 
ecological reckoning: ‘sooner, rather than later,’ Halsey writes, 
‘the relative comfort’ of our ‘vessels (cars, jets, offices, mansions, 
yachts, time-share apartments) will encounter the bank of the 
river and the illusion of interiority will be forced center stage’ 
and then ‘everyone,’ ecological deniers and managers, ‘will be 
forced to play the game.’ In opting for this reading, however, 
Halsey ignores the critiques that have been made of Lewis’s, 
and author James Dickey’s, hypermasculinist survivalism as 
a libertarian denial of sociality and a proto-fascist critique 
of civilization’s ‘feminization’ of men, and of its depiction 
of ‘hillbillies’ as the very kind of urban stereotype that lays 
bare the hollowness at the core of the film’s romanticization 
of the wild. Halsey’s reading thus exemplifies one strain of 
Deleuzo-Guattarian critique, which places d&g’s ideas at 
the service of a kind of nature-culture dualism that the two 
theorists, at times at least, strove hard to overcome. 
Chapters by Conley, Olkowski, Luciana Parisi, Yves Abrious, 
and Matthew Fuller, on topics ranging from bioinformatics 
and symbiosensation (Parisi) to art made ‘for animals,’ or at 
least intended to involve humans in interaction with nonhu-
man animals (Fuller), round out the anthology. Abrioux’s is 
a particularly engaging meditation on landscape, gardening, 
and land art (a topic that recurs in a few of the other chapters 
as well), read via d&g’s ‘eleventh plateau,’ ‘Of the refrain.’
As a whole, the collection is marked both by a welcome diver-
sity of writing and expressive styles and by a tension between 
the more cohesive theoretical pieces, such as DeLanda’s and 
Berressem’s, which work toward establishing a complex and 
layered d/g-inspired theoretical framework, and the applica-
tions of Deleuzo-Guattarian themes to single instances or 
specific types of art, science, or politics. Along with the other 
two anthologies of Deleuzo-Guattarian ecological philosophy, 
this one can be considered as representative of an initial 
phase whereby Deleuzo-Guattarian ecological work remains 
exploratory and marked neither by a clear convergence nor 
a divergence into distinct ‘camps’ or ‘schools.’ Some of the 
authors, of course, are hard at work on their own synthetic 
eco/geophilosophical programs, which shows through in 
their chapters here. As a set of working reports on the pos-
sible directions of a Deleuzo-Guattarian ecologics, then, this 
anthology is a welcome addition to the literature.
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for rethinking our relationship to the environment without 
the overly Romantic notion of nature, the present book sets 
out to provide the background “mesh” that he will discuss 
in Ecology without Nature in terms of “practical” ecological 
concerns. In this sense, The Ecological Thought, as the title itself 
suggests, lays the theoretical ground that the earlier work had 
put into practice.
Given the venue for this review, I will argue for its place 
in the larger “speculative” realist orbit, and, joining with 
the other reviews in this issue, argue for a more ecumenical, 
even ecological, consideration of realism. In other words, I 
see Morton’s book as akin to the “object oriented ontology” 
found in such thinkers as Graham Harman and Levi Bryant, 
while also touching on the post-metaphysical realism on order 
from other thinkers (e.g., Jean-Luc Nancy). By challenging the 
bases of any anthropocentrism (and even deeming “anthro-
pocentrism” to be a line of attack from within anti-realisms), 
Morton’s book joins forces with these thinkers, though, as I’ll 
note, the premises of his “relationism” will be at odds with the 
“allure” and secreted otherness of objects found in several of 
these thinkers. But his attunement to “hyper-objects” and an 
s a “pre-quel” to Morton’s 
Ecology without Nature (2008), 
in which the author argued A
almost Latourian “mesh” should itself mesh well with think-
ers in and around these incipient movements. Finally, before 
turning to the review proper, let me note that Morton’s work 
is simply a fine piece of writing. If anything is represented 
by Harman, Latour, Bryant, and many others considered in 
relation to this speculative realism, it’s a facility with master 
figures while not getting lost in the mesh of their writings. 
Morton’s work is a lively book and performs the relational-
ity of concepts, descriptions, allusions, etc., that is its topic.
For this reason, this is a difficult work to summarize, 
since it lays out its concepts by thinking ecologically (it’s an 
ecological thought at the level of “form,” if the mesh doesn’t 
undo such form/content distinctions as a matter of course), 
that is, each chapter enfolds on the other, rather than hav-
ing discrete subject matter. This should not be read to mean 
that this is but a meandering tome in search of its thesis, but 
that Morton performs a kind of horizontal thinking that 
he believes necessary for coming to terms with ecological 
being. In his earlier Ecology without Nature, Morton argued 
that nature itself is a modern concept that pushed a part of 
being to some “out there” beyond human cultures (like the 
carrot on a stick always used to make Bugs Bunny march 
along—he never would get to it). This present book makes 
clear just how destructive he takes this concept to be. In the 
first place, “nature” repeats the capitalist treatment of the 
non-human as a resource for human beings, except this re-
source is the mark of a pre-cultural origin to which we are to 
return. Politically, this is disastrous, not least because of the 
use and abuse of nature in various right-wing ideologies of 
the past two hundred years. (Here Morton is dead-on in his 
critique of Heidegger-inflected environmental holism as a 
repetition in another form of Heidegger’s notorious 1930s 
political convictions, an argument I’ll let the reader discover 
for herself.) It’s also problematic in the way that it can’t help 
but be puritanist and reactionary to what is technologically 
and culturally omnipresent, though Morton is also clear that 
there never was a time of a lost communion of humans with 
nature. In this way, “nature” is a by-word for “wilderness areas” 
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that “are giant, abstract versions of the products hanging in 
mall windows”1 (7).
Thus, in a sense, Morton’s book is directed less at the ideo-
logues who will deny global warming until well after the 
water has waded up to the knees of Floridians than at deep 
ecologists, who, following Arne Naess, talk about a profound a 
priori harmony between human beings and nature disrupted 
by modern capitalism. It’s not clear from Morton’s book what 
the ontological status of such a “nature” would be, since it’s 
one thing to say that ecological thinking must deal with nature 
as it is now, another to argue against the deep ecologists that 
there is some x that is outside and beyond the human, and 
still another to deny tout court a non-human real. 
The point, as I take it, is that it’s the Romantic “nature” as 
well as any conception of a pre-established harmony that 
truly must be done away with: “The idea of Nature as holistic, 
healthy, real thing avoids the challenge” of radical coexistence 
(11). In this way, Morton argues, we must also do away with the 
notion of the “environment,” which has also stood for that 
which surrounds the human. But an ecological thought, he 
argues, does not just protest the “rigid ideological categories” 
of human/animal, culture/nature, etc. Rather, it sets out to 
demonstrate not just how nature itself is a category of the 
human (when it posits what does not belong to it) but also 
how what we consider the natural (minerals, machine-like 
movements, etc.) is the human.2
Here, though, I am less convinced. I think Morton’s “mesh” 
does much to “deconstruct” the old nature/culture binaries, 
but I’ve also been convinced by ecologists and environmental 
thinkers such as my colleague Mark Woods, whose forthcom-
ing book argues for a thinking of the “wild” irreducible to 
human conceptualization. In the first part of that work, Woods 
traces the production and the history of the legal creation of 
specific wilderness areas—a social/political construction if 
there ever was one. But this should not take away from the 
“strange strangeness,” to borrow Morton’s term, of such “wild” 
areas. Moreover, it seems to me that the “wild” is itself a wild 
concept, too anti-essentialist in itself to be tamed under a 
given heading.
It is just for this sort of reason that Morton introduces 
the idea of the “mesh” as a means for understanding the 
“interconnectedness” of existence. Since he is well aware of 
the use and abuse of internet (the web, networks, etc.) and 
spiritualist (vitalism, the holism, etc.) metaphors and con-
cepts, Morton seeks out this term to take up those forms of 
connections and separations among the objects of the world, 
without arguing that there is some substance (e.g., Thales 
water) hovering in the background of all things. To think the 
“mesh” is to think these connections and blank spaces that 
exist in a mesh, which is akin to Bruno Latour’s irreductionist 
theory of assemblages, wherein there are no substances but 
only collectives of relations. To bulk up this concept, Morton 
turns at several crucial places to the writings of Darwin and 
points out how his thought enables anti-essentialist, anti-
teleological thinking inimical to considerations of structures 
not a posteriori to material events. He writes, “The ecological 
thought stirs because the mesh appears in our social, psychic, 
and scientific domains. Since everything is interconnected, 
there is no definite background and therefore no definite 
foreground. Darwin,” he concludes, “sensed the mesh while 
pondering the implications of natural selection” (28). The 
seeming “pointlessness of life forms” in evolutionary theory, 
he notes ironically, provides the “saving grace” of ecological 
thought. 
In his first chapter, “Thinking Big,” Morton attacks the 
postmodern thesis according to which all that is left to us, after 
modernity, are petit narratives bereft of totalizing force. Yet, 
he clearly is not out to return to “thinking big” in terms of 
“centered” modes of thinking (humanism, theology, substance 
ontology, etc.). Conceptually, a mesh is itself nothing but a 
set of relations that are None-All, to use Lacanian parlance, 
or all-at-once, but also not utterly divided temporally and 
temporarily from each other. Thus, it functions as “vast yet 
intimate” space-time: “there is no here or there, so everything 
is brought within our awareness. The more we analyze, the 
more ambiguous things become” (40). Here Morton raises 
the mesh of the works of Darwin. The turn to evolutionary 
theory in the last several years—not to offer amateurish 
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one-offs, but profound analyses—is welcome and mirrored 
in Morton’s work. From Martin Hägglund’s radical atheism 
project to Elizabeth Grocz’s vitalist conceptions of time to 
Adrian Johnston’s considerations of the cadence of change, 
no longer do Continental philosophers equate Darwinism, 
as Heidegger did, with de-spiritualized mechanization or un-
repentant biopower, as some Foucaultians argue. For Morton, 
thinking the mesh of Darwinian interdependence means 
taking cognizance of the non-existence of species difference 
wherein an essence of “animality” could be offered as simply 
“non-human.” (Whenever the legatees of humanism declare 
an essential human trait, it’s not long before some animal 
is found with an akin characteristic [70-71].) The point is to 
think the “strange strangers” of those that coexist with us, in-
cluding the strange depths of our subjectivities. At this point, 
Morton lapses into the mode of the poetic, working through 
Coleridge’s The Rime of the Ancient Mariner as a means of con-
ceiving this mysterious strangeness among and within us.3
This brings us to the “uncanny” element of the mesh itself, 
which, while precisely not something in which we would be 
at home or heimliche (so much for all the metaphors of deep 
ecology), is something “you never perceive directly,” since it 
would cease to be the “interconnectedness” of things and be 
but one thing among others (57).4 The point, as I take it, is 
to think an expanding unboundededness of relations, while 
being attuned to the mysterious element this “unbounded-
ness” marks. But this “mesh” is not a formalism. He argues 
that it informs, rather than forms, a “true materialism” that 
“would be nonsubstantialist: it would think matter as self-
assembling sets of interrelationships in which information 
is directly inscribed” (83).5
This brings us to the second chapter, “Dark Thoughts.” I 
want to be careful not to suggest that Morton is providing 
us with another environmentalist or new age conception 
of the “ineffable.” A “dark ecology” does not stop short of 
thinking the non-human beyond, like a spiritualist version 
of negative theology. Rather, it marks how “knowing more 
about interconnectedness results in more uncertainty” about 
the very categories we use to mark out the world. Where this 
has led some to a postmodern skepticism that dictates all 
we know is that we cannot know about the world, Morton is 
right to champion a mode of realism, but one in which clar-
ity is precisely the enemy of thought about what is real: “The 
book of Nature is more like a Mallarmé poem than a linear, 
syntactically well organize, unified work” (61). More recently, 
Morton has linked this “ecology” less to Darwinian biology 
than (meta)physics, attacking the Newtonian pool hall view 
of the world of previous generations of “realists”:
[I]n the late 80s I remember one rather belligerent fellow guilting us 
out for even thinking about deconstruction—“Reality as I see it is like a 
boring painting, but you make it sound like an acid trip.” The funny thing 
is, the current state of physics means that the view of matter as shiny 
pingpong balls, with a separate self viewing them, is the hallucination. 
In any case, these developments [in physics] are 1) Real, 2) Pressing 
and 3) They severely limit (or in the case of nonlocality, profoundly 
undermine) a materialism consisting of little shiny pingpong balls, 
bundled with the attitude of subject–object dualism, in particular, the 
mind–matter manifold that has done some damage (shall we say) in 
its rather brief historical run.6
The author is not alone, of course, in trying to tease out a 
workable ontology consistent with the fantastic, almost trippy 
visions of the world on offer from physics and biology as well 
as the deconstruction of the subject where co-existence or Hei-
deggerian “Mitsein” comes to the fore. The trick is to produce 
concepts that don’t fall back into the old binary oppositions 
now rendered moot while also not simply rendering oneself 
mute in the face of our quite dark thoughts about ecological 
devastation. This occasionally, however, leads Morton to link 
“the ecological thought” to all manner of progressive think-
ing, which, while critical of identity politics, would “also be 
friendly to disability” studies (85). Morton’s “dark ecology” 
guides us to a rather bright version of the future in which 
races are known not to exist, disabilities are to be thought as 
differential abilities, and homophobia becomes homo-philia. 
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one-offs, but profound analyses—is welcome and mirrored 
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But, on the flip side, isn’t there a danger of this being anti-
ecological in the every day sense? Thinking big seem to mean 
here simply describing as inoperative the stubborn localized 
identities of various “collectives” whose members, such as 
indigenous critics of globalization, are simply holding to 
naïve essentialisms, while Morton also aligns himself to the 
goodness of rather heterogeneous areas of study—many of 
which are indeed anti-ecological. In other words, Morton’s 
metaphysical claim is that “absolutely everything is absolutely 
related to absolutely everything else.”7 But this doesn’t mean 
the ecological thought can be all things to all people.
This brings us to Morton’s minimal thesis: existence “is 
coexistence.” His final chapter, “Forward Thinking,” cham-
pions an ethics that no longer is content to find ways to “let 
nature be” (101). (This, of course, is an implicit criticism of 
Heideggerian environmentalisms founded in the dead-end of 
“Gelassenheit.”) In this chapter, Morton weaves considerations 
of “cooperation” across species and across the globe as an 
“obligation of ecological thought” (101). But here more theoreti-
cal choices need to be made. It is not a simple binary, but for a 
short review let’s put it thusly: Levinas or Heidegger? Morton’s 
work is convincing on the problems of using Heidegger’s 
later writings for the “ecological thought,” and his references 
to Levinas and the “elemental” are the most incisive in this 
work. But ultimately, again to simplify, it is Heidegger who is 
the horizontal thinker of being as being-with, of existence 
as “co-existence.” This “co-existence” of the mesh, in which, 
again, everything is related and relatable, is hard to square 
with a Levinasian conception of otherness that is specifically 
unrelatable, in fact, the non-relation par excellence. (This is 
why when Levinas used the phrase “relation to the Other,” he 
talked about “separation” and the “epiphany of the face” both 
to side-step a relational ontology and in order not to depict 
the Other as someone with whom I could be with; this was 
specifically his critique of Heideggerian Mitsein.) The aim 
of Morton’s analysis is to have the mesh, to have relationality, 
but also have something irreducible, singular, testifying to 
each…other. And here, let me be bold and tickle Graham Har-
man a bit, by asserting that his work could be the “vanishing 
mediator” between Heidegger and Levinas, precisely since 
he seeks a non-relatable interiority, which as non-relatable, is 
unnameable. Though he would critique Morton’s relationism, 
this would be a welcome conversation to begin.
What Morton, for his part, provides in the end is both a 
“realism” and an ethics of certain humility given our place in 
the world: “perhaps the ecological art of the future will deal 
with passivity and weakness; with lowliness, not loftiness” 
(109). In this way, we are forced from our place as sovereigns 
over nature, returning us to an “animism” that Morton puts 
under erasure (“animism”). What he means is not thinking 
of trees and the grass and books as having an animating soul, 
the mark of vitalisms and panpsychism—terms thrown about 
in critiques of variants of speculative realism—but rather 
as having a “sentience” marked by an openness to the very 
interconnectedness under discussion. As he does throughout 
this book, Morton himself shows an abundant openness to 
a variety of discourses, from Darwinian theory to Romantic 
literature to treatises on cybernetics, that make up the de-
centered “ecological thought” as well as the thinking that is 
itself ecological. 
But this is not simply a thought or even a praxis. It is what 
Derrida calls in The Animal that Therefore I Am the “undeni-
able”: the reality that enmeshes us in a world in which I “fol-
low” and simply “am” (he plays on the homonym of “je suis,” 
meaning both “I am,” and “I follow”) related to unspeakable 
cruelties and movements in, around, and beyond us. Before 
all denials is the undeniable, in a manner symmetrical to 
Morton’s claim that deeper than any “deep ecology” is the 
mesh. He writes: “We are only beginning to think the eco-
logical thought. Perhaps there is no end to its thinking. T.S. 
Eliot declared, “Human kind/ Cannot bear very much real-
ity” (Burnt Norton, lines 44-45)” (134). Eliot himself turned 
to his own forms of “sovereign cruelty” and mysticisms as 
a means for “bearing” any reality at all. It is undeniable the 
mesh offers another way.
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Response to Peter Gratton
Tim Morton
I’m very grateful for Peter Gratton’s thoughtful review of 
The Ecological Thought. I’m putting myself through Specula-
tive Realism (SR) and Object oriented ontology (OOO) boot 
camp at present as I return to the Deleuze that everyone but 
me has been seeing in my work since I stopped writing in 
a Deleuzian style! SR and in particular OOO are refreshing, 
powerful and very good for thinking with. I’d certainly rather 
be thought of as part of SR than as part of posthumanism—
even if posthumanism is anything other than just a label in 
a record store. There is some real rigor there. And almost 
everyone seems to write so beautifully. The Ecological Thought 
is in very good company then. The funny thing is I kind of 
backed into SR via deconstruction. It seems to me that there’s 
a lot more to deconstruction than the dreaded correlationism. 
For instance, deconstruction provides a view of language as 
non-human—even when humans are using it. It would be a 
big mistake to think that deconstruction is a form of nominal-
ism or idealism. The concept “strange stranger” is a way to 
think about life forms but as Peter Gratton and Levi Bryant 
have argued, there is no problem with thinking non-life 
this way too.8 There’s a sense in which the strangeness of the 
stranger is precisely the withdrawal of objects according to 
OOO. I’m particularly pleased with Gratton’s use of Mitsein 
as this had been occurring to me recently—right after the 
presses started whirring…
OOO seems to have a little more trouble with the other 
concept in The Ecological Thought: the mesh. Contemporary 
physical theories of matter tell us that the entire Universe is 
what in chapter 3 I call a hyperobject, massively distributed 
in spacetime in ways that far outstrip human capacities to 
know or imagine it. In this sense the idea is Spinozan—there 
is really only one substance, modulated in different ways. This 
doesn’t appear too dissonant with some thinking in OOO. 
I’m not sure I am a relationist if that means that relation-
ships are real, or more real than other things. For instance, 
relationality might go all the way down, which means that 
we are living in an infinite Universe. In a strict sense there 
would no single solid substance that could truly “relate”: rela-
tions are always a kind of abstraction. I think this brings me 
in line with OOO, who probably see relationism as a mode of 
correlationism (well it’s in the word, isn’t it?). I might differ 
from OOO to the extent that for me relationality and unicity 
go hand in hand. Yet relating is epiphenomenal. I believe I 
was careful to say that the mesh doesn’t exist apart from the 
entities that directly are it.
The question of objects is a matter of supreme ethical and 
political urgency, not just a good idea, and we need as much 
thinking about it as possible. The bp oil spill is evidently a 
hyperobject. How we allow plutonium into social life will be 
an issue for the next 24,100 years—the time it takes pluto-
nium’s radioactivity to decay. 
Some issues remain in thinking what I do alongside SR 
and OOO. Hyperobjects are a good way to understand my 
concept of mesh. Of course one of the aspects of the hyper-
object called Universe is (human) consciousness. Until OOO 
is able to account for “mind” (did I say “human”?) it will be 
incomplete from the standpoint of contemporary physical 
science. The concept “wild” that Peter Gratton juxtaposes with 
mesh fits with a conclusion I’ve been drawing about some 
forms of SR—that they’re sophisticated versions of the kind 
of environmentalist language that I’ve critiqued in various 
places. In essence “wild” is something that happens beyond 
our control and/or awareness “over there.” The “beyond our 
control” part is not so much of a problem for me—it’s self-
evident. The “over there” part is, because it reproduces an 
aesthetic distance that is precisely the subject–object dualism 
that we are all trying to think outside of at present. It’s a way to 
reify objects and it imagines them precisely in a correlation-
ist way. There is an aspect of the “beyond our control” meme 
that fits well with the resignation and defeatism expected in 
this phase of advanced capitalism. Substitute automated for 
wild and you will see what I mean. It’s not so much the idea 
itself as the attitude it codes for. The recovering Marxist in 
me sees this as a big problem with SR. Some SR thinkers have 
already critiqued my notion of “responsibility”—the more 
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nihilist SR says, “Why wouldn’t an accurate view of reality 
bankroll irresponsibility? After all, it’s beyond our control.” 
The only big difference between this mode of SR and eco-
phenomenology is that the latter is somewhat theistic, while 
the former is nihilistic. Both are forms of belief, except that 
one believes that it’s not a belief (guess which one). That’s 
not honest. If we truly want to think beyond correlationism 
we must think beyond belief. 
One final word: the real problem is not humans but selves.
notes
1 Tim Morton, The Ecological Thought, p 7. Henceforth all citations from 
this book are indicated in parentheses. Other citations will be provided 
in these endnotes.
2 Here, I’m left to wonder about the status of this mesh vis-à-vis the human/
nature split. At times, Morton can sound like Merleau-Ponty, who argued 
that overcoming the dualism of man and world meant enfolding them in on 
one-another—thus his flesh of the world where time is always “correlated” 
to human being-in-the-world. Linguistically, this is a tough conceptual 
distinction to make: not to enfold the old dualism in a hybridized human-
world reality while also not naming some extra-human reality that reifies 
a “nature” Morton rightly critiques.
3 This raises the question of whether an “ecological thought” can provide 
something of a “method” for new forms of reading and taking on texts. 
Morton at times suggests that it is, but he is more apt to perform this than 
to cite an explicit modus operandi that he is following.
4 I take this up soon enough, but here Morton moves quickly between a 
quasi-epistemology (what we “perceive”) and the ontology of the mesh as 
such. I think he is making a double claim: (1) the ecological thought is new in 
history and is a disseminative perception of the things themselves; (2) that 
reality is itself mesh-y and we’ve finally caught up to this fact of existence.
5 Here, he explicitly joins his work to the “vibrant materialism” of Jane Ben-
nett. See her Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010), as well as Tim Morton’s “Materialism Expanded 
and Remixed,” presented at a March 2010 conference on Bennett’s book 
(available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/25830212/Materialism-Expanded-
and-Remixed).
6 Morton, “Materialism Expanded and Remixed,” 3.
7 Morton, “Materialism Expanded and Remixed,” 4. 
8 Levi Bryant, “The Ecological Thought,” larvalsubjects.wordpress.
com/2010/06/16/the-ecological-thought/, accessed June 23, 2010.
In the “Editor’s Introduction,” Anthony Paul Smith and Daniel Whistler declare that this volume is 
“concerned with contaminations” (2). In a Deleuzian sense, it 
might be stated that this volume is about connections. How-
ever, the connections enacted in After the Postsecular and the 
Postmodern are not concerned with treading a familiar line 
of critical thought in the field that is largely understood as 
“philosophy of religion”; neither are these connections merely 
alluded to. Instead, the book itself embodies an alternative 
and peculiar manifestation of “speculative philosophy of 
religion” as a discipline that is eminently concerned with the 
“practice of philosophy which avoids dissolving into theology 
or becoming a tool of theological thought” (2). 
Throughout the twenty essays (including the “Editor’s In-
troduction” and the “Afterword”) a consistent (though some-
times silent) theme is that the field designated “Continental 
Philosophy of Religion” has, in many respects, been contami-
nated by theological thought, which has since peppered said 
literature with commitments to religious superstition and 
metaphysical transcendence. With the increased popular-
ity of the French Phenomenological tradition’s attention to 
theology, philosophers such as Merold Westphal, James K. A. 
Smith, Richard Kearney, John Caputo, and Bruce Ellis Benson 
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have attended considerably to philosophers in said field (as 
well as others) in order to bridge the divide that (supposedly) 
exists tout court between philosophy and theology. The oft-
seen result is a “theoligisation” of philosophy, with the latter 
performing a supportive role to the principle characters of 
God, liturgy, and the church. This is seen most explicitly in 
those outspoken opponents of modern secular thought—the 
loosely affiliated group known as Radical Orthodoxy. The 
result of the connections and contaminations of the essays 
contained in this volume however skirt such “postsecular” 
tendencies in favor of a renewed and vigorous approach to 
the future hope of a true Modernity; one that retains the hope 
for the New that lit the West afire post Descartes, that has 
learned from its postmodern critics, but that doesn’t fall into 
either crude reductive materialism or fideism. The result is 
a collection of essays that gel together to create a symphonic 
piece that resists the pitfalls of the “theological turn” (while 
often critically engaging with those who carry said mantle) 
and that embodies an alternative understanding of philosophy 
of religion itself as a speculative philosophical discipline. 
Divided into three sections, this volume is self-professedly 
modeled upon Deleuze’s “account of the liberation and auto-
mutation of philosophy of religion” (6); and as such stresses 
modernity, secularity, and speculative philosophy. The first section 
therefore stresses “the significance of the early modern period 
for philosophical thinking about God” (6). For example, the 
first essay by Rocco Gangle outlines the “chimerical” sense 
of Spinoza’s Ethics, whereby the latter employs medieval 
Scholastic and early modern philosophical terminology in 
new ways (i.e. through new connections) to the end that “new 
syntactical practices and systematically constructed relations” 
(26) might alter presupposed philosophical methods and 
assumptions. Two such terms that undergo the chimerical 
process in Spinoza, according to Gangle, are individuation 
and affect. The former term had been generally understood 
as a process arising at (what Deleuze would call) the molar 
level. However, Gangle demonstrates the radical move of 
Spinoza toward immanence: “For Spinoza...individuation 
is conceived independently of any witnessing conscious-
ness and without reference to any transcendental unity of 
experience...[Individuation] is an event immanent to the 
unique causal order of universal Nature, or God, and is not a 
function of any subjective-objective or noetic-noematic cor-
relate or polarity” (33). By placing individuation pre-subject-
object, Spinoza sketched an affective metaphysics of dynamic 
physical processes within the Real (in a Lauruellian sense, 
by whom Gangle’s reading of Spinoza is greatly influenced). 
Therefore, while there are differences among bodies, at the 
core there is “an underlying continuity of nature” (34). This 
interplay of dynamical processes allows us, Gangle claims, 
to better understand the sense of affects in Ethics: “Spinozist 
affects are defined as capacities of bodies to affect and to be 
affected by other bodies in all specifically determined ways...
It is impossible to distinguish what a thing is from what it 
does...The essence or nature of a thing, for Spinoza, becomes 
understood as the sum of its internal and external affects” 
(37). According to Gangle, the resultant affective monism 
that Spinoza advances disorientates the transcendental 
presupposition that has shaped most of the philosophical 
tradition, “namely the very presupposition that thought is 
itself governed transcendentally” (38). In this disorientat-
ing chimerical project, Gangle sees hope for thought itself. 
Through a “strategy of the chimera,” Gangle envisions that 
it would be possible to overcome, for example, the duality 
of theological orthodoxy/heterodoxy altogether, in favor of 
a “new instrument of affectivity and a new employment of 
thought” (41). As he summarizes in the closing paragraph, 
“Immanence does not realize one possible figure of thought. It 
is not a framework, template, or schema. It does not interpret. 
It unlocks. And thought’s every real future remains foreclosed 
if thinking itself is not first made truly free” (42). 
Throughout the remaining five chapters in the opening 
section, similar excursions are taken through modern think-
ers such as Irish Philosopher John Toland, Schelling, Kant, 
Bergson, Rozenzweig, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger. Though 
the specific task changes, each essay in this section functions 
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very much like the task outlined by Gangle in Spinoza’s Ethics: 
an unlocking of thought that (1) highlights the oft-neglected 
speculative intent of modern philosophy of religion and that 
(2) challenges the notion and content of the “secular” in mod-
ern philosophy of religion. The goal of the first section is to 
therefore rethink and reenact key modern thinkers through 
creating new connections in order to allow the resultant 
philosophical machines of “Modernity” to affect anew what 
Continental Philosophy of Religion might become. 
The second section continues the process of disorientation 
by reformulating the sense of secularity. Thus, the claim is that 
the modern “secular” is only “secular” to a degree because of 
its emergence from a profoundly Judeo-Christian heritage. 
Instead, the essays in this section attempt think anew the 
secular which “takes up the modern emancipation of philoso-
phy in the service of a new speculative construction of a true 
secular. This requires a reconsideration of discussions of the 
secular in modernity so as to take up what is most powerful 
therein, and recast it in a new critical form” (15). While the 
second section continues the process of the first, there is a 
substantial leap forward by way of the overall project of the 
volume. It might be best to view the first section as the open-
ing act, where characters are introduced, plots are developed, 
and dynamic tension is established. In other words, there is a 
clear script that is followed (for the most part, although some 
improvisation is included). The second section however is 
where the actors break script and begin to create. The essays 
in this section bring together a cacophony of voices: Asad, 
Deleuze, Bergson, Hegel, Agamben, Badiou, Jambet, Foucault, 
Feuerbach, Virno, Hägglund, Bataille, and others are all em-
ployed to architect a secularism that is “located equally in all 
religious traditions” rather than the present post-Christian 
secularity that subversively insists in the hands of Western 
powers (16). With great articles by Daniel Barber, John Mul-
larkey, Clare Greer, Adam Kotsko, Albert Toscano, Nina Power, 
and Alex Andrews, this section (for me) is the strongest and 
most intriguing section, as well as the most explicitly political. 
The final section of the volume is by far the most audacious 
of the lot. If the second section is where the actors begin to 
create, then the final section can only be considered “philoso-
phia dell’arte.” Contributing to the burgeoning speculative 
movement in contemporary philosophy, this section follows 
a similar vein to the work of Harman, Grant, Brassier, and 
Meillassoux. Of particular notice for readers of Speculations 
are the essays by Anthony Paul Smith, Michael Burns, and 
Daniel Whistler, who all engage with figures who have had 
considerable influence on the current speculative trend in 
philosophy. Smith’s essay considers the radical immanence of 
François Laruelle’s non-philosophy and the possible implica-
tions the latter might have on constructing a non-theology 
that thinks from the Real (rather than of the Real) and what 
such a non-theology might be able to offer the future of a 
truly secular philosophy of religion that resists succumb-
ing to the sufficiency of religious material. As one of the few 
English-speaking expositors of Laruelle’s non-philosophy, 
Smith’s essay is a real treat for those interested in teasing out 
the former’s thought as developed in Brassier’s Nihil Unbound. 
Likewise, Michael’s Burns’ essay spends considerable time 
developing a Kierkegaardian reading of Meillassoux’s After 
Finitude that attempts to supplement the shortcomings of the 
latter’s “divinology” (i.e. God-as-possible) with a ŽiŽekian-
Kierkegaardian inspired materialism that posits God as 
possibility itself. Then arguing against the “radical atheism” 
of Martin Hägglund, Burns turns to Badiou’s concept of 
“materialist dialectics” in order to advance a philosophy of 
infinitude that both escapes the drab “bio-material struggle 
for life” (of Hägglund) and that remains committed to Meil-
lassoux’s notion that “anything is possible.” Finally, Whistler’s 
article addresses in what a speculative approach to religion 
might consist. The path he takes to answering this question 
is through the work of F. W. J. Schelling. Engaging with the 
work of Ian Hamilton Grant, Whistler asks of speculative 
philosophy in general and of Grant’s philosophy of nature in 
particular: “Do [they] have the range and capacity to provide 
an adequate account of religion” (339)? Through a “phys-
ics of language” and geology, Whistler develops Schelling’s 
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Naturphilosophie to show how religious studies, philology, and 
geology are physically related and therefore “have the same 
ground (the unruly) and are generated by the same subject 
(productive nature)” (354). This leads to the conclusion that 
both “language and religion are subjected to the speculative 
process: they are incorporated as regional subjects of an 
overarching, unconditioned Naturphilosophie” (354). 
Although only a select few of the essays were highlighted 
above, each one of the essays in the volume offers a consider-
able amount to the overall project of After the Postsecular and 
the Postmodern and to the future of Continental Philosophy of 
Religion. Whether or not one agrees with the various writers 
of the volume, the “chimerical” process of the project will 
surely provide fodder for future debate. That said, I highly 
recommend this volume for anyone interested in current 
developments in “Continental Philosophy.” Whether it’s read 
straight through or used piecemeal, this volume is a neces-
sary tool for thinkers interested in the future of speculative 
philosophy.  (For those interested, the editors have provided 
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